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ABSTRACT 
 
Directors’ remuneration has been subjected to continuous study by researchers in 
different fields such as accounting, management, human resource and psychology. 
Accounting scholars primarily based their research on agency theory. Recent papers 
focused on the affect of corporate governance on the determination of directors’ 
remuneration.  
 
This study aims to investigate the effect of three main variables on directors’ 
remuneration – corporate governance variables, human capital attributes and firm 
performance. The study controls the effect of firm size, type of industry, leverage, 
diversification and location. 417 (50%) Malaysian public listed companies were 
selected using stratified random sampling for three years period from 2004 to 2006. 
Only non-financial companies are included in the sample because financial companies 
are subjected to different set of regulations in Malaysia.   
 
Using multiple regression method, it is found that seven corporate governance 
variables are significantly related to directors’ remuneration. The study shows that 
board size, CEO-chairman duality role, proportion of independent directors and 
proportion of interlocking directors in the board are significantly related to directors’ 
remuneration. Proportion of non-executive directors in the board, percentage of 
indirect directors’ shareholding and percentage of block holders’ shareholdings are 
found to be negatively related to directors’ remuneration. Of the three human capital 
attributes studied, only executive directors’ average age and tenure are found to be 
significantly related to the level of directors’ remuneration. No evidence was found to 
conclude the role of qualification towards level of directors’ remuneration.  
 
The model used was tested for its robustness using different set of alternative 
measures for some of its key variables. Corrections were also made to address other 
common problems associated with multiple regression such as outliers, non-normality 
of residuals, heteroscedasticity and multicollinearity. Finally, the study extends the 
analysis by running fixed effect model in order to control for firm specific effects. 
There are few discrepancies between the pooled regression model and fixed effect 
model result but this may be caused by little variation over time among governance 
variables. Finally, the findings further supports the agency theory by showing that, 
among Malaysian companies, performance still plays significant role in determining 
rewards for its directors 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Background of the study 
 
The evolving literature on directors’ remuneration has spanned across a number of 
disciplines, such as accounting, economics, finance, industrial relations, law, 
organisational behaviour, psychology and strategy. Hallock and Murphy (1999) 
document the escalating number of academic papers published on directors’ 
remuneration based on their search in the Social Science Citation Index database. 
They observed only one to two papers was published annually prior to 1985 but sixty 
papers were written on the subject by the year 1995.  The sudden burst of interest on 
executive remuneration is parallel to the emerging trends of separation of ownership 
and control in modern corporation and general acceptance of agency theory (Murphy 
1999).   
 
Voluminous of studies have attempted to relate directors’ remuneration and corporate 
performance since the early 1960s till now (for instance Marris 1963; Williamson 
1964; Gregg et al 1993; Conyon and Leech 1994; Conyon et al 1995; Deckop 1998; 
Eriksson 2000). In fact, Bender (2004) quoted Taussig and Barker’s paper in 1925 as 
the earliest study on remuneration. However, the results found are inconclusive 
(Barkema and Gomez-Mejia 1998). Some studies found strong relationship between 
remuneration and performance (for instance Lewellan and Huntsman 1970; Main et. 
al 1996; Deckop 1998), some found weak relationship (for instance Main 1991; 
Conyon 1997; Finkelstein & Boyd 1998; Buck 2003) while others found no 
12 
 
significant relationship at all (for instance Gregg et. al 1993; Ezzamel & Watson 
1997).    
 
The main reasons for such inconclusive findings among scholars on this topic are the 
variety of techniques and analysis employed by researchers. Tosi et. al (2000) 
conducted a meta analysis on 137 studies that examined CEO pay. They found 16 
different measures of company size and 30 different measures of company 
performance. They conclude that: 
“..different methods of collection, different statistical techniques, 
different samples, the presence of moderator variables and 
difference in how the constructs of interest have been 
operationalised in the various studies” (p. 305)   
 
Pavlik et al (1993) provided a good summary of thirty-one studies from 1962 to 1993 
that attempted to link performance and directors’ remuneration.  However, most of the 
studies were conducted in developed countries, particularly in the US, thus suffers 
from North American perspective bias (Werner and Ward 2004). In the Asian context, 
or developing economies in general, research in this area is still lacking.  
 
Beside performance, substantial number of studies tested the link between director’s 
remuneration and corporate size (for instance Agrawal 1981; Murphy 1985; D’Orio 
2001), industry (Ely 1991), diversification (Cordeiro and Veliyath 2003; Chen 2004), 
risk (Core et. al 1999; Abdullah 2006) and human capital attributes such as director’s 
tenure and age (for instance McKnight and Tomkins 2004; Clarkson et. al 2005; 
Abdullah 2006). Majority of these studies involve testing hypotheses and developing 
model to explain director’s remuneration. The hypotheses developed are mostly based 
on the agency theory (Indjejikian 1999).  
13 
 
Duffhues and Kabir (2008) suggest in their vigorous study on pay performance link 
that other ways of resolving agency problem is needed. In recent years, governance 
structure was identified as another complementary factor to control directors’ in their 
decision, including remuneration. For instance, studies have looked at the affect of 
firms’ ownership (Hambrick and Finkelstein 1995; Holderness 2003) and board 
characteristics (Boyd 1994; Core et. al 1999; Hermalin and Weisbach 2003) on 
directors’ remuneration. In general, they found that the governance structure of the 
company affects the level of directors’ remuneration.   
 
Despite the fact that numerous studies has been conducted in this area for nearly six 
decade, scholars find research in this area is far from end, in particular from the 
emerging market perspective (Barkema and Gomez-Mejia 1998; Werner and Ward 
2004). The importance of linking the governance structure and other variables to 
explain directors’ remuneration becomes even more imperative as the public demands 
to know the justification for increasing pay to directors. This study extends this line of 
research and examines the determining factors that explain executive directors’ 
remuneration in emerging markets such as Malaysia, focusing on three important 
factors; governance structure, human capital attributes and firm performance.  
 
The investigation on how these three variables affect executive directors’ 
remuneration in Malaysia is motivated by three factors. First, Malaysia has 
experienced tremendous change in its governance settings after the Asian financial 
crisis in 1997. Among the changes made were introduction of Malaysian Code of 
Corporate Governance, revamping of legal and stock exchange listing requirements 
and establishment of new bodies to improve the governance structure in Malaysia 
14 
 
such as Malaysian Institute of Corporate Governance (MICG) and Minority 
Shareholders Watch Group (MSWG)
1
. Previous empirical studies have established 
that governance structures have strong influence on CEO compensation (Core et. al 
1999; Davila and Penalva 2006). It is argued that additional agency cost associated 
with governance structure is needed in order to govern the executive directors from 
exerting their bargaining power to write optimal contracts that are more favourable to 
his or her interests. However, limited number of studies of this kind is conducted in 
other emerging and less developed countries. Rosen (1990) urged scholars to broaden 
their scope to other countries other than the US. Hence, it is important to examine 
whether such case applicable in emerging economies like Malaysia.  
 
Second, Malaysia placed very much weight on human capital development, 
particularly though training and education. This is translated in the form of yearly 
national budget, in which significant amount of money was allocated for education. 
For instance, in Malaysian Budget 2007 and 2008, RM 33.4 billion RM30 billion 
respectively were allocated for education sector. In addition, MCCG recommends a 
board should be made up of a combination of executive directors, with their intimate 
knowledge of the business and of outside non-executive directors, who can bring a 
broader view to the company’s activities. Furthermore, companies must ensure that 
the succession planning is carried out in order to ensure the highest calibre person is 
appointed. MCCG also recommends directors should receive further training from 
time to time, particularly on relevant new laws and regulations and changing 
commercial risks also are encouraged to go for training. It is therefore expected that 
                                                 
1
 The details of these changes are presented in Chapter 2. 
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such emphasis on human capital attributes would have an effect on the directors’ 
remuneration.  
 
Third, the figure of directors’ remuneration attracts widespread attention from the 
Malaysian public and investors. Based on the KPMG’s survey on Malaysian public 
listed companies directors’ remuneration in 2001, the total aggregate of directors’ 
payout in 639 Malaysian public listed companies has grown by 23% from RM 1.3 
billion to RM 1.6 billion (2005-2006) (Kaur, 2007, pp.16-17).  The public perceived 
such increment should be reflected by directors’ performance. Furthermore, MCCG 
recommends that the executive directors’ remuneration should be linked to corporate 
or individual performance.   
 
1.2 Objective of the study 
 
The main objective of this study is to determine the key variables that explain the 
level of directors’ remuneration in Malaysia. In particular, this study intends to know 
whether (i) governance structure affects the level of directors’ remuneration; (ii) 
human capital attributes of the directors affect the level of directors’ remuneration; 
and (iii) firm performance affects the level of directors’ remuneration. Other 
significant factors previously taken into consideration in earlier studies such as firm 
size, industry, diversification, location and risk will be used as control variables.  
 
Hence, this study contributes to the understanding of the role of governance structure, 
human capital attributes and firm performance in explaining the level of directors’ 
remuneration. At the end of the study, it is hoped that the role of corporate 
governance structure and performance can be linked to explain executive director’s 
16 
 
remuneration. This research is distinctive in the sense that it contributes from the 
perspective of emerging economy.  
 
Using a combination of agency theory and human capital theory, the study attempts to 
answer three main research questions: 
 
1) Is governance structure of company affects the level of directors’ remuneration? 
Specifically, is the board characteristics and firm ownership affects the level of 
directors remuneration? The board characteristics considered in this study are (i) 
board size and effectiveness (measured by board size and frequency of board 
meetings); (ii) board independence (measured by proportion of independent 
directors in board, proportion of independent directors in audit committee, 
proportion of independent directors in remuneration committee and proportion of 
non executive directors in board); (iii) board composition (measured by proportion 
of interlocking directors, proportion of old non executive directors and proportion 
of busy non executive directors) and (iv) board leadership (measured by CEO-
Chairman dual role). The ownership structures used in the study are direct 
managerial ownership, indirect managerial ownership and outside block holder 
ownership.  
 
2) Is human capital attributes of the director affects the level of their remuneration? 
This study will examine three aspects of human capital attributes, namely age, 
tenure and qualification.  
 
3) Is corporate performance affects the level of executive directors’ remuneration?  
 
17 
 
Besides the above key variables, there are other control variables that will be used in 
determining the level of executive directors’ remuneration such as firm size, firm 
diversification, industry and firm risk. These variables are expected to have 
significant effect on directors’ remuneration.  
 
1.3 Scope of the study 
 
The study covers the sample from Malaysian listed companies only. Foreign 
companies listed in Bursa Malaysia are excluded because their practices maybe 
influence by their home country’s practice and regulation. The sample also excludes 
banks and financial institutions as they are guided by addition rules and regulation 
that are unique to this industry alone. The period in which this study is undertaken is 
from 2004 to 2006 inclusive. Prior to 2001, the disclosure on director’s remuneration 
in Malaysia was not yet established. Year 2002 and 2003 are considered as grace 
period for companies to act on MCCG’s recommendation thus not included in this 
study.  
 
This study only uses the total board remuneration rather than CEO, and other 
directors’ remuneration separately. This is due to limited disclosure by Malaysian 
listed companies despite recommendation by the MCCG to disclose directors’ 
remuneration individually. However, Dogan and Smyth (2002) argued the use of total 
board remuneration is better proxy for executive remuneration because the board as a 
whole will affects corporate performance.   
18 
 
 
1.4 Research Methodology 
 
This research employs quantitative approach. The first part of the study involves 
research on the theory and existing literature on directors’ remuneration and its 
contributing factors. Based on this, a set of hypotheses are developed. For each of the 
factors identified, at least one proxy is selected to measure that factor. In some cases, 
a few proxies are selected in order to get the best proxy for that factor. Having a few 
proxies also enabled sensitivity analysis and robustness tests to be carried out. This 
will enhance the final results of the study.  
  
Based on the secondary data obtained from annual reports of sampled companies, 
multiple regression is used to test the research hypotheses presented in chapter 3 and 
answer the research questions stated earlier in section 1.2.  This method is chosen 
mainly due to the limitation of both data and access to the directors (Ewers 2002). 
Very few studies (for instance Bender 2004) adopted interview survey in this topic. 
However, Bender (2004) spent over one year and a half to conduct the interviews 
alone but only managed to interview few respondents, mainly through her contact 
from her previous employment. In addition to the multiple regression, the error term 
of the regression is further analysed using panel data analysis. The use of panel data 
analysis enables further clarification of the effect of firm characteristics of firms from 
the normal cross section regression.  
 
This study covers the period from 2004 to 2006 inclusive. An initial total number of 
816 listed companies in Bursa Malaysia were selected as at the end of year 2003. 
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Accordingly, the number was reduced in order to exclude all foreign companies, 
bank, insurance and unit trust companies. A sample of 50% of companies from each 
industry was selected. The study only includes companies that survive for the entire 
period of study. In other words, new listed companies and insolvent companies during 
the three year period are excluded from the study.  
 
1.5 Significance of the study 
 
Corporate governance code was established in order to realign and guard 
shareholders’ interest by governing the management. This study will provide 
empirical evidence on the level and effectiveness of corporate governance in Malaysia 
from the perspective of executive directors’ remuneration. According to agency 
theory, directors’ remuneration is one of the most effective ways to keep managers 
and shareholder’s interest in line. Thus, the findings of this study will enhance 
confidence among investors, in particular foreign and institutional investors to invest 
in Malaysia. In short, the findings will indirectly contribute towards the development 
and economic activities in Malaysia.  
 
The findings of this study also will expand and benefit the foreign investors as they 
are more aware and able to expand their choices to invest according to the level of 
corporate governance in overseas market. This is inevitable as more newly developing 
economies countries become more influential in shaping the global economy. 
 
From the academic perspective, the study will provide evidence on the level of 
executive compensation practices with governance structure, human capital attributes 
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and company performance. It tests whether agency theory and human capital theory 
are applicable in the context of developing country such as Malaysia.   
 
1.6 Organisation of the thesis 
 
The thesis is organised into seven chapters. The first chapter introduces the overall 
objectives, scope, the significance of the study and the research methodology 
employed. Chapter two provides an overview of the Malaysian accounting and 
corporate governance environment. 
 
Chapter three covers the theories and existing literature on the corporate governance 
issue, both in developed and developing countries. Based on the literatures and 
theories, hypotheses development is also presented concurrently in this chapter.   
These two chapters will further illustrate evidence on the need and importance to 
conduct the present study.  
 
Chapter four explains the methodology used in the study. It includes the research 
design, sample selection, modelling specifications and definitions of variables and 
measurements. This chapter also explains the statistical methods used in this study, 
namely multiple regression and panel data analysis.   
 
Chapter five and six will present the results of secondary data analysis. In Chapter 
five, the results of descriptive and bivariate analysis will be presented. Chapter six 
will explain the findings of multivariate analysis. The discussion of the findings is 
done concurrently with the analysis. 
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The final chapter summarised the main findings of the study and provide the overall 
conclusion of the study. Suggestion for future research and limitations of the study are 
also presented in this chapter.   
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND DIRECTORS’ REMUNERATION IN 
MALAYSIA 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter two aims to provide a general understanding on Malaysia particularly, on its 
corporate sector and corporate governance environment. This chapter will present a 
general institutional framework of this study. It illustrates the unique and special 
characteristics to study Malaysian corporate governance and executive directors’ 
remuneration in contrast to those in the West. The chapter is divided into six sections. 
Sections 2.2 commence a brief discussion on Malaysian social and economic 
background. Section 2.3 discusses Malaysian corporate sector, Section 2.4 provides 
background on corporate sector in Malaysia and Section 2.5 outlines the Malaysian 
corporate governance system followed by Malaysian corporate governance settings 
prior and after Asian Crisis in 1997 in section 2.6. Finally, section 2.7 presents the 
summary and conclusion of the chapter.    
 
2.2 Social-Economic Background  
 
Malaysia (formerly known as ‘Malaya’) is located in the South East Asia. It is a 
federation of thirteen states: eleven states are located in the Peninsular Malaysia and 
the remaining two in the northern part of Borneo Island. Malaysia has an estimated 
total population of 25.3 million in 2005. There are three main ethnic communities in 
Malaysia: Malay, Chinese and Indian.  
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Malaysian social and economy were greatly influenced by its previous colony 
masters: Portuguese, Dutch and British. These colonial masters were drawn primarily 
to Malaysia due to the richness and prosperity of the port of Malacca, a well-known 
business hub for traders from various countries such as Arabs, Chinese, Indians, 
Malays and Persians. By the end of 15th century, Malacca hosted some 15,000 
merchants, and it is claimed that there were more ships in the harbour than any other 
ports in the then known world (Md Ali 2001).  Under the colonial masters ruling, in 
particular the British, the three main ethnic in Malaysia was purposely separated in 
order to prevent inter-ethnic unity – Malays concentrate on paddy field thus reside in 
rural areas; Chinese dominates the timber extractions activities, thus reside in the big 
cities; and Indians work and reside in rubber estates. This British ‘divide and rule’ 
policy creates economic imbalance between the ethnic. The policy ensures significant 
separation of occupational and economic activities, spatial development and cultural 
attributes (Rasiah 1997). Other differences such as language, religion, residence and 
dietary habits contribute more towards the disparity (Young et al 1980: 11).  
 
On 31 August 1957, Malaysia gained her independence after numerous negotiations 
between the British and leaders representing major ethnic groups like United Malays 
National Organisation (UMNO) (representing Malays), Malaysian Chinese 
Association (MCA) (representing Chinese) and Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) 
(representing Indians). The final agreements were documented in Malaysian 
constitutional whereby Malays and other minority ethnic groups originated from 
Malaysia such as Iban, Murut and Orang Asli (known as ‘bumiputera’) were given 
privileges in most economic, political and social spheres while Chinese and Indians 
were given nationality in Malaysia without questions.  
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The economic imbalance inherited from the colony masters remains the main concern 
of the government in the early post independence period. The occurrence of a tragic 
interracial riot on 13th May 1969 causes government to realise the importance of 
balancing the economic and status among all ethnic groups. As a result, a series of 
government policies were introduced over time, in which the first New Economic 
Policy (NEP) was launch in 1971. The main aim of this policy is to restore equal 
economic, social and asset ownership distribution amongst major ethnics in Malaysia.  
 
Other later policies are concerned with the promotion of industrialisation, export 
orientation, privatisation and foreign investment (Jomo 1997). As a result of these 
policies, certain bodies such as Permodalan Nasional Berhad (PNB) through its 
subsidiaries Amanah Saham Bumiputra (ASB) and Amanah Saham Nasional (ASN) 
was set up to increase bumiputera ownership. FELDA and FELCRA were established 
to help bumiputera increase their income and economic status by opening new areas 
for rubber and palm oil plantations. PERWAJA and HICOM and were later founded 
to promote industrialisation. The government also identified several areas as Free 
Trade Zones to support export among manufacturing industries. Privatisation occurred 
in the late 1980s, where several public enterprises like telecommunication 
(TELEKOM) and utilities (TENAGA) were made public. Foreign investment 
restrictions on equity in manufacturing industries were relinquished in order to 
promote foreign investment (IMF 1999).  
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2.3 Economic Development 
 
In its early years after independence, Malaysian economy continued to focus on the 
tin and rubber industries, whereby 75% of exports earnings were derived from these 
industries (Baharumshah and Rashid 1999: 389). However, the economy underwent 
radical transformation over the three decades since her independence time. The initial 
dependency on a few primary commodities such as tin and rubber has changed over 
the years with manufacturing sector dominating the national output and employment 
(Mohamed Arif 1991: 7).  Currently, Malaysia is also known as one of the ‘South 
East Asian tiger’ for her very fast economic development and become the envy and 
role model of many other developing countries.   
 
It was mentioned in Section 2.2 that government policies were implemented and 
contributed significantly to the overall economic condition during 1980s and 1990s. 
Two world economic recessions in 1981-1982 and in 1985-1986 had slowed down the 
economic development in Malaysia. Despite this, Malaysia continues to gain 
economic growth and the private sectors replacing the public sector to generate 
strength to the Malaysian economy. In 1990s, manufacturing sector become the 
primary sectors that driving the growth of the economy. This sector observes a steady 
growth at an average of eight percent per year from 1990 to 1997. During this period, 
Malaysia recorded a constant increment of its per capita income, low inflation rates 
and gradual decrease of poverty among the public.  
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2.4 Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 
 
The financial crisis in the late 1997 has greatly affected Malaysian economy, 
particularly its equity market. The Malaysian currency, Ringgit Malaysia (RM) 
deflated from a peak exchange rate of RM2.493 to US$1 in April 1997 to its lowest 
rate of RM4.88 on 7 January 1998. As a result, the market capitalisation of Bursa 
Malaysia Berhad (BMB) (formerly known as the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange) 
dropped significantly from RM807 billion in 1996 to RM376 billion in 1997 and 
further to RM182 billion in 1998. Most of the companies’ equity or share prices fall 
drastically from 1300 points of the stock index in February 1997 to 262 points on 2 
September 1998, on the day after the announcement of capital controls by the 
government (Jomo 2001).  
 
The crisis causes the public; in particular investors lose confidence on the local stock 
market, corporate governance and financial reporting system as a whole. This is 
reflected on the cash flow movement where the country observes a significant 
decrease in capital inflows and increase in capital outflows. In addition, the crisis led 
interest rates to increase and Malaysian Ringgit to depreciate against other currencies.  
 
There are two possible reasons to explain why the financial crisis took place (Bank 
Negara Report (1998: 11-16). First, the crisis was caused by domestic policy 
weaknesses such as overheated economies, fixed exchange rates, exorbitant public 
sector spending, large account deficits, speculative property and stock markets, poor 
risk management techniques resulting in poor-quality investments and non-
performing loans, unhedged borrowing by local corporations of short-term foreign 
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capital dominated in foreign currencies, inadequate financial sector supervision and 
lack of transparency in data. The proponents of this argument include International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, Paul Krugman and Rudi Dornbusch.  
 
Second reason is supported by Jeffrey Sachs and regulators in Malaysia and Hong 
Kong that the financial crisis was caused by external factors, particularly on 
weaknesses in the international financial system. The proponents of this argument 
believed that the crisis was lead by massive movements of portfolio capital by highly 
leveraged institutional investors that besieged small financial markets in Asia. This 
later led chaos among investors that further exacerbate the capital flows and created 
mismatch of maturities and currencies of Asian borrowers (Bhattacharya 2001). 
     
The Asian financial crisis in 1997 causes the Malaysian government to take several 
measures to revive and stabilise the economy including strengthening the level of 
corporate governance in Malaysia. Among the important measures are the 
incorporation of National Economic Action Council (NEAC) on 7th January 1998 to 
consult the Cabinet and set up a National Economic Recovery Plan (NERP). The plan 
contains a detailed framework for economic recovery, including recommendations to 
government on how to restore the economy and prevent it from going into recession. 
At the same time, in order to create a framework for corporate governance in 
Malaysia, the government established the Finance Committee on Corporate 
Governance (FCCG) on 24th March 1998. The members of this high level committee 
consisted of both government and industry. The key task of the committee was to 
establish a framework for corporate governance and to set the best practices for the 
industry (Report on Corporate Governance 1999).  
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In addition, Danaharta and Danamodal were incorporated to offer companies or 
organisation restructuring plans and to take over the non-performing loans (NPLs) of 
local banking institutions. Danaharta is an asset management company and was set up 
to remove large NPLs from the worst affected banks and financial institutions. In 
total, Danaharta has acquired RM23.1 billions NPLs, accounting of 31.8 per cent of 
the total NPLs in the banking system, thus successfully reducing the level of NPLs to 
12.4 per cent (Mahani 2000). This step is necessary in order to restart the economy, as 
bankers are allowed to focus more on lending rather than on debt collecting. On the 
other hand, Danamodal deals with restoring liquidity to the banking system by 
injecting funds to financial institutions, thus pre-empting potential systematic risks to 
the financial sector (Jomo 2001). A total of RM6.4 billion was injected to ten 
financial institutions. As a result, the capital adequacy ratio of the banking system was 
increased to 12.7 per cent; exceeding the international recognised standard of 8 per 
cent (Mahani 2000). Further discussion on corporate governance reform after Asian 
crisis will be presented in section 2.5.2.  
 
The economic growth finally improves in 2002 after experiencing a negative growth 
in 1998 and 1999 and a stall in 2001. The real gross domestic product (GDP) between 
2002 and 2004 showed an improvement whereby the growth was recorded at 4.1% in 
2002, 5.4% in 2003 and 7.1% in 2004. In 2005, the real GDP growth declines to 5.3% 
but is projected to increase to 5.5% in 2006 due to strong private consumption and the 
ongoing recovery of fixed private investment (IMF Survey 2006). 
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2.5 Corporate Sector 
 
Malaysian corporate sector in the post independence period was initially controlled by 
British capital through its large companies such as Guthrie Corporation, Sime Darby 
and Renong. The companies operated in various industries like plantation, mining, 
agency housing, rubber and timber extraction. These companies were initially traded 
in the London Stock Exchange and later obtained a second listing on the Malaysian 
and Singaporean Stock Exchange. The formation of Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange 
(now known as Bursa Malaysian Berhad) in 1973 creates a market place to trade for 
shares, bonds and other forms of financial instruments of listed companies.  
 
During 1970s and 1980s, the government employ several entities to take over these 
companies in order to increase bumiputera’s entities. For instance, Sime Darby and 
London Tin (now known as Malaysia Mining Corporation Bhd) were taken over by 
Permodalan Nasional Berhad (PNB) and Perbadanan Nasional Berhad (PERNAS) 
(Thillainathan 1999). Similarly, in the banking sector, the government holds majority 
of rights in three biggest banks in Malaysia at that time, Malayan Banking Berhad, 
Bank Bumiputera Berhad and United Malayan Banking Corporation Berhad (Sori 
2005).  
 
In the 1990s, Malaysian corporate sectors expanded. A number of listed companies in 
Bursa Malaysia grew from 285 in 1990 to 708 companies in 1997, particularly due to 
the new launch of second board of KLSE, whereby smaller companies with good 
growth prospects are allowed to enter to capital market. The Asian Financial Crisis in 
1997/98 slowed down the growth of listed companies as only 28 new companies are 
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listed in 1998. Table 2.1 presents the breakdown of new companies listed in Bursa 
Malaysia from 1990 to 2005 according to the board. By the end of 2005, 1,021 
companies were listed in Bursa Malaysia. Figure 2.1 shows the number of new 
companies listed in Bursa Malaysia from 2001 to 2005.  
 
 
Figure 2.1. Total Number of Listed Companies and Total Number of New Listed 
companies in Bursa Malaysia Berhad 2001 to 2006. 
 
  
 
Source: 
http://www.bursamalaysia.com/website/bm/listed_companies/ipos/listing_statistics.ht
ml as at 5 February 2007 
 
At present, there are two dominant categories of public listed companies in Malaysia: 
(i) large privatised entities such as Telekom Malaysia, Tenaga Nasional and Petronas 
Dagangan; and (ii) smaller-sized companies which are mainly owner-dominated 
enterprises, seeking new avenues for raising capital (Report on Corporate Governance 
1999: 42). Thus, the corporate sector in Malaysia comprises of companies with unique 
characteristics and different from other capital market in developed countries. This 
further justifies the importance of studying corporate governance in Malaysia, in 
particular of its executive remuneration aspect.   
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2.6 Corporate Governance System in Malaysia 
 
There are two main systems of corporate governance: insider system and outsider 
system. The insider system refers to a system with the following characteristics: (i) 
high concentration of ownership; (ii) the corporate sector has controlling interests in 
itself; (iii) the number of listed companies is relatively small; (iv) the capital market is 
illiquid due to dominant controlling block holdings rather than trading; (v) large 
number of holdings or interlocked companies acting to deter outsiders from acquiring 
control; and (vi) major shareholders typically also part of active management team 
and have large influence over the major decision in the company. Majority of 
countries in the world, including continental Europe and Asia belong to this system. 
On the other hand, the outsider system refers to a system where ownership and control 
remain with the outside party, usually institutional investors. This system applies in 
the US and the UK.  
 
2.7 Corporate Governance Settings in Malaysia 
 
This section is divided into two parts in order to establish the significant improvement 
on the corporate governance settings in Malaysia after Asian financial crisis 1997. 
The first part explains the corporate governance settings in Malaysia prior to the 
Asian financial crisis in 1997 and the later part presents the corporate governance 
settings after the Asian financial crisis 1997.  
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2.7.1 Prior to Asian Crisis 1997 
 
Prior to the financial crisis in 1997, Malaysia had established its corporate governance 
framework in pieces. There was a combination of statutory legislation as well as stock 
exchange requirements that governs the corporate sector in Malaysia. It inherited a 
strong common law system, including corporate law system from the British. It also 
adapted changes to its law based on new development from other commonwealth 
jurisdictions with variations to suit local environment. The initial establishment of 
corporate governance requirements in Malaysia can be traced back to 1965 in which 
the Companies Act was enacted. 
 
Beside statutory legislation and stock exchange requirements, accounting standards 
also play an important role in shaping the level of corporate governance in Malaysia. 
However, the accounting standards were not legally enforced to all companies but 
rather to the members of professional bodies like Malaysian Institute of Accountant 
(MIA) and Malaysian Association of Certified Pubic Accountants (MACPA) until 
1997. Prior to the enactment of Financial Reporting Act 1997 (FRA), the two 
professional bodies compete with each other to dominate the standard setting process. 
The following sections discuss the details of different aspects of corporate governance 
in Malaysia prior to Asian financial crisis in 1997.  
 
Legal Requirements of Capital Market 
 
There are three main acts that governed the non-financial corporate sectors in 
Malaysia: the Companies Act 1965 (CA), the Securities Industry Act 1983 (SIA) and 
the Securities Commission Act 1993 (SCA). CA becomes the foundational basis for 
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corporate governance requirement in Malaysia. The Act itself was modelled on the 
Australian Uniform Companies Act 1961 and the UK Companies Act 1948 (Craig and 
Diga, 1996). The Act governs all aspect of company law in Malaysia. It covers the 
basic principal requirements governing corporate governance practices such as 
financial disclosure, directors’ duties and liabilities and shareholders rights. For 
instance, it is stated in provision 55 and 166 of the Act about the ‘one-share-one-vote’ 
rule and the requirements governing the duties and responsibilities of directors, 
including their duties to prepare financial statement respectively. In a cross country 
study carried out in 1996, Malaysia was found to be one of only 11 countries out of 49 
which impose a genuine one-share-one-vote-rule. In 1987, Malaysian Code on Take-
overs and Mergers was gazetted under the CA 1965. This code aims to regulate 
takeovers and mergers among corporations. 
 
The Securities Industries Act 1973 (SIA) also supplements Malaysian corporate law. 
This Act was subsequently repealed and replaced by a similar Act in 1983. The 
establishment of this Act provides more protection on investor interests and more 
specific regulations on the securities industry. The SIA covers among other things, 
powers to curb excessive speculation, insider trading, market manipulation and 
enhancement of supervision and control of the industry. In addition, the SCA was also 
enacted. SCA establishes an entity called Securities Commission, which acts as a 
regulatory body for the capital market. In 1995, SCA was amended to mark the first 
move of the Malaysian regulatory regime towards a disclosure-based regime. 
 
In the banking and financial institutions sector, a specific regulation known as 
Banking and Financial Institution Act (BAFIA) 1989 was enacted. Basically, BAFIA 
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regulates the licensing and the activities of all financial institutions including money 
broking services. Two years later, the Securities Industry (Central Depositories) Act 
1991 (SICDA) was enacted. SICDA governs the maintenance and operation of a 
central depository system. Since this study did not intend to include any of the 
financial institutions, further discussion on this area is not necessary.  
 
It is apparent from the above discussion that, in terms of statutory requirements, 
Malaysia has already established a strong background to govern its corporate sectors. 
This is acknowledged by La Porta et. Al (1998) in which they found Malaysia has a 
fairly strong legal frameworks relating to corporate governance, and those governing 
creditors’ and shareholders’ protection are comparable to those of develop countries.   
It is also evident that changes have been made to these legislations in order to 
incorporate new requirements to further strengthen the corporate environment in 
Malaysia. However, no specific requirements are stated in any of these statutory 
requirements regarding any aspect of directors’ remuneration. In addition to these 
statutory requirements, companies are also bound to comply with accounting 
standards and stock exchange listing requirements. The details are presented in the 
following sections.  
 
Bursa Listing Requirements 
 
Another important aspect of corporate governance structure in Malaysia is the Bursa 
Malaysia Listing requirements (previously known as Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange 
(KLSE)). Since its incorporation in 1973, the listing requirement experience 
continuous amendment that would enhance greater control and disclosure among the 
companies. A new company seeking to be listed in KLSE would be required, among 
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other things to include minimum thresholds regarding the number of shareholders and 
the value and volume of public shares, earnings and balance sheet criteria over a 
number of years; an assessment of the potential of the firm and industry it belongs to; 
qualitative criteria regarding corporate governance; and credible documentation of 
compliance with the above criteria (Thillainathan 1999).  
 
Initially, Bursa Malaysia used merit-based system to decide which companies were 
allowed to be listed. Merit reviews are judgements by regulatory bodies on Initial 
Public Offerings (IPOs) solely on the merit of the prospective investment. Merit-
based systems usually also include a strong role for the regulatory institution in 
setting prices and allocating rights for IPOs, thus shifting the investment decision role 
from investors to the regulatory authorities. From the mid 90s, the merit- based 
system was gradually replaced by a disclosure-based regulatory regime. Under the 
disclosure-based system, the pricing of corporate offers in Malaysia was to be fully 
determined by market forces. The initial intention was to complete the 
implementation of the disclosure-based regime by the beginning of 1998. However, 
due to the regional financial crisis, the target date was moved to 1 January 2001 
(Thillainathan 1999). 
 
Over time, the listing requirements have included a number of provisions to provide 
for checks and balances to enhance transparency and accountability. For instance, it 
introduced the requirements for independent directors on boards of public listed 
companies in 1987. In 1993, a new listing rule was introduced for which every listed 
company need to establish their own audit committees. However, the rule took effect 
on the following year. Nevertheless, prior to the financial crisis, the listing 
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requirements did not stipulate any obligation to disclose any matters regarding 
directors’ remuneration.  
 
Accounting Standards 
 
Prior to 1967, there was no legislation to regulate accounting profession in Malaysia 
(Susela 1999). Thus, Malaysian Institute of Certified Public Accountants (MICPA), 
formerly known as Malaysian Association of Certified Public Accountants (MACPA), 
a private association set up in 1958 by chartered accountants from UK and Australia, 
was the only body that issues technical guidelines, provides training and sets up 
professional exams. MICPA was supported by the Big Six (now Big Four). Later, the 
Accountancy Act 1967 was enacted. The Act requires registration of accountants and 
the establishment of Malaysian Institute of Accountant (MIA). The establishment of 
MIA however did not hinder MICPA from being the forefront body in developing 
accounting standards in Malaysia until 1987. As majority of MICPA members are 
chartered accountants from UK, Malaysian accounting profession and practices are 
greatly influenced by the British accounting systems in its early years (Md Ali 1999). 
  
The accounting standard setting activities commenced in the early 1970s. However, 
during the period of 1970 to 1980, the accounting standards setting activity was very 
much an ad hoc activity as basic infrastructure was being put into place during. 
International Accounting Standards (IASs) were adopted without consideration of its 
suitability to local environment (Susela 1999). In 1987, MIA’s function was 
broadened to include its involvement in standard settings. Although the two bodies 
managed to co-operate to set accounting standards for the period of May 1987 to 
1992, disagreement among them later lead each body to pursue their own accounting 
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standards2. The matter is only resolved with the enactment of Financial Reporting Act 
(FRA) 1997 in which a new body, Malaysian Accounting Standard Board (MASB) 
was established to become the sole body to issue accounting standards. FRA therefore 
has taken away the accounting standard setting activities from the profession.  
 
It was apparent that the accounting standards in Malaysia prior to 1997 are not 
properly established as the two bodies compete with each other to dominate the 
accounting standard setting activities. Such unstable circumstances lead to confusion 
and inconsistency of reporting and disclosure among companies. Therefore, 
accounting standards also do not address matters with respect to directors’ 
remuneration.  
 
2.7.2 After Asian Crisis 1997 
 
Corporate governance issues became the centre of public concern following the 
collapse of East Asian economies in the later part of 1997.  The government has taken 
significant steps in order to improve the strength of corporate governance in Malaysia. 
The major reforms that took place were the issuance of Malaysian Code on Corporate 
Governance (MCCG) by FCCG, Capital Market Master Plan (CMP) by Securities 
Commissions and Financial Sector Master Plan (FSMP) by Bank Negara Malaysia. 
Other significant reforms are the establishment of key institutions such as Malaysian 
Institute of Corporate Governance (MICG) and Minority Shareholders Watchdog 
Group (MSWG). The details of which are presented in the following sections.     
 
                                                 
2
 See Susela (1999) for the details of conflict between MIA and MACPA. 
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Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG) 
 
It was mentioned in section 2.3.1 that the Asian Financial crisis has led the Malaysian 
government to establish FCCG. The FCCG published a comprehensive 275-page 
report, which contains 70 recommendations pertaining to the proposed Code on 
Corporate Governance, reformation of law and regulations and training and education 
of directors. This section will address specifically the code of corporate governance 
and followed by discussion the changes in laws and regulations.  
 
The FCCG released the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance in March 2000. 
The hybrid approach was adopted in order to give companies broad principles that can 
be used as guidance, thus allowing for variation depending on the circumstances of 
each company. The hybrid approach combines the prescriptive and non-prescriptive 
models. The prescriptive model sets standards of desirable practices for disclosure of 
compliance. The Non-prescriptive model requires actual disclosure of corporate 
governance practices Hence, by combining this two models, the Code allows for a 
more “constructive and flexible response to raise standards in corporate governance 
as opposed to the more black and white response engendered by statute and 
regulation” Khoo (2003).  
 
The code comprises of four parts: (i) principles for good corporate governance; (ii) 
best practices in corporate governance; (iii) exhortations to other corporate 
participants and (iv) explanatory notes to principles and best practices. The first part 
of the Code aims to allow flexibility for companies to apply broad principles of good 
corporate governance depending on their individual circumstances. Companies are 
required by the Bursa listing requirements to include in their annual report a narrative 
40 
 
statement of how they apply the relevant principles to their particular circumstances. 
Hence, investors and others indirectly will be able to assess companies’ performance 
and governance practices, and respond in an informed way. 
   
The second part of the MCCG elucidates a set of guidelines or practices intended to 
assist companies in designing their approach to corporate governance. Companies are 
not mandated to comply with best practices, as it is voluntary. However, companies 
will be required as a provision of the Bursa listing requirements to state in their 
annual reports, the extent to which they have complied with the best practices. If the 
companies’ practices differ from the best practices, the companies need to provide 
justification as to why such differences exist.  
 
Part three of the Code is relevant only to investors and auditors. It explains how they 
can enhance their role in corporate governance. These are purely voluntary. The final 
part of the Code provides explanatory notes to the first three parts set out earlier. 
Additionally Part 4 also sets out best practices directed at listed companies that do not 
require companies to explain circumstances justifying departure from best practices - 
“mere best practices”. 
 
The underlying principles of the code stated in part 1 are divided into four main areas 
- board of directors, directors’ remuneration, shareholders and accountability and 
audit. A brief discussion on each of these areas is presented below. However, given 
the focus of this study is on the directors’ remuneration, the section on the directors’ 
remuneration aspects is explained in more detail.     
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Board of Directors 
The principle of corporate governance states that every listed company should be 
leaded and controlled by an effective board. The board should be balanced with a mix 
of executive directors and non-executive directors (including independent non-
executives) in order to prevent domination of an individual or small group of 
individuals in the board’s decision making. The board should be supplied in a timely 
fashion with information in a form and of a quality appropriate to enable it to 
discharge its duties. There should be a formal and transparent procedure for the 
appointment of new directors to the board. Finally, all directors should be required to 
submit themselves for re-election at regular intervals and at least every three years. 
 
Directors’ Remuneration 
In relation to directors’ remuneration, the code suggests that  
 
 
 
 
The code also pointed the needs for companies to establish a formal and transparent 
procedure for developing policy on company’s executive remuneration and for fixing 
remuneration packages for each director.  The explanatory notes further explain the 
need to ensure that directors, whether executive or non-executive, should not 
participate in decisions on their own remuneration packages. Companies are also 
required to disclosure details of remuneration for each director in their annual reports.  
It is further explain in part four of the Code that standards should be set which provide 
a rational and objective remuneration policy. The Code gives two examples of the 
‘The levels of remuneration should be sufficient to attract and retain 
directors needed to run the companies successfully. The components parts 
of remuneration should be structured so as to link rewards to corporate 
and individual performance, in the case of executive directors. In the case 
of non-executive directors, the levels of remuneration should reflect the 
experience and level of responsibilities undertaken by the non-executive 
director concerned.’ 
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objective of remuneration policy; (i) to ensure that the company attracts and retains 
the directors needed to run the company successfully; and (ii) to link remuneration 
rewards to corporate and individual performance. 
 
Shareholders 
The Codes outlines the necessity for companies and institutional shareholders to be 
ready, where practicable, to enter into a dialogue based on the mutual understanding 
of objectives. The companies also should encouraged private investors to participate 
in corporate governance process by improving the use of the AGM.  
 
Accountability and Audit 
The final area in the principle of corporate governance is on audit and accountability. 
It states that the board should present a balanced and understandable assessment of 
the company’s position and prospects. In addition, the board should maintain a sound 
system of internal control to safeguard shareholders’ investment and the company’s 
assets. The code also place equal importance on the board to establish formal and 
transparent arrangements for maintaining an appropriate relationship with the 
company’s auditors. 
 
Capital Market Master Plan (CMMP) 
 
CMMP was introduced to shape the direction of the Malaysian capital market for the 
next ten years. It was approved by the Ministry of Finance in December 2000 and 
later launched in February 2001. The CMMP visions are to create efficient 
mobilization and allocation of funds and at the same time to obtain high degree of 
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confidence to market participants. Thus, good corporate governance practices among 
public listed companies is considered vital to build investors confidence on Malaysian 
capital market.      
 
Financial Sector Master Plan (FSMP) 
 
FSMP was launched in March 2001 to chart the future direction of the financial sector 
over the next ten years. The plan was launched by Bank Negara Malaysia with the 
aim to develop a more resilient, competitive and dynamic financial systems that 
contributes to the economic growth and technology driven. Again, the anchor to attain 
these objectives rests on the level of corporate governance practices among financial 
institutions in Malaysia.  
 
The plan was divided into two phases. The first phase of the plan targeted on the 
domestic capacity and capability enhancement. The second phase focuses on the 
transition towards a more competitive environment and finally towards greater 
international integration by 2007.  Among the recommendations of the plan were to 
have board committees to further improve corporate governance, the implementations 
of a transparent and clearly structured early warning system for weak banking 
institutions. It also encourages mergers between banking institutions and 
establishment of a deposit insurance fund.       
 
Legal Requirements of Capital Market 
 
The FCCG also responsible to review the existing corporate laws and regulation and 
suggests whether legislative or regulatory reform is required to bring them up-to-date 
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with current commercial reality as well as with internationally accepted concepts on 
corporate governance. In FCCG reports published in February 1999, it states that the 
review covers the following areas: 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source:Reports on Corporate Governance 1999: 105) 
 
The reviews cover the statutory legislation, in particular Companies Act 1965, 
securities law and listing requirements. Following the FCCG recommendation, a 
number of provisions in the Companies Act (1965) were amended.  
 
A new body, Companies Commission of Malaysia (CCM) was established through 
the enactment of Companies Commission of Malaysia Act 2001. CCM is a statutory 
body and is a merger between the Registry of Companies (ROC) and Registry of 
Business (ROB). The establishment of CCM is expected to further improve the 
surveillance and enforcement of corporate legislation. CCM started its operation on 
16 July 2002 and is responsible for the administration and enforcement of the 
following legislation: 
 Companies Act 1965 (Act 125);  
 Registration of Businesses Act 1956 (Act 197);  
 Trust Companies Act 1949 (Act 100);  
 Kootu Funds (Prohibition) Act 1971 (Act 28);  
 Duties, obligations, rights and liabilities of directors, 
company officers, and controlling shareholders; 
 Adequacy of disclosures and conflicts of interests with respect 
to transactions that involve the waste of corporate assets; 
 Enhancing the quality of general meetings; 
 Shareholders’ rights and remedies; 
 Developing effective governance and enforcement 
mechanisms within the regulatory framework. 
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 any subsidiary legislation made under the Acts specified above such as: 
Companies Regulations 1966; and Registration of Businesses Rules 1957.  
 
SIA was amended in 2003 to incorporate better control and improvement of the 
securities industry, in terms of its disclosure, enforcement and reports. For instance 
part VIIIA capital market development fund section 83K states that: 
 
 
  
 
 
Improvements also is observed in term of enforcement power of the Securities 
Commission, for instance section 11 states that 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The amendment of SIA also requires annual Regulatory Report on compliance with 
ongoing requirements, as stated in provision 11E.  
 
The Securities Commission (Amendment) Act 2000 was passed by both houses of 
parliament in April 2000 and received royal assent on May 30th. The act introduces 
enhanced disclosure obligations on issuers and stringent sanctions for false and 
misleading information in prospectuses. It gives investors the right to pursue civil 
action against companies, directors and their advisers where there has been a 
‘..member of the board must disclose the existence and nature of 
his or her interest either direct or indirect interest in relation to 
any matter under discussion by the board’ 
‘a person who fails to comply with the rules of stock exchange, or 
a recognized clearing house or rules of a central depository or 
provisions of this Act other than the provisions of Part IX, the 
Commission may take any one or more of the following actions: 
(a) direct the person in breach to comply with, observe, enforce 
or give effect to such rules or provisions; (b) impose a penalty in 
proportion to the severity or gravity of the breach on the person 
in breach, but in any event not exceeding one million ringgit; (c) 
reprimand the person in breach; (d) require the person in breach 
to take such steps as the Commission may direct to remedy the 
breach or to mitigate’ 
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contravention of the law. The SC is also empowered to pursue civil action on behalf 
of investors where it is in the public interest to do so. 
 
Finally, Malaysian Accounting Standard Board (MASB) was established with the 
enactment of Financial Reporting Act 1997 (FRA). FRA requires all public listed 
companies in Malaysia to comply with the approved accounting standards issued by 
MASB. Thus, non-compliance has become illegal in the country. Thus, the power to 
set accounting standards was taken away from the professional bodies and rest solely 
in the hand of MASB. 
 
It is clear from the above discussion that the statutory requirements level of corporate 
governance in Malaysia has been improved after the financial crisis. The amendment 
and introduction of new legislation further clarify and strengthen the enforcement of 
the laws, in which it was lacking before. 
 
Bursa Listing Requirements 
 
Effective from 1 June 2001, Bursa’s listing requirements was revamp. The revamps 
are found to be consistent with the MCCG (see Section 2.5.4.1) and CMMP (see 
section 2.5.4.2) objectives. The main aims of the new listing requirements are to 
enhance corporate governance and transparency, enhance efficiency in capital market 
activities, strengthen investor protection and promote investors confidence. This new 
listing requirement affects all public listed companies both in the main and second 
board.  
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By virtue of paragraph 15.26 of the Bursa Listing Requirements, all listed companies 
should state in their annual report how they have applied the principles set out in Part 
1 of the Code and the extent to which they have complied with the best practices set 
out in Part 2 and identify and give reasons for any areas of non-compliance, and 
where applicable, state the alternative practice(s) adopted. In other words, companies 
need to provide narrative statement of how they apply the relevant principles to their 
own particular circumstances in their annual report. In respect of Parts 1 and 2, boards 
are not expected to comment separately on each item of the Code with which they are 
complying, but areas of non- compliance will have to be dealt with individually. 
(MCCG 2000). Practice note 9/2001 was issued in order to further clarify the listing 
requirements related to the MCCG and the state of internal control.    
 
The MCCG also includes best practices in corporate governance to guide companies 
in their approach towards corporate governance. Companies are not required to 
comply with these best practices. However, companies are required under listing 
requirement to provide explanation if their practices differ from the best practices.       
 
Accounting  Standards 
 
With the enactment of FRA 1997, the structure for standard settings is clearer. The 
FRA 1997 requires an establishement of Financial Reporting Foundation (FRF). The 
FRF acts a trustee body, has responsibility for the oversight of the MASB's 
performance, financial and funding arrangements, and as an initial source of views for 
the MASB on proposed standards and pronouncements. The FRF comprises 
representation from all relevant parties in the standard setting process, including 
preparers, users, regulators and the accountancy profession. 
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Continuous improvements were shown in the development of accounting standards. 
In 2004, MASB issued Financial Reporting Standard (FRS) to replace MASBs. It was 
among steps taken in the effort by MASB to be compatible with other international 
standards. 
 
Establishment of New Bodies 
 
The Malaysian government had established a few new bodies in order to ensure 
successful reformation plan. The establishment of these bodies where an extra efforts 
by the government in order to strengthen the corporate governance settings in 
Malaysia.  
 
Malaysian Institute of Corporate Governance (MICG) 
 
 
MICG was established in March 1998 by the High Level Finance Committee on 
Corporate Governance. It is a not-for-profit public company limited by guarantee. Its 
founding members are the Federation of Public Listed Companies (FPLC), the 
Malaysian Institute of Accountants (MIA), the Malaysian Association of Certified 
Public Accountants (MICPA), the Malaysian institute of Chartered Secretaries and 
Administrators (MAICSA), and the Malaysian Institute of Directors (MID).  
 
The purpose of MICG’s establishment is to raise the awareness and practice of good 
corporate governance in Malaysia. In order to meet its objective, MICG is actively co-
operating with other bodies such as MIA, FPLC and MASB. MICG involves in 
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organising various dialogues, training and conferences that promotes good corporate 
governance and corporate social responsibilities.     
 
 
Minority Shareholders Watch Group (MSWG) 
 
In August 2000, MSWG was incorporated to protect the interests of minority 
shareholders. The establishment of this body is part of the government efforts to 
provide avenue of market discipline on corporate governance matters amongst public 
listed companies. MSWG provides a platform and a collective voice to both retail and 
institutional minority shareholders, and it advises on voting at general meetings of 
public listed companies. This has been the first step towards encouraging shareholder 
activism without recourse to the courts.  
 
MSWG also acts as the think-tank and resource centre for minority interest and 
corporate governance matters in Malaysia. It develops and disseminates the 
educational aspects of corporate governance to its members. By doing so, MSWG 
indirectly encouraged its members to raise enquiry on questionable practices by 
management of public listed companies. Collectively, the voice of minority 
shareholder will be voiced out by MSWG in order to influence the decision making 
process in public listed companies as the leader for minority shareholders’ legitimate 
rights and interests. This enables MSWG to monitor for breaches and non-compliance 
in corporate governance practices by public listed companies. In case where MSWG 
found any breaches or non-compliance in corporate governance practices, it will 
initiate reports to regulatory authorities.  
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MSWG role has an impact on the improvement on corporate governance in Malaysia. 
The body has been very active since its incorporation and provide excellent reference 
point to minority shareholders.     
 
2.8 Summary and Conclusion 
 
As one of the commonwealth country, many aspects of Malaysian landscape were 
greatly influenced by the United Kingdom, including its financial system and capital 
market system. This is evident from the history where the UK influence was very 
strong in Malaysia’s early post independent years. However, that influences were 
slowly changing in the subsequent years and Malaysia had developed and became one 
of its own, unique country. For instance, from the capital market perspective, the 
common law was established based on the UK law prior to the Asian Financial Crisis 
in 1997. Bursa Listing requirement was also in place and accounting standards were 
in its very early development stage. However, no specific regulations, be it 
compulsory or voluntary were developed on directors’ remuneration. 
 
The financial crisis however had triggered and escalated the reformation in many 
aspects of corporate governance in Malaysia. The government had realised the 
importance to strengthen the capital market regulations. The capital market master 
plan was drawn in order to deal with this. As a result, a number of bodies were 
established in order to deal specifically with the task of improving the capital market 
system. For instance, MICG was established to come out with MCCG while MASB 
was established to come out with accounting standards to govern accounting practices 
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in Malaysia. MSWG was established in order to protect and act in the interest of 
minority shareholders.  
 
Along the process, laws and regulations were amended to be more relevant. Bursa 
Listing requirements also had been revamped and many new rules were established, 
in order to govern the corporate sector and eventually gain back investors’ confidence 
in Malaysian capital market. MCCG was also introduced and has included directors’ 
remuneration as part of items need to be disclosed by listed firms. These changes 
made it timely to look at various aspect of corporate governance in Malaysia, such as 
directors’ remuneration. In addition, Malaysian unique background and capital market 
system made this study relevant and of importance to many.  
  
52 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
 
THEORY AND LITERATURE REVIEW:  DETERMINANTS OF 
EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS’ REMUNERATION 
  
 
3.1 Introduction and Overview  
 
Chapter three aims to provide review of theories and literatures on determinants of 
executive directors’ remuneration. The purposes of this chapter are (i) to identify and 
review the theories that explain what determines the level of executive directors’ 
remuneration in the context of this study; (ii) to evaluate the extent in which scholars 
have addressed the issue of directors’ remuneration determinants; and (iii) to identify 
the gap in the literature thus leads towards the current research questions and research 
hypotheses.  
 
Theory acts as the basis to identify and raise research problems. It helps to identify 
relevant factors, concept or variables and relationship, interpret and understand 
observations or data and more importantly to advance explanations (Ghauri and 
Gronhaug 2002: 52). Figure 3.1 summarises three main theories used by different 
researchers to explain directors’ remuneration (Bender 2004). The selection of theory 
depends on the philosophical stance of the researcher. In general, it is more common 
for economists, finance and accounting scholars to use economic theories (for 
instance  studies by Murphy 1985; Indjejikian 1999; Ewers 2002), while 
psychologists (for instance Belliveau et al 1996) tend to use social-physiological 
theories like equity theory, expectancy theory, social influence theory and social 
comparison theory.  
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This study is based on economic theories, in particular agency theory and human 
capital theory. Justification for using these two theories will be discussed in the 
following discussion. Hence the following discussion will only focus on agency 
theory and human capital theory
3
. Research hypotheses for this study are developed 
concurrently with literature review in this chapter.  
 
Figure 3.1 Overview of Extant Theories Of Directors’ Remuneration 
(Source: Bender 2004: 20) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3
 For further discussion on the other theories, please refer to Appendix 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Theories underlying directors’ remuneration 
 
Other Theories Economic Theories 
Social-psychological 
theories 
Market 
forces 
Individual 
Directors 
Individual 
directors 
Remuneration 
committee 
 Labour 
market 
theory 
 Human 
capital 
theory 
 Agency 
theory 
 Relative 
performance 
evaluation 
 Tournament 
theory 
 Expectancy 
theory 
 Equity 
theory 
 Social influence 
theory 
 Social 
comparison 
theory 
Organisational theories 
 Institutional theory and legitimacy 
 Decision theory 
 Power and politics 
 Contingency theory 
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This chapter is divided into six sections. Section 3.2 and 3.3 review agency theory and 
human capital theory respectively and its relation to directors’ remuneration. Section 
3.4 and 3.5 evaluate studies on remuneration in developed countries and developing 
countries respectively. Section 3.6 assesses the common measurements and variables 
used for remuneration, performance, governance structure and other key variables that 
affect directors’ remuneration such as size, leverage and risk. Finally, section 3.7 
outlays the conclusion comments from literature review and direction for future 
research.   
 
3.2 Agency Theory 
 
The central theory used in this research is agency theory. This theory is used by 
majority of the research on directors’ remuneration (Murphy 1999; Bender 2003a). 
Agency theory spans from the believe that there is mismatching between owner and 
manager of a firm, which leads to the need for certain  measures to be taken in order 
to realign their interest back. The origin of agency theory can be traced back to 1960s 
when modern corporations were developed whereby control of the company changed 
from owner to manager. Economists began to explore different risk attitudes among 
individuals and groups that lead towards risk sharing problems between owners and 
managers (Arrow 1971; Wilson 1968).   
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) defined agency relationship as a contract under which 
one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform 
some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making 
authority to the agent. Assuming both the principal and the agent are utility 
55 
 
maximisers, potential conflict may arise whereby the agent may not always act in the 
same interest as the principal. In other words, this theory emphasis that rational 
individual will behave in manner that maximise its utility function. In the context of 
managerial-company relationship, the goal of shareholders (principal) is to maximize 
their wealth, while the goals of management (agent) is to maximize a utility function 
that includes pay, prestige, size and power. Jensen and Meckling (1976) also argued 
that both agent and principal may have different risk preference that will further 
escalate the problem. Consequently, the management tends to pursue their own 
interests instead of increasing the owners’ wealth. In addition, the principal-agent 
relationship still inherits problems such as cheating, limited information and bounded 
rationality in general (Perrow 1986). Although such relationship is governed by a 
contract specifying what the manager does with the funds and how the returns are 
divided between them, agency problems arise because the agent cannot possibly 
contract for every possible action whose outcome affects both his own welfare and the 
welfare of the principal (Brennan 1995).  
 
In order for principal to minimise agent’s deviation from its interest, the principal can 
provide appropriate incentives and adequate monitoring mechanism. According to 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), such incentives must be able to restraint the agent from 
taking any actions that may not in the best interest of the principal or to ensure that the 
principal will be compensated if he does take such actions. The principal also must 
establish appropriate monitoring mechanism that will minimise aberrant activities by 
the agent. However, it is impossible to ensure the agent always act in the interest of 
the principal. There must always be divergence between agent’s decision and 
principal’s decision. This cost is referred to by Jensen and Meckling (1976) as 
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residual loss. Therefore, agency costs are the sum of (i) the monitoring expenditure, 
(ii) the incentive (bonding) expenditure, and (iii) the residual loss (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976). 
 
This theory was used extensively by researchers in the following years (Eisenhardt 
1989). It became the backbone for various studies that mainly focusing on aligning 
the shareholders’ and managers’ interests through incentives and governance 
mechanisms (Gomez-Mejia and wiseman 1997).  For instance, based on agency 
theory, the performance-related pay will induce the management so that their interests 
coincide with the shareholders’ goals. Hence, management contracts must be written 
in such a way as to facilitate this (Prendergast 1999). Other mechanisms to align the 
interests of managers and shareholders include improving the roles of board of 
directors (Fama and Jensen 1983) through appointment of independent directors and 
separation between chairman and chief executive director (CEO).  In other words, 
governance structure of the company will assist the owner in aligning their interest 
with the management of the company.   
 
Jensen (1983) identified two streams of research based on agency theory: the 
‘principal-agent’ stream and the ‘positivist’ stream. Basically, the research focus for 
each stream is different but the underlying assumptions for both streams are 
indistinguishable (Eisenhardt 1989). Both streams study the contract between the 
principal and the agent and recognised the same assumptions of agency theory such as 
self-interest, bounded nationality and risk adverse preference, information as a 
purchasable commodity, partial goal conflicts and information asymmetry between 
organisational participants (Chen 2006, Eisenhardt 1989).  
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The main focus of ‘principal–agent’ stream is on identifying optimal contract in order 
to control agency costs. This stream involves careful specification of assumptions and 
logical deduction and mathematical verification. Studies under this stream tested 
different conditions such as scenario when the principal has complete information 
about the agent’s efforts. The most optimal contract is based on behaviour since an 
outcome contract will not transfer risk to a risk-averse agents (Eisenhardt 1989). The 
more realistic condition is when the principal does not have complete information 
about the agent’s efforts.  In this scenario, two aspects of agency problem may occur 
– moral hazard and adverse selection (Eisenhardt 1989; Chen 2006). Moral hazard, 
also known as ‘shirking’ arises when the agent cheats on the agreed efforts. Adverse 
selection refers to the principal inability to verify the skills or capabilities of the agent 
either at the time of hiring or after due to agent’s misrepresentation on his or her 
ability or qualifications. To control for both of these agency problems, the principals 
can either hire some mechanisms to discover the agent’s behaviour or to transfer the 
risk to the agent by designing an outcome-based contract, such as incentive alignment 
(Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman 1997; Chen 2006).  
 
Subsequent researchers in this stream also examine other types of scenarios by 
relaxing basic assumptions of agency theory. For instance, taking away assumption on 
risk-averse agent (Harris and Raviv 1979) and relaxing the assumption on interest 
conflicts (Demski 1980). However, by relaxing many of the basic assumptions in 
agency theory has made the research under this stream less supportive to agency 
theory (Gomez –Mejia and Wiseman 1997). In addition, researches under this stream 
are criticised as less accessible to organisational researchers due to the normative and 
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deterministic nature of the stream, thus making limited impact on organisational 
studies in general (Beatty and Zajac 1994; Eisenhardt 1989).   
 
On the other hand, ‘positivist’ stream focuses on introducing governance mechanism 
to limit the agent’s behaviours through identifying goal-conflicting situations 
(Eisenhardt 1989; Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman 1997; Chen 2006). Under this stream, 
governance mechanism are captured by two proposition – incentive alignment and 
information system. Incentive alignment will be able to mitigate the conflict of self 
interests between the agent and the principal if the rewards for both parties depend on 
the same outcome. Information system will be able to curb the agent’s opportunistic 
behaviours through making the agent aware that the principal have the information 
and control on what the agent is doing. One way of obtaining the information is 
through the establishment of board of directors (Fama and Jensen 1983). 
 
Agency theory was used exhaustively by numerous studies and its contributions were 
well acknowledged. Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman (1997) identified the most 
significant contribution of agency theory is the articulation of specific mechanisms to 
help control the managements’ opportunistic behaviour. Agency theory also 
establishes the importance of formal information systems such as budgeting and 
corporate governance systems that will limit the management opportunism. However, 
agency theory is also being criticised, mostly on its unrealistic assumptions. For 
instance, agency theory assumes a causal relationship between the manager’s actions 
and firm performance and that the effect of other factors can be separated. However, 
such assumption is not possible in reality.  
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3.3. Human Capital Theory 
 
The human capital theory was first proposed by Schultz (1961) and later developed 
extensively by Becker (1964). The theory stems from labour economics and has been 
developed in the sixties due to the realization that the growth of physical capital has 
only small part of growth in the growth of income (Becker 1964). Relatively, the 
emergence of education and skills training in military technology has also played an 
important part in the discovery of this theory. 
 
Human capital theory suggests that education or training raises the productivity of 
workers by imparting useful knowledge and skills, hence raising workers’ future 
income by increasing their lifetime earnings (Becker, 1964). It suggests that 
expenditure on training and education is costly, and should be considered as an 
investment since it is undertaken with a view to increase personal incomes. The 
human capital approach is often used to explain occupational wage differentials, 
including directors. In general terms, human capital can be viewed as the ability to 
read and write, or in specific terms, such as the acquisition of a particular skill with a 
limited industrial application. According to Becker (1964), human capital is similar to 
"physical means of production", e.g., factories and machines: one can invest in human 
capital (via education, training, medical treatment) and one's outputs depend partly on 
the rate of return on the human capital one owns. Thus, human capital is a means of 
production, into which additional investment yields additional output. Human capital 
is substitutable, but not transferable like land, labour, or fixed capital (Becker 1964). 
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The human capital model proposes that an individual's decision to invest in training is 
based upon an examination of the net present value of the costs and benefits of such 
an investment. Individuals are assumed to invest in training during an initial period 
and receive returns to the investment in subsequent periods. Workers pay for training 
by receiving a wage which is lower than what could be received elsewhere while 
being trained. Since training is thought to make workers more productive, workers 
collect the returns from their investment in later periods through higher marginal 
products and higher wages. Human capital models usually decompose training into 
specific training, which increases productivity in only one firm, and general training, 
which increases productivity in more than one firm. Purely general training is 
financed by workers, and the workers receive all of the returns to this training. In 
contrast, employees and employers will share in the costs and returns of specific 
training. Despite these differences between general and specific training, the model 
predicts that both forms of training lower the starting wage and increase wage growth. 
 
 
Block (1990) criticised the human capital theory as a poor concept of capital because 
the theory unable to understand human activity other than as the exchange of 
commodities. The theory treats the notion of capital employed as purely a quantitative 
one. This misses the point that capital is an independent social force where the 
creation of social value comes about through its capital accumulation. Therefore, 
Block (1990) argued that human capital is not capital but an abstract form of labour - 
a commodity. Commodities such as human capital are therefore part of the life cycle 
of capitalism as a form of labour and not able to be exchanged independently of it. 
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Another criticism that could be argued here is based on assumption that education in 
fact improves productivity. A higher productivity or performance then leads to an 
increase in the remuneration. However productivity or performance itself is a function 
of many other variables and its relation to education is questionable. Does the 
duration of education and training really could increase productivity? In addition, 
there are differences of remuneration in different regions and different type of 
industry. 
 
In essence, human capital theory implicitly believes that there is a ‘true value’ for 
remuneration, captured in some way by using market forces or human capital (Bender 
2004). It provides justification to employer to accept a prospective employee, 
including director that the employee is capable of delivering whatever the tasks he or 
she required to do. Thus, human capital theory argues that directors’ remuneration is 
determined not solely on the job itself but rather incorporates the human capital that 
he or she owns. Agrawal (1981) argued that directors with greater amount of human 
capital should be able to perform his or her job thus should be paid more.  
  
Both agency theory and human capital theory provide reasons and justification for the 
directors’ remuneration by companies. Merchant et al. (2003) argued that most of 
different theories explain a single phenomenon. Thus, by using one theoretical 
explanation, the research conclusion will be limited and incomplete.  It is also noted 
that most of the studies, except a few (for instance Ezzamel and Watson 1998; Bender 
2004; Chen 2006), adopted multiple theories to explain director’s remuneration.  
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3.4 Review of Remuneration Studies in Developed Countries 
 
It is found that this topic received wide interest among scholars from various 
discipline from early 1960s until now. Majority of the early studies were conducted in 
the US. In other developed countries such as the UK, Canada and other European 
countries, studies on remuneration are relatively low compared to the US. Scholars 
used different terms and label to study executive directors’ remuneration. Frequent 
terms used by previous studies are executive compensation, CEO compensation, 
directors’ compensation, directors’ remuneration, board remuneration, managerial 
remuneration, executive pay, directors’ pay and bosses’ pay (Ewers 2002). In the 
forthcoming discussions, the terms are used interchangeably.  
 
Based on the literature, a number of factors were identified as determinants of 
directors’ remuneration. Initial studies on directors’ remuneration focused on linking 
directors’ remuneration with corporate performance and firm size (Marris 1963; 
Williamson 1964; Roberts 1959). Later on, Agrawal (1981) initiated the argument 
that individual human capital should have an impact on the remuneration level. His 
argument was empirically supported by subsequent studies like McKnight and 
Tomkins (2004), Murphy (1985) and Tosi and Gomez Mejia (1989). There are also 
studies that look at other variables such as firm diversification, firm risk and industry 
classification in order to improve the explanation on directors’ remuneration (for 
instance Balkin and Gomez-Mejia 1990; Murphy 2000). In addition, the most recent 
corporate scandals and mismanagement had triggered the emphasis on corporate 
governance mechanism thus new requirement and disclosures were imposed on firms. 
As a result, researchers started to look at the corporate governance mechanism, in 
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particular board characteristics and ownership structure and tried to link them with   
directors’ remuneration (for instance Core et. al 1999; Boyd 1994; Conyon 1997).         
 
Executive directors’ remuneration and corporate performance studies had started as 
early as 1960s in the developed world, particularly in the US (for instance Marris 
1963; Williamson 1964). The number of studies on this subject rises significantly 
during 1980s to 1990s (Hallock and Murphy 1999). Murphy (1999) argues that this is 
due to the emerging trend of separation control in corporation and the acceptance of 
agency theory among the scholars. This is evident from the US-based literature in 
which majority of studies used agency theory as the basis to study remuneration-
performance studies (for instance Lewellan and Huntsman 1970; Deckop 1988; 
Finkelstein and Hambrick 1989). Pavlik et. al (1993) divided the US studies on 
executive compensation into two categories: (i) studies that examine the association 
between compensation and performance over time and across firms; and (ii) studies 
that examine whether available set of incentive contracts appears to successfully align 
manager and shareholder interests. The latter category is investigated by examining 
the stock market’s response to the adoption of compensation plans or its response to 
merger and disposition activity contingent on the set of compensation contracts in 
place. Since this study belongs to the first category of executive remuneration studies 
suggested by Pavlik et al. (1993), the literature reviewed in this study will exclude the 
studies in the latter category. 
 
However, majority of the early studies on US focuses on the CEO remuneration rather 
than all directors (see Murphy 1999 for extensive review of literature on this). 
Directors’ remuneration has started to receive attention only recently by the US firms 
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(Brick et. al 2006). The studies no longer look at performance per se, but include 
corporate governance mechanism as a factor to explain variation in directors’ 
remuneration level. Among the recent studies that examine the directors’ 
remuneration are Conyon (1997), Bryan et al. (2000) and Adam (2000).    
 
In the UK, the number of studies on this area is relatively lower to the US (Bender 
2004). Most of the studies (with exception Cosh 1975) were conducted after 1990s, 
following the public concern at cases of mismanagement (for instance the collapse of 
BCCI bank and Polly Peck and the misappropriation of employees’ pension monies at 
the Mirror Group) and excessive pay or ‘fat cat’ awards to executive directors. As a 
result, a number of reports have been published such as Cadbury Committee Report 
(1992), Greenbury Committee Report (1995) and Hempel Committee Report (1998). 
Cadbury Committee Report (1992) recommended ‘Code of Best Practice’ that relates 
to the appointment and responsibilities of executive directors, the independence of 
non-executive directors and tighter internal financial control and reporting procedures. 
The Greenbury Report (1995) deals more specifically on executive directors’ 
remuneration in which it recommends executive directors’ remuneration should be 
determined by remuneration committee that consist only non-executive directors. In 
addition, share awards given to the executive directors under executive share option 
schemes and long term incentive plans (LTIP) should be linked to company’s 
performance.  The Hempel Committee Reports (1998) further suggests ‘principle of 
good governance’ in relation to the power of individual executive director, more 
independent and stronger voice of non-executive director and more accountability of 
shareholders during the AGM. The code of best practice and ‘principle of good 
governance’ were incorporated as listing rules for London Stock Exchange.  
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Hence, the combination of public concern and increasing corporate disclosure by UK 
companies provides great opportunity for scholars to carry out more rigorous research 
on the relationship between remuneration and performance. For instance Ewers 
(2002) carried out extensive analysis of directors’ remuneration by segregating 
between different types of directors and different types of remuneration. More 
importantly, studies have looked at various corporate governance mechanisms and 
examined their impact on directors’ remuneration level (Conyon and Murphy 2000; 
Vafeas and Theodorou 1998). Similar situation happens in other developed countries 
like European countries, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Japan. The issue on 
executive remuneration has not received much attention by the scholars until in 
1990s. The lack of paper published on the subject probably due to the limitation of 
publicly available data on directors’ remuneration as corporate governance was not 
heavily emphasised earlier (Eriksson and Lausten 2000). For instance, analysis on 
executive remuneration was only possible in Canada after 1993 after all publicly 
traded companies in the Toronto Stock Exchange were required to disclose top 
executive directors’ remuneration under the new Ontario Securities Regulation (Zhou 
2000). Similarly, executive directors’ remuneration studies in Japan are also hindered 
by the lack of disclosure among Japanese companies (Kato and Kubo 2004). In Japan, 
companies are not required to disclose remuneration for every single directors but are 
only required to disclose the total salary and bonuses of all directors, hence forcing 
the researcher to use this information or create a proxy in order to improve the 
analysis (for instance Kato and Rockel 1992; Kaplan 1994; Kato and Kubo 2004) 
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Despite the growing number of studies that attempt to link between directors 
remuneration with various factors, the findings of the studies are not robust, even in 
the case of performance-pay link. For instance, empirical studies from US alone found 
inconsistent results on performance-pay link, ranging from strong positive 
relationship (for instance Lewellen and Huntsman 1970; Murphy 1985; Deckop 1988; 
Finkelstein and Hambrick 1989; Mehran 1995) to weak positive relationship (for 
instance Jensen and Murphy 1990; Abowd 1990). Similar results were found from 
other studies in other developed countries. More importantly, the growing interest to 
link corporate governance mechanisms with directors’ remuneration level is evident 
in the developed countries literatures. The urge to restore public confidence in 
corporate governance following the scandals in the US has led the introduction of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002. Similar situations were found in other developed 
countries. However, due to overwhelming interests on corporate governance 
mechanisms, few studies attempted to examine human capital effect on directors’ 
remuneration level; despite it was proven important in the earlier studies. Summary of 
selected studies in developed countries is presented in the Appendix 2. 
 
3.5 Review of Remuneration Studies in Developing Countries 
 
Studies on remuneration are relatively new in the developing world. One of the 
reasons for slow development in this area of studies is the lack of available data on 
director’s remuneration. It is only recently, following the corporate scandals and 
financial market crisis that sparks the importance of corporate governance, which later 
leads to greater disclosure by companies. For instance, Malaysia introduced its code 
of corporate governance in 2000, Singapore (2001), India (1998) and China (2001). 
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Therefore, most of the studies in the developing countries started to explore directors’ 
remuneration and performance after the period. Most studies include firm 
performance as one of the explaining variable on directors’ remuneration. Firm size, 
firm risk and other variables such as industry classification are added as control 
variables. Only few studies examine the impact of human capital (for instance Ghosh 
2006) and corporate governance mechanisms (for instance Chen 2006) on directors’ 
remuneration level. Hence, this study will include these two factors as its focal 
variables.    
 
In Malaysia, few studies were conducted to examine the directors’ remuneration level 
(for instance Santhapparaj and Tong 2004; Dogan and Smyth 2002). Santhapparaj and 
Tong (2004) examine the relationship between corporate performance and directors’ 
remuneration in Malaysia. They found that companies’ assets and turnover are 
positively related to directors’ compensation but surprisingly, shareholders fund are 
negatively related to directors remuneration. They argued the reason for such 
unexpected relationship depends on the cause of shareholders funds depletion for 
instance when shareholders fund reduced due to operating losses, shareholders may 
need to hire new management at higher compensation to replace the existing 
management. However, this study uses only 10% sample size (113 companies) and 
covered one-year period. The study did not distinguish between cash compensation 
and other form of compensations like ESOS. These factors may contribute to lack of 
reliability and unexpected results of the study. 
 
Dogan and Smyth (2002) examined Malaysian listed companies for period of 1989 to 
2000. However, the sample size ranges from 45 to 222 firms over the years, due to 
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exclusion of firms that do not disclose the required measurement used by the study, 
particularly data on ownership concentration. The variation and exclusion of sample 
size cast doubt on the generalisation of the results of this study. Nevertheless, they 
found positive relationship between board remuneration and sales turnover and 
negative relationship between board remuneration and ownership concentration.  
 
Other studies on directors’ remuneration are Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) and Abdullah 
(2006). Both of these studies do not directly study the determinants of board 
remuneration. For instance, Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) examined the relationship 
between corporate governance structure and corporate performance of Malaysian 
listed companies. They used secondary data and employed five years timeframe in 
which 347 companies were included. They found board size, substantial 
shareholdings, managerial shareholdings, multiple directorship and role duality to be 
associated with performance. On the other hand, Abdullah (2006) examined whether 
firm performance, board structure and ownership structure explains directors’ 
remuneration in distressed companies in Malaysia. By focusing on the distressed 
companies, Abdullah (2006) indirectly assumes that there is a difference between 
healthy and distressed companies in terms of its governance and internal control thus 
leading to poor performance. He found no relationship between firm performance and 
board remuneration but found governance structure did constrain the level of 
remuneration. Instead, firm growth and size are found to be important to affect board 
remuneration.    
 
It is clear from the above discussion that corporate governance mechanism was not 
fully explored by earlier researchers in the Malaysian context. Although Haniffa and 
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Hudaib (2006) did explore various aspects of governance, the study did not link it 
directly to directors’ remuneration. Other studies like Abdullah (2006) and Dogan and 
Smyth (2002) did not examine the governance factor in detailed. On the other hand, 
Santhapparaj and Tong 2004 based their study on single period, making their 
conclusion less reliable. None of the previous studies in Malaysia has taken all the 
variables intended to be examined in this study thus making this study able to come 
out with more extensive model to explain directors’ remuneration. Specifically, the 
human capital attributes were not examined in any of the previous studies. The 
findings of this study would therefore contribute this gap in the literature.  Summary 
of selected studies in the developing countries is presented in the Appendix 3. 
 
3.6 Determinants of Remuneration and Hypotheses Development  
 
Based on studies in both developed as well as in developing studies, this study 
identified three main factors that influence the level of directors’ remuneration - 
corporate governance, human capital attributes and firm performance. Other variables 
like firm size, firm risk, firm diversification and industry classification are treated as 
control variables. The following discussions for each variable and measurement will 
lead to the development of research hypotheses.  
 
 
3.6.1 Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
 
Corporate governance mechanisms have become important following various 
corporate scandals and mismanagement (for instance Enron and World.com). Recent 
studies showed tremendous importance of corporate governance environment factors 
in explaining executive directors’ remuneration. In general, corporate governance 
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mechanisms are divided into two main groups – board characteristics and ownership 
structure. Different aspects of board characteristics are examined such as board size 
and activities (Chen 2006; Jensen 1993), board independence (Core et. al 1999), 
board structure (Core et. al 1999; Chen 2006) and board leadership (Jensen 1993; 
Conyon 1997). Similarly, different ownership structures are examined such as 
managerial ownership (Mehran 1995; Jensen and Murphy 1990), institutional 
ownership (Mehran 1995; Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman 1997) and in unique market 
such as China, state ownership and legal person ownership (Chen 2006).         
 
The empirical results are mixed. Baysinger and Butler (1985), Hermalin and 
Weisbach (2003) and Bhagat and Black (1997) found no meaningful relation between 
various characteristics of board composition and firm performance. Others like Core 
et al (1999), Chen (2006) and Randoy and Nielsen (2002) found corporate governance 
mechanism does affect directors’ remuneration.  The following discussion focused the 
relevant literature for each of aspect of corporate governance mechanism separately. 
 
Board Size and Activities 
 
Large board size means larger group of people from different background and 
expertise. This will enable larger board to have wider connections with outside world 
and resources that make them decide, control and monitor in a more effective way. An 
effective board of directors can monitor executives’ behaviour and design appropriate 
remuneration packages. It follows that an effective board would lead to a more 
sensitive link between executive pay and performance.  
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Studies across the world, both in developed countries and developing countries have 
shown that board size have a linear relationship with level of executive directors’ 
remuneration For example, Randoy and Nielsen (2002) empirically proven that board 
size is positively related to executive directors’ remuneration in Sweden and Norway. 
The same result was reported in the US (Core et al. 1999; Jensen 1993) and Malaysia 
(Abdullah 2006). However, Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) argued that larger boards 
do not necessarily reflect a better board in case where meeting agenda is always been 
pre-determined by chairman or CEO. If such case happened, board meeting will not 
functioning as it should. Yermack (1996) also found an inverse relationship between 
pay performance and board size, suggesting board effectiveness decrease with large 
boards. Chen (2006) found that the size of the board has a positive relationship with 
firm performance only up to a certain point (to be specific, when board size consists 
of eight members) and will have an inverse relationship afterwards. In other words, 
she argued board size has a non-linear relationship.  
 
The mix results presented above lead to believe that there is a relationship between 
directors’ remuneration and size of the board. However, the direction of the 
relationship is not clear. Hence, the following non directional hypotheses are drawn:   
 
H1a: There is a relationship between directors’ remuneration and board size. 
H1b: There is a relationship between directors’ pay-performance sensitivity and 
board size.   
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Board Activity – frequency of board meetings 
 
Vafeas (1999) found that board activity is an important dimension of board 
operations. He found that board activity measured by board meeting frequency is 
related to corporate governance. The more frequent the meeting, the more activities 
are conducted by the company.  The meeting acts as a monitoring device for the 
managers on behalf of the shareholders thus ensure the effectiveness of the board.   
Both Adams (2000) and Davila and Penalva (2006) further support this claim. Hence, 
it is argued that the frequency of meeting should have an impact on the directors’ 
remuneration.  
The hypotheses for this variable are as follows: 
 
H2a: There is a relationship between directors’ remuneration and frequency of 
board meeting. 
H2b: There is a relationship between directors’ pay-performance sensitivity and 
board meeting. 
 
Board independence 
 
Board independence is an important aspect of governance structure that ensures the 
effectiveness of the board (Chen 2006; Core et al. 1999; Weisbach 1988). Inside 
directors are prone to take side with the CEO’s orders and suggestions and not to be 
protective towards shareholders (Jensen 1993). Internal directors’ positions in the 
organisation are determined by the CEO himself. This fact alone makes the inside 
directors not independent. Outside directors are more likely to be independent because 
they are not from the organisation. Various governance reports such as Cadbury 
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report, Greenbury report and Malaysia Corporate Governance Report suggested the 
employment of non executive directors on the board as a governance mechanism that 
could help reducing agency cost. However, it is argued that non executive directors 
are not necessarily independent (Chen 2006). Non executive directors can be affiliated 
and influenced by the CEO of the organisation by many ways. For example, 
challenging the CEO may risk both their personal and professional relationships as 
well as the non executive directors’ seats in the board. Singh and Harianto (1989) 
noted that CEOs may offer non management directors attractive contracts and 
consulting agreements. Almost certainly, future relationships of this type will be 
jeopardized should directors fail to support the CEOs' wishes. Where personal 
relationships constitute the basis for directors' affiliation, a sense of obligation to the 
CEOs may be even stronger (Fierman, 1990).    
 
A number of studies have empirically test the effect of board independence on 
directors’ remuneration. Dahya et al. (2002) found board independence improved the 
quality of the monitoring effectiveness of the board in the UK. Core et al. (1999) 
found a link between outside director’s effectiveness and pay-performance. Similar 
results are reported by Rupp and Smith (2002), Chen (2006) and Mehran (1995).    
Most of the previous studies use the proportion of independent directors as a measure 
of board independence (Core et al. 1999; Chen 2006). Few studies further examined 
the independence of remuneration committee and audit committee and its affect on 
the remuneration level. For instance, Daily et al (1998) examined composition of 
compensation committee as determinants of executive pay level. They found no 
evidence to support board independence with directors’ remuneration, even at the 
compensation committee level. They argued this inconsistent finding with agency 
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theory may be due to popular press with regard to excessive CEO compensation that 
has greatly raised general awareness of this issue. In Malaysia, such issue are not 
greatly publicised in the press. Hence, it may be argued that this finding is relevant to 
the US sampled firms only. On the other hand, Conyon (1997) found evidence on the 
negative link between board remuneration and remuneration committee.  
 
The above discussions lead to the development of the following hypotheses: 
H3a: There is a negative relationship between directors’ remuneration and the 
proportion of independent directors in the board of directors. 
H3b: There is a positive relationship between directors’ pay-performance 
sensitivity and the proportion of independent directors in the board of directors. 
 
Board composition 
 
Board composition are measured using four proxies, namely proportion of non 
executive directors in the board, proportion of interlocking directors (Core et al 1999, 
Ferris et al 2003), proportion of old non executive directors (Core et al 1999, Ferris et 
al 2003) and proportion of busy directors (Core et al 1999, Ferris et al 2003). 
Theoretically, high proportion of outside directors will improve the monitoring 
mechanism of the CEO. However, empirical evidence on the link between outside 
directors and directors’ remuneration level is mixed. Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) 
provide evidence that shareholder wealth is affected by the proportion of outside 
directors by documenting a positive stock price reaction at the announcement of the 
appointment of an additional outside director. Few studies found contrary evidence on 
this matter. For instance, Firth et al (1999) found a strong positive relationship 
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between the number of non executive directors and average directors’ compensation 
in Hong Kong. Similarly, Boyd (1994) document a negative relationship between 
CEO compensation and the percentage of the inside directors. Boyd (1994) explained 
that insider directors, particularly those considered as possible successor of the CEO 
may fear the appearance of siding with the CEO and alienating outside board 
members. In addition, legal obligations and concern for professional reputation 
contribute towards hindering inside directors to show their support for their CEO. On 
the other hand, Finkelstein and Hambrick (1989) and Yermack (1996) found that 
compensation is unrelated to the percentage of outside directors on the board. Due to 
inconsistent results in the literature, the following non-directional hypotheses are 
developed. 
H4a: There is a relationship between directors’ remuneration and the proportion 
of non executive directors. 
H4b: There is a relationship between directors’ pay-performance sensitivity and 
the proportion of non executive directors in the board of directors. 
 
Another aspect of board composition is the number of interlocked directors among the 
board members. Core et al. (1999) define an outside director to be interlocked if an 
inside director of the firm serves on the board of that outside director’s firm. An 
interlocked director may be less independent because an insider has influence over the 
interlocked director’s own board. Hallock (1997) finds that CEO compensation is 
higher at firms with interlocked outside directors. Similarly, Core et al. (1999) and 
Bilimoria (1997) reported positive relationship between board compensation with 
proportion of interlocking directors. Their findings suggest that high proportion of 
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interlocked directors would affect the independence of the board and ultimately the 
directors’ remuneration. Hence the following hypotheses are developed:  
 
H5a: There is a positive relationship between directors’ remuneration and the 
proportion of interlocked directors in the board of directors. 
H5b: There is a negative relationship between directors’ pay-performance 
sensitivity and the proportion of interlocked directors in the board of directors. 
 
Another aspect of board composition examined in the previous literature is ‘old’ non 
executive directors. ‘Old’ non executive directors are defined as any directors aged 
more than 70 years old. Many company boards require mandatory retirement at age 
70 for directors. In fact, it is stated in section 129 (2) of the Malaysian Companies Act 
1965 that the age limit for director of a public limited company is not more than 70 
years old. However, the company at the general meeting may extend the director’s 
term until the next general meeting. The extension must be approved by a special 
resolution of the company in general meeting. Core et al (1999) found old directors 
are less effective compared to younger directors thus lead to high CEO compensation. 
The following hypotheses are therefore predicted for old directors.  
 
H6a: There is a positive relationship between directors’ remuneration and the 
proportion of old directors in the board of directors. 
H6b: There is a negative relationship between directors’ pay-performance 
sensitivity and the proportion of old directors in the board of directors. 
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The final aspect of board composition is busy directors. Busy directors are defined as 
directors who serve more than three other boards or retired directors who serve more 
than six other boards (Core et al. 1999). This definition is consistent with NACD 
guidelines (1996) whereby some reform advocates suggest that many directors serve 
on too many boards to attend to their duties adequately. The empirical findings are 
mixed. Core et al. (1999) found a positive relationship between busy directors and 
CEO compensation while Shivdasani (1993) found a negative association between 
additional directorships with directors’ effectiveness. Hence, the following non-
directional hypotheses are developed:   
 
H7a: There is a relationship between directors’ remuneration and the proportion 
of busy directors in the board of directors. 
H7b: There is a relationship between directors’ pay-performance sensitivity and 
the proportion of busy directors in the board of directors. 
 
Board leadership – CEO duality 
 
Jensen (1993) argues that boards of directors are ineffective because board culture 
discourages conflict, the CEO determines the agenda and information given the board, 
there is little equity ownership by managers and non managers on the typical board, 
boards are too large, and the CEO and the chairman is frequently the same person. 
When CEO holds both the position of CEO and the chairman of board of directors, he 
or she will have strong influence on the decision making in the board. Therefore, the 
CEO will most likely to exert his or her influence on matters concerning their pay, 
regardless of the performance of the company. Many studies, both from developed 
and developing countries found positive relationship between directors’ remuneration 
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and CEO duality (for instance Core et al 1999; Finkelstein and Hambrick 1989; Chen 
2006). However, few studies found little evidence to support the effect of CEO-
chairman duality towards directors’ remuneration (for instance Conyon 1997). The 
related hypotheses are as follows: 
 
H8a: There is a positive relationship between directors’ remuneration and CEO 
duality role. 
H8b: There is a negative relationship between directors’ pay-performance 
sensitivity and the CEO duality role. 
 
 
Ownership structure 
 
 
Ownership structure is another governance mechanism that helps to minimise agency 
problems. Theoretically, institutional or block shareholders should have more 
resources to monitor the management’s opportunistic behaviour compared to minority 
shareholders. Hence, in company where ownership disperses among many parties, 
shareholders would exercise less monitoring because it will costly for them to do so. 
In addition, assuming self-interest attitude among the shareholders, they are not 
willing to incur costs for the benefits of others (Chen 2006).  
 
Previous research documented negative association between ownership concentration 
and managerial opportunistic behaviour (Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman 1997; Dogan 
and Smyth 2002). Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman (1997) reviewed the previous literature 
and found that higher ownership concentration leads toward (1) stronger linkage 
between executive pay and performance (Boyd 1994; Mehran 1995); (2) less 
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influence of firm size over executive performance (Gomez-Mejia et al. 1987); (3) 
lower agency costs in executive remuneration (Goldberg and Idson 1995); (4) weaker 
CEO power and influence over the board of directors (Tosi and Gomez-Mejia 1989); 
and few other unrelated variables for the purpose of this study such as less financial 
manipulation and more risk taking.  
 
Previous literature mainly examined two types of ownership – external block holder 
ownership and managerial ownership. In general, consistent results were reported on 
relationship between external block holder ownership and executive remuneration 
both in developed (Core et al. 1999; Randy and Nielsen 2002) and developing 
countries (Firth et al 1999; Cheung et al. 2005). However, the findings on managerial 
ownership and executive remuneration were not consistent. Most study not only 
looked at the relationship between ownership concentration and pay level but also 
addressed the pay-performance sensitivity in the presence of a block holder 
(Holderness 2003).       
 
Managerial Ownership 
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) emphasized the role of executive stock ownership as a 
mechanism to align the interests of managers and shareholders, and promote greater 
managerial efforts as well as stricter value enhancing decisions. When managers have 
only a small stake in the firm, executive stock ownership plans can be used for 
reducing the fixed (cash) portion and increasing the variable (stock-related) portion of 
CEO compensation. As a result, there should be a negative relation between cash 
compensation and share ownership. However, the empirical findings are mixed.    
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Core et al (1999) and Khan et al. (2005) found that ownership structure explains a 
significant amount of cross sectional variation in CEO compensation among their US 
sampled firms. Allen (1981) reports that the level of CEO compensation is a 
decreasing function of the equity held by the CEO (and his family), as well as the 
extent of equity holdings by board members not related to the CEO. Randy and 
Nielsen (2002) also found negative relationship between CEO compensation and CEO 
ownership in Scandinavian companies. However, other studies did not support this 
relationship. For instance, Holderness and Sheehan (1988) provide evidence that those 
managers who are majority shareholders (defined as individuals owning at least half 
but not all of the common stock) in publicly held corporations receive marginally 
higher salaries than other officers. Morck et al. (1988) demonstrate that firm value 
first rises with increases in inside ownership as the incentive alignment effect of share 
value dominates, then falls as the entrenchment effect of insider voting control 
becomes stronger. Cheung et al. (2005) find managerial concentrations are positively 
related to cash remuneration among Hong Kong firms. 
 
This inconsistency warrants further research. In the Malaysian context, many public 
listed companies are originally family owned business. Hence, in many cases, 
ownership is not confined only to the managers but also to other family members.   
This study will follow the previous studies’ definition of managerial ownership that 
includes both managerial ownership and their close member of the family (Allen 
1981). However, this study will separate the direct managerial ownership and indirect 
managerial ownership.  Direct shareholdings refer to percentage of shares held under 
the name of the directors. Indirect shareholdings refer to percentage of shares held by 
close relatives of the directors. Close relatives included are parents, spouse (wife or 
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husband) and children. Hence the following hypotheses, based on agency theory are 
developed: 
H9a: There is a negative relationship between directors’ remuneration and 
directors’ direct shareholdings. 
H9b: There is a positive relationship between directors’ pay-performance 
sensitivity and directors’ direct shareholdings. 
 
H10a: There is a negative relationship between directors’ remuneration and 
directors’ indirect shareholdings. 
H10b: There is a positive relationship between directors’ pay-performance 
sensitivity and directors’ indirect shareholdings. 
 
Block holder shareholding 
 
A block holder is defined as an external shareholder who owns at least 5% of the total 
shares of the company. External block holders, normally consists of institutional 
investors act as deterrent to managerial opportunistic behaviour. Lambert et al. (1993) 
find that CEO compensation is lower when the CEOs ownership is higher and when 
there is a block holder among the company’s shareholders. Yeo et al. (2002) reported 
block holder ownership moderates the relationship between managerial ownership 
and agency conflict. Thus, the result implies that block holder ownership can become 
an effective monitoring mechanism on managerial incentives.   
 
Chen (2006) identified at least three reasons why institutional investors are more 
active in monitoring than individual shareholders. First, it is incumbent upon the 
institutional investors to be proactive because they are investing on behalf of their 
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clients or shareholders. In other words, it is their legal fiduciary duties to act 
according to their stakeholders. Second, institutional investors must exercise their 
power in response to poor firm performance. Failure to do so may result in lowering 
the share price thus affecting them badly as they own substantial percentage of the 
company’s shares. Finally, institutional investors are able to govern and judge 
remuneration policy due to their economy of scale and opportunities to interact with 
other firms. In addition, David et al. (1998) also highlighted the fact that institutional 
investors may have difficulties to find substitute investments due to their volume of 
ownership, thus motivated them to monitor executives.  
        
Previous studies both in developed and developing countries support the relationship 
between block holder ownership and directors’ remuneration. For instance, David et 
al. (1998) and Hartzell and Starks (2003) conducted studies on US firms and conclude 
that institutional investors have a direct impact on CEO pay policy. Chen (2006) and 
Firth et al. (1999) also documented similar findings based on their study in China and 
Hong Kong respectively. Despite consistency of result reported in the previous study, 
little evidence was found in the Malaysian environment. Dogan and Smyth (2002) has 
tested the relationship and found some evidence on the ownership concentration but 
this study suffers from sample selection bias and inconsistent sample size over the 
sampled period. Hence, the hypotheses related to block holder ownership are 
presented as follows: 
H11a: There is a negative relationship between directors’ remuneration and 
block shareholdings. 
H11b: There is a positive relationship between directors’ pay-performance 
sensitivity and block shareholdings. 
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3.6.2 Human capital attributes 
 
Human capital theory suggests that individual human capital explains the 
remuneration level. An individual with high human capital attributes should become 
more productive and efficient than those individual with less human capital attributes  
thus should be rewarded higher (Agrawal 1981). This proposition was supported by a 
number of studies (Finkelstein and Hambrick 1989; McKnight and Tomkins 2004; 
Milbourn 2003; Tosi and Gomez-Mejia 1989). In addition, Malaysian government has 
placed great emphasis on human capital development among the people. It is 
therefore important to examine whether the firms are recognising the attributes 
accordingly in the case of executive directors. Among the most common human 
capital attributes examined are directors’ age, tenure and education. 
 
Directors’ Age  
 
Age is one aspect of human capital attributes that reflects experience and expertise of 
a person. Older directors would be exposed to various training that raises their 
productivity, knowledge and skills (Becker 1994). Thus it will be reflected in their 
level of pay.  Age is also expected to have an influence on individual attitudes 
towards risk (McKnight and Tomkins 2004). Hitt and Tyler (1991) argue that risk 
acceptance is encouraged by modifying reward systems at different levels of the 
organization. Research to date suggests that younger individuals are more ready to 
accept risk (Hambrick and Mason 1984). In addition, prior research suggests that age 
may be related to corporate growth (Child, 1974), strategic decisions (Wiersema and 
Bantel, 1992) and remuneration decisions (Hitt and Barr, 1989).   
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Prior research has provided mixed results with regard to CEO age (Ingham and 
Thomson 1995; Kostiuk 1990; McKnight and Tomkins 2004; Deckop 1988). For 
instance, Ingham and Thomson (1995) and Hogan and McPheters (1980) both 
reported a positive influence of directors’ age on CEO remuneration. On the other 
hand, Deckop (1988) examined the incremental effect of CEO age on cash 
remuneration, measured by salary plus bonus, and concluded that age was not a 
significant pay determinant. McKnight and Tomkins (2004) found weak influence of 
directors’ age on remuneration. Due to this inconclusive findings, the following non-
directional hypothesis is developed: 
 
H12: There is a relationship between directors’ remuneration and average 
directors’ age. 
 
Directors’ Tenure 
 
Long tenure can also be related to high experience and expertise of a person. More 
importantly, long tenure would allow director to build a proven track record and 
develop new relationships with key individuals both within and outside the 
organization (i.e. a political dimension). Throughout this process, an executive may 
also accumulate wealth in the form of company stock (i.e. many times via share 
options). These two power dimensions allow an executive to acquire the respect and 
confidence of key board members; enough perhaps to exercise influence over their 
voting rights. As a result, an executive in this position may encourage the 
appointment of board members more sympathetic towards his or her views. Hill and 
Phan (1991) relate this directly to the matter of executive pay and argue that through 
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increased tenure the CEO may gain control over the pay setting process and in turn 
design remuneration schemes to his or her preference.  
 
Empirical studies on tenure and directors’ remuneration is also mixed. For example, 
Deckop (1988) claimed executive tenure was a significant variable in determining 
total executive pay, whereas Randoy and Nielsen (2002), Hill and Phan (1991) and 
Finkelstein and Hambrick (1989) found no association. McKnight and Tomkins 
(2004) explain that such contrasting findings may be partially due to selection of a 
single measure of CEO pay; that is, the aggregate of the aggregate of salary and 
bonus. Lewellen et al. (1982) argued changes in salary are lagged with respect to 
achievement (usually growth in size of the firm) whereas a performance bonus is 
contemporaneous with the relevant measure of performance (profit, return on 
investment, etc). McKnight (1996) follow this suggestion and found that by splitting 
salary from bonus, both the size and level of the lagged (salary) and contemporaneous 
(bonus) coefficients increased considerably; suggesting each pay component is 
influenced by a diverse set of factors. However, this study could not follow this 
suggestion as it considers other determining factors on directors’ remuneration. 
Separating different types of remuneration would lead to multiple models that would 
complicate the subject matter. In some cases (for instance McKnight and Tomkins 
2004; Ewers 2002), such move did not improve the model at the end. Hence, the 
following non-directional hypothesis is developed: 
H13: There is a relationship between directors’ remuneration and average 
directors’ tenure. 
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Qualification 
 
Qualification or the extent of education background is one of the important aspects of 
human capital attributes. In general, qualifications provide justification to employer to 
accept a prospective employee, including director that the employee is capable of 
delivering whatever the tasks he or she required to do. In the Malaysian context, 
qualification is one of the most important agenda of the country and became the key 
factor to influence level of pay. To the author’s knowledge, there are no studies 
consider this aspect of human capital. Hence, the direction of the relationship cannot 
be determined. The following hypothesis is predicted: 
  
H14: There is a relationship between directors’ remuneration and directors’ 
qualifications. 
 
3.6.3 Corporate performance 
 
Despite the growing number of studies that attempt to link between directors 
remuneration and corporate performance, the findings of the studies are not robust. 
Empirical studies from US alone found inconsistent results, ranging from strong 
positive relationship (for instance Lewellen and Huntsman 1970; Murphy 1985; 
Deckop 1988; Finkelstein 1989; Mehran 1995) to weak positive relationship (for 
instance Jensen and Murphy 1990; Abowd 1990). Similarly, the UK-based studies 
also found inconclusive findings. However, consistent with agency theory and 
majority of empirical evidence in the US, most UK studies found significant positive 
relationship between directors’ remuneration and performance (for instance Main et. 
al 1996; Cosh and Hughes 1997; Ewers 2002;). Other studies found weak relationship 
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(for instance Main 1991; Gregg et. al 1993; Conyon et. al 1994; Ezzamel and Watson 
1997; Conyon 1997; Conyon 1998; Buck et. al 2003).   
 
The studies in other developed countries also found inconclusive evidence on the 
relationship between executive directors’ remuneration and corporate performance. 
Crespi and Claden (2003) found a significant positive relationship between board 
remuneration and company performance in their studies for large and listed Spanish 
companies for the period from 1990 to 1995. Similar result was found in Italy 
(Brunello et. al 1999), Denmark (Eriksson and Lausten 2000), Germany (Kaplan 
1994b, 1997; Schwalbach and Grasshoff 1996), Canada (Zhou 2000) and Japan (Kato 
and Rockel 1992; Kaplan 1994a, 1997; Kato and Kubo 1996; Kang and Shivdasani 
1995; Abe 1997). However, Randøy and Nielsen (2002) found no evidence to support 
this relationship for their study on Norwegian and Swedish companies except in the 
case of Norwegian firms when they used a change in market-to-book performance 
measure. In Australia, few studies found significant relationship between the two 
variables (Matolcsy 2000; Merhebi et. al 2006) while others found no relationship or 
negative relationship (Defina et. al 1994; Izan et. al 1998; O’Neill and Iob 1999). 
 
The inconsistency of results offered by previous studies warrant more careful 
examination. Overall, the inconclusive results are due to the differences in variable 
measurements, statistical techniques, data sets and the way constructs are studied 
among these studies (Tosi et. al 2000). Early studies conducted after 1960s attempt to 
empirically test sales-maximisation hypothesis introduced first by Baumol (1967). His 
hypothesis states that when there is a separation between owners and control of an 
organisation, managers tend to pursue their own goals. Managers are expected to act 
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to increase sales rather than to maximise the present value of the company. Hence, the 
early remuneration-performance studies (for instance Lewellen and Huntsman 1970; 
Cosh 1975; Ciscel and Caroll 1980; Hogan and McPheters 1980) uses cash 
compensation as a measure of remuneration and sales as the measure of performance. 
They found positively association between remuneration and performance and to a 
lesser degree between accounting profits and remuneration, hence their findings 
support Baumol’s hypothesis. However, these early studies suffer from a number of 
weaknesses. They ignore other form of remuneration except cash compensation; 
exclude stock performance as a measure of company performance, employ cross-
sectional methodology that fails to consider differences between individuals and firms 
and focus only on remuneration level per se but not on changes in remuneration 
(Pavlik et. al 1993).  
 
Subsequent studies made adjustments to overcome these shortcomings. For instance, 
remuneration’s measurement was broadened to include options, long-term incentives, 
executive stock holdings and other components. Mason (1971) uses comprehensive 
compensation measurements such as cash, bonuses, deferred compensation, 
retirement benefits and stock options and stock market return as performance 
measurement. He found that comprehensive compensation was strongly related to 
firm stock market performance but not with sales performance. He concluded that the 
hypothesis present-value maximisation better explains firm behaviour than Baumol’s 
hypothesis of sales maximisation. His conclusion was further supported by several 
studies (Murphy 1985; Antle and Smith 1986; Clinch 1991; Jensen and Murphy 
1990). They found that the inclusion of stock-related type of remuneration directly 
cause relationship between executive directors’ remuneration and wealth of 
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shareholders (measured by stock return). In addition, few studies (Benson 1985; 
Murphy 1985) found that the changes in directors’ wealth from holding stock are very 
large compare to their salaries during the time when company’s stock return is high. 
This suggests that directors are likely to be interested to maximise stock return and 
therefore justify the importance of stock-related compensation in aligning manager 
and shareholder interests.  
 
Studies in developing countries also found mixed results. Dogan and Smyth (2002) 
found significant positive relationship between form performance (measured by sales 
turnover) and board remuneration among Malaysian firms.  In Hong Kong, Firth et al 
(1999) also found significant positive relationship between accounting profitability 
and management remuneration, but no relationship in the case of stock returns. Based 
on the above discussion, most of the empirical studies support agency theory, thus 
leads to the following hypothesis:                 
 
H15: There is a positive relationship between directors’ remuneration and firm 
performance. 
 
3.6.4 Other factors – control variables 
 
The determination of executive directors’ remuneration is not entirely associated with 
corporate performance alone. Previous studies in the developed countries documented 
other factors that affect performance. In general, these factors can be divided into two 
groups – company attributes and personal attributes. These factors are not the main 
focus of this study but are included as control variables in many remuneration-
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performance studies (for instance Ewers 2002; Clarkson et. al 2005). The most 
common company attribute that has been established by scholars to have relationship 
with executive directors’ remuneration is company size. It has been empirically 
proven that company size has strong affect on the level of executive directors’ 
remuneration (Tosi et al 2000; Gregg et. al 1993). Other variables include leverage, 
risk, industry, whether a company has a multiple listing, ownership structure and 
whether a company is being audited by big four firms or smaller firms.  
 
Firm size 
 
Both economic and sociological theory can be used to explain the relationship 
between remuneration and company size. Roberts (1959) explains using neo-classical 
economic theory that the marginal productivity of a chief executive varies directly 
with the size of the company he manages. In other words, large company will have 
higher marginal productivity and remuneration as compared to the smaller company. 
Alternatively, Simon (1957) explains that remuneration and company size is related 
based on three sociological premises. First, remuneration must be internally 
‘consistent’ whereby the determination of director’s remuneration must be 
competitive with the lowest executive levels or new employees hired from outside 
organisation. Second, remuneration is also determined socially, in which a norm for 
the ‘steepness’ of organisational hierarchies (also known as the span of control) must 
be met. Finally, due to influence of competitive market forces, companies are forced 
to pay the similar salaries with other companies in the similar market.  
 
The above theoretical proposition was supported by empirical works of other studies 
(for instance Marris 1967; Lewellen and Huntsman 1970; Leonard 1990; Ewers 2002; 
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Merhebi 2006). The most common variables used to measure size are total asset, sales 
revenue and market capitalisation.  Main (1991) found no evidence to support that 
firm size has an impact on directors’ remuneration among his US sampled firms. 
McKnight (1996) found strong relationship between firm size and executive directors’ 
salary in UK firms.  In Hong Kong, Firth et al (1999) also found similar result to 
support firm size as the major determinants for management remuneration. In Canada, 
Zhou (2000) found positive relationship between firm size and CEO compensation. 
Similar findings found by Crespi-Cladera and Gispert (2003) in their study using 
Spanish firms as the sample. Randoy and Nielsen (2002) also found positive 
relationship between CEO remuneration and firm size measured by market 
capitalisation among Scandinavian companies.  
 
 
Firm Risk  
 
  
According to agency theory, managers are assumed to be risk averse (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976). Thus, managers that manage firms with higher risk should be 
compensated more than managers who manage firms with low risk. The additional 
compensation is to reward the managers for their willingness to face insecurity of 
firms’ return. Therefore, firm risk, both as a measure of the firm’s information 
environment and the risk of its operating environment, is also a potentially important 
determinant of the level of CEO compensation. Consistent with other empirical 
research on compensation (e.g., Smith and Watts 1992; Core 1997), this study 
includes measures of firm risk as control variables for the level of compensation.  
 
Garen (1994) and Miller et al. (2002) reported an positive relationship between firm 
risk and total remuneration. Miller et al. (2002) also found that firm specific risk are 
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stronger than those of market-driven risk. Other studies such as Bloom and Milkovich 
1998; Chen 2006; Murphy 2000) also reported the same findings both in developed 
and developing countries. This study will therefore control for firm risk effect.    
 
Firm Diversification  
 
Firm strategic stance was another factor that may affect directors’ remuneration. In 
particular, level of firms’ diversification is expected to increase the complexity of 
management’s job (Finlekstein and Hambrick 1989). A diversified firm needs 
managers to make strategic allocation decisions that require him or her significant 
understanding of more than one product markets (Rose and Shepard 1997). 
Management of a diversified company needs to exercise greater efforts to learn and 
master knowledge of its various customers, competitors, product life cycles and 
competitive strategies in multiple product lines. As a result, it is expected the 
management remuneration would increase as a reward for managing this added 
complexity.  
 
Finkelstein and Hambrick (1989) and Riahi-Belkaoui and Pavlik (1993) both found 
diversifications relate positively to CEO remuneration. Hence, this study will include 
diversification as one of its control variable.  
 
Industry 
 
Companies that operate in different industry faced different level of competitiveness 
and challenges. It is therefore affect the level of firm risks. For example, companies 
that operate in fast changing technology environment will face high competition thus 
more risky than the other industry. Accordingly, the managers in the industry should 
be compensated higher for the risk that they have to take. Zhou (2000) found 
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executives in utility firms earn lower pay and their compensation is less responsive to 
performance compare to their counterparts in other industries in Canada. This shows 
that there is differentiation between the levels of directors’ remuneration among 
different industry. Thus, the study will control of the industry effects. 
 
3.7 Summary 
 
This chapter has discussed and reviewed critically both agency and human capital 
theory. An overview of literatures found in both developed and developing countries 
were presented separately in order to show the lack of studies in the developing 
countries. This shows the importance and the motivation for the author to pursue this 
study. I have also reviewed the literature based on each factor that may affect 
directors’ remuneration. It was clear from the discussions in this chapter that the 
empirical findings are still not consistent. It therefore warrants for further research. 
 
This study aims to examine the determinants of executive directors’ remuneration in 
Malaysia, specifically focusing on corporate governance mechanisms, human capital 
attributes and firm performance. Based on the literature, theory and institutional 
background in Malaysia, several hypotheses were developed in this chapter. Table 3.1 
summarise the factors included in this study and the predicted sign of the relationship 
between the variables. 
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Table 3.1. Summary of hypotheses and their predicted sign 
Hypothesis Dependent variable Independent variable Predicted sign 
1a Directors’ remuneration 
Board size 
? 
1b Directors’ pay-performance sensitivity ? 
2a Directors’ remuneration 
Frequency of board meetings 
? 
2b Directors’ pay-performance sensitivity ? 
3a Directors’ remuneration 
Proportion of independent directors 
- 
3b Directors’ pay-performance sensitivity + 
4a Directors’ remuneration 
Proprotion of non executive directors 
? 
4b Directors’ pay-performance sensitivity ? 
5a Directors’ remuneration 
Proportion of interlocked directors 
+ 
5b Directors’ pay-performance sensitivity - 
6a Directors’ remuneration 
Proportion of old directors 
+ 
6b Directors’ pay-performance sensitivity - 
7a Directors’ remuneration 
Proportion of busy directors 
? 
7b Directors’ pay-performance sensitivity ? 
8a Directors’ remuneration 
CEO- chairman duality 
+ 
8b Directors’ pay-performance sensitivity - 
9a Directors’ remuneration 
Directors’ direct ownership 
- 
9b Directors’ pay-performance sensitivity + 
10a Directors’ remuneration 
Directors’ indirect ownership 
- 
10b Directors’ pay-performance sensitivity + 
11a Directors’ remuneration 
Block holder ownership 
- 
11b Directors’ pay-performance sensitivity + 
12 Directors’ remuneration Directors’ age ? 
13 Directors’ remuneration Directors’ tenure ? 
14 Directors’ remuneration Directors’ qualification ? 
15 Directors’ remuneration Firm performance + 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 Introduction and Overview of the Chapter 
 
Chapter three presents review of theories and literature on corporate governance that 
relates to the determinants of executive directors’ remuneration. Accordingly, several 
research hypotheses were developed. This chapter aims to describe the research 
methodology employed by this study in order to fulfil the research objectives and 
research questions stated in section 1.2.    
 
This study adopts quantitative research approach. Quantitative approach involves 
precision and can offer statistical and significant effects while qualitative approach 
yields rich source of data. Most studies (except a few for instance Bender 2003) in 
this area applied quantitative approach due to difficulty in getting access and 
information from public listed companies’ directors. More importantly, quantitative 
approach is appropriate as it fits to answer the research objectives and questions.   
 
To test the research hypothesis stated in section 1.3, the study uses a panel data set of 
417 Malaysian listed companies for the period of 2004 to 2006. The data was first 
analysed using cross sectional pooled data ordinary least square (OLS) regression. 
However, OLS fails to control for unobservable firm specific factors that might affect 
directors’ executive remuneration. Hence, panel data techniques are used in order to 
control for those factors and at the same time reduce the effect of omitted data on the 
final result (Hsiao 2003).   
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This chapter is divided into ten sections. The first section presents the introduction 
followed by section 4.2 which explains the research design used in this study. Section 
4.3 describes the sample selection and section 4.4 explains the data collection used. 
The following section presents the modelling specification used in this study. Section 
4.6 defines the variables and measurement for all dependent and independent 
variables for this study. Section 4.7 and 4.8 respectively describe the descriptive and 
multivariate analysis carried out in this study. Finally, section 4.10 concludes this 
chapter.   
 
4.2 Research Design  
 
Essentially, the selection of research methodology should be based on the ability of 
that approach to address the specific research questions. Majority of the studies 
conducted in this area employed quantitative methods, with few studies used 
qualitative methods (for instance Bender 2004, Main & Johnston 1993, McNulty et. al 
2003; Perkins and Hendry 2005) and the combination of both methods (for instance 
Conyon & Murphy 2000, Ogden and Watson 2004). The main reasons that hinder 
researchers from using qualitative methods are difficulties in getting access to the 
individuals involved in remuneration settings and the sensitivity of the subject matter 
to the respondents (Ewers 2002; Chen 2006).  
 
Few studies tried to adopt qualitative approach in studying directors’ remuneration. 
Bender (2004) provides evidence that qualitative approach able to generate deeper 
understanding of how executive remuneration is determined. She managed to provide 
excellent insights of remuneration setting process that adds our understanding to this 
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topic. However, pure qualitative approach is difficult to follow as it is difficult to gain 
access to directors and time consuming. For instance, Bender (2004) spent nearly one 
and a half year in conducting interviews and observations alone.  
 
Despite the strength and weaknesses of both approaches, the final selection of the 
methods must be based on the specific research questions that this study seeks to 
answer. To recap, this study aims to examine the factors that affect the level of 
executive directors’ remuneration in Malaysia, in particular governance structure, 
corporate performance and human capital attributes. In other words, this study 
attempts to answer the ‘what’ question rather than ‘how’ question. The questions also 
need large number of samples in order to generalise the results. It is therefore 
appropriate to use quantitative approach for this study.  
 
This study will utilise secondary data that are available from companies’ annual 
reports. Most previous researchers (for instance Ewers 2002; Chen 2006) 
acknowledged that remuneration is a sensitive subject to respondents and most of 
them chose not to discuss the area in details. Due to the sensitivity of the subject, it is 
argued that directors will be reserved on what they say and it is likely to get different 
information other than information that were publicly available. Hence, the use of 
questionnaire would generate few responds and less answers from the directors. Same 
problems were faced in the researcher’s attempt to do interviews. Only one director 
agreed conditionally to do the interview after several attempts via letter, email and 
phone calls to the directors. Bender (2004) highlighted the key reason for her ability 
to do interviews and observations is the personal contact with the respondents.     
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The data will be analysed using cross sectional pooled data ordinary least square 
(OLS) regression. Different models were tested and some improvement and 
modifications were made in order to improve the final model. The final model 
presented was the best model after taking into consideration of major issues like 
normality, heteroscedasticity, multicollinearity etc. Each issue will be discussed 
separately in the later parts of this chapter     
 
4.3 Sample Selection 
 
The main research method used in this study is secondary data analysis. This method 
enables the results to be generalisable, provided the sample size is sufficiently large.  
Scholars have different opinions of what constitute large. Tabachnick and Fidell 
(1996) argued that sample size should depend on the number of independent variables 
used. They device a specific formula to calculate sample size: N>50 + 8m (where m is 
equal to the number of independent variables). Stevens (1996) suggest reliable 
equation should use 15 subjects per independent variable.     
 
In this study, there are limited numbers of companies listed in BMB. In 2004, there 
are a total of 963 companies listed in both the main and secondary listing board. This 
study covers the period from 2004 to 2006 inclusive. In order to reduce the number of 
missing data, only companies that are listed during the entire period of study will be 
included. Thus, new companies listed after 2004, insolvent or de-listed companies 
will be excluded from the sample. In addition, all financial related and investment 
companies will also be excluded from the sample as these companies are subjected to 
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other specific regulations. Thus the total selected sample for this study is reduced to 
842 companies with 2,526 total observations.  
 
Based on BMB classification, this study grouped the public listed companies in 
Malaysia into five main industry group (Table 4.1). Few original industry 
classification by BMB are being combined together in order to improve the number of 
companies in that group. For instance, property, hotel, plantation and mining 
companies are grouped together. Fifty percent of the companies in each of the 
category are selected randomly to make up the final sample of 417 companies. The 
study does not choose the sample according to size of the companies (main or second 
board) because the models used later will control the firm size. The stratified random 
sampling technique will ensure the results based on the sample can represent all type 
of industries in Malaysia. The final companies selected for this study according to 
their industry classification are presented in Table 4.1.  
 
Table 4.1. Sample size according to industry classification 
Industry 
Size 
Percentage 
Population Sample  
Consumer Product 133 66 50% 
Industrial Product 281 139 50% 
Trading & Services/ Technology 216 107 50% 
Construction / IPC 65 32 50% 
Property/Hotel/Plantation/ Mining 147 73 50% 
Total  842 417 50% 
 
4.4 Data Collection 
 
Section 4.2 explains the quantitative approach and the use of secondary data by this 
study. The study derived its secondary data from two main sources. The first source is 
from DataStream database. Using this database, only financial data were extracted, for 
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examples market capitalisation, total assets, net profit and total equity value. The 
second source of data used is from individual sampled firms’ annual reports. Majority 
of the data on corporate governance and human capital attributes are not available 
from the database, for instance number of independent directors in board, number of 
interlocking directors, number of ‘busy’ directors, age and tenure of directors. The 
individual firms’ full annual reports were downloaded from BMB’s website.  
 
All data collected are for the three year period from 2004 to 2006. However, for a 
number of variables like return on asset and return on equity, the relevant data are 
collected for year 2003 in order to calculate the lag effect of these variables. The 
period was chosen because prior to 2001, disclosures on corporate governance matters 
were very limited. The issuance of MCCG and the new listing requirements by BMB 
had improved the disclosure on corporate governance matters, in particular on 
directors’ remuneration significantly. The study allows for two years adjusting period 
for the firms to ensure consistent level of disclosure among the listed firms. Three 
years period is appropriate to separate company’s specific effects on directors’ 
remuneration through panel data analysis.   
 
4.5 Modelling Specification 
 
This study seeks to develop a model that able to explain the level of executive 
directors’ remuneration among Malaysian listed firms. In particular, the executive 
directors’ remuneration model will explain the impact of corporate governance 
variables, human capital attributes and corporate performance. The models will be 
used to test the hypotheses specified in section 1.3.  
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It was explained in chapter 3 that corporate governance variables, human capital 
attributes and corporate performance are among the important variables that affect the 
level of executive directors’ remuneration. These three factors are the main focus of  
this study. Other factors like firm size, firm risk and firm diversification are also 
considered in this study. However, these variables will only act as control variables 
thus will not be the discussed in length. Figure 4.1 summarises the main three factors 
that affect executive directors’ remuneration considered in this study. 
 
Figure 4.1. Summary of factors that affects executive directors’ remuneration 
 
 
In order to test the hypotheses 1a, 2a, 3a, 4a, 5a, 6a, 7a, 8a, 9a, 10a, 11a,12, 13, 14 and 
15, the following model is used: 
Lntotalremit = 0 + 1 Perfit + g CGgit + h HChit + c Controlcit +  
tt Dummy  + εit 
 
  
Directors' 
Remuneration 
Human 
Capital 
Attributes 
Corporate 
Governance 
Variables 
Corporate 
Performance 
Control 
variables 
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where:  
i = 1, 2, 3….N (1 to 417 companies); 
t = 1, 2 ….T 
itLntotalrem  refers to the log of reported total remuneration of executive directors’ 
remuneration for company i in the year t. 
Perfit  refers to firm performance of company i for year t.                     
itCG  refers to corporate governance variables for company i in the year t. CG consists 
of twelve specific variables – (1) board size (Boardsize); (2) frequency of board 
meetings (BMeet); (3) proportion of independent directors (Indpt_Board); (4) 
proportion of non executive directors (Nexecdir); (5) proportion of interlocking 
directors (Interlock); (6) proportion of old non executive directors (Old); (7) 
proportion of busy non executive directors (Busy); (8) CEO-chariman duality 
(CEO_Dual); (9) direct managerial ownership (Directshare); (10) indirect managerial 
ownership (Indirectshare); and (11) outside blockholder ownership (Blockshare). 
Therefore,  g CGgit is the sum of all the eleven corporate governance variables (i.e.  
g CGgit  =   2 Boardsize + 3 BMeet +  4 Indpt_Board  + 5 Nexecdir + 6
Interlock + 7 Old + 8 Busy + 9 CEO_Dual + 10 Directshare  +  11 Indirectshare + 
12 Blockshare), where g = 2 to 12 for coefficients of the eleven corporate governance 
variables.  
       
 
itHC  refers to human capital attributes for company i in the year t.   HC consists of 
three specific variables – (1) directors’ tenure (Tenure); (2) directors’ age (Age); and 
(3) directors’ qualifications (Qualify). Therefore, h HChit is the sum of all three 
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human capital attributes (i.e. h HChit = 13 Tenure + 14 Age + 15 Qualify), where 
h = 14 to 15 for coefficients of the three human capital variables. 
 
itControl  refers to the control variables for company i in the year t. (such as firm size, 
leverage and location). c is the indexes of the control variables. 
itDummy    refers to the set of dummy variables for time. 
 and t are both coefficients for independent variables and time dummy 
respectively.              
it  
 refers to the error term for company i in year t.     
 
Note that the model can be extended into several sub-models because there are a 
number of proxies used for the both dependent and independent variables. The full 
discussion on definition for each variables and proxies will be explained in Section 
4.6.   
 
 
The above model only captured the direct effects of corporate governance 
mechanisms on directors’ remuneration. This study also interested to know the 
indirect effects of corporate governance and performance on directors’ remuneration 
(i.e. the interactions terms between the corporate governance variables and 
performance). This is to test hypothesis 1b, 2b, 3b, 4b, 5b, 6b, 7b, 8b, 9b, 10b and 
11b.  The following model adds the interactions terms into the existing model 
presented earlier: 
 Lntotalremit =  0 +  1 Perfit  + g CGgit + h HChit + Perfit  x 14 g CGgit + 
c Controlcit +  tt Dummy  + εit 
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The indexes remain the same as in the original equation, except for the thirteen 
additional interactions. To recap, the coefficients for main effects of corporate 
governance variables are from 
2  to 13 . The corresponding interactions terms’ 
coefficients would be from 17  to 28 . For example, the index for Boardsize is 2 (i.e. 
g = 2) while the index for interaction terms between performance and boardsize is 16 
(i.e. g = 2 +14).  
 
4.6 Variables Definition and Measurement       
 
4.6.1 Dependent Variable: Remuneration 
 
Milkovich and Newman (2002) define remuneration as ‘all forms of financial returns 
and tangible services and benefits employees receive as part of an employment 
relationship’. At present, directors of company receive their rewards in many forms. 
By right, compensation packages should be design to compensate, sustain, motivate 
and reward directors of company. In the early 1970s, where the separation of 
ownership is not yet common, directors were paid simply in the form of cash – both 
for the salary and bonuses. As the corporate structure becomes relatively more 
complex, new forms of rewards were needed to sustain and motivate managers.   
 
Pavlik et. Al (1993) has identified eleven components of executive compensation: 
i) short-term incentive bonus – A periodic, usually lump sum cash payment 
based on corporate and/or individual performance; 
ii) Stock bonuses – Periodic distribution of shares of stock, usually based on 
years of service, position, or extraordinary performance. 
105 
 
iii) Deferred compensation – Any type of cash or stock remuneration whose 
receipt is deferred to future periods. For instance ‘golden handcuff’, 
whereby bonus are deferred over a period of time after it is earned. 
iv) Stock options – Rights to purchase shares at a fixed price in the future 
period. 
v) Stock appreciation rights – Rights to increase in stock price from the time 
awarded to payment date. 
vi) Restricted stock plan – Stock awarded to managers that remain loyal to 
company for a number of years.  
vii) Long-term incentive performance plans – Accounting-based plans that 
reward managers based on performance over a period of time, usually at 
least a three to six year period 
viii) Pension plans – Plans to provide managers payment upon retirement. 
ix) Interest-free loans  
x) Life Insurance 
xi) Other perquisites – For instance club membership, medical check-ups, 
automobiles, etc. 
 
However, most studies used cash from salary and bonuses as their measures of 
remuneration (for instance Ciscel and Carroll 1980; Agrawal 1981; Deckop 1988; 
Ezzamel and Watson 1997). More recent studies however adopted more vigorous 
analysis whereby they include other types of remuneration. For instance, Ewers 
(2002) identified four categories of directors’ remuneration in UK: (i) salary; (ii) short 
term bonus; (iii) longer term incentive; and (iv) ownership income. Accordingly, he 
develops four different sets of model for each type of remuneration and links it with 
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performance. Clarkson et al. (2005) also develop four separate models to explain 
remuneration in Australia. They examine salary, bonus, options and total 
remuneration separately. However, their findings show that there not much difference 
between all the models except for options whereby not a single variable is significant. 
It is however important to note that such thorough analysis is possible due to 
increasing disclosure by companies on directors’ remuneration.    
 
In the context of Malaysia, the level of disclosure among listed companies is 
relatively low compared to other developed countries. Companies only report the total 
executive directors’ remuneration and total non-executive directors’ remuneration for 
the year, without being specific the amount each executive director or non-executive 
director received. In most cases, salary and other emoluments are grouped together 
and other fringe benefits are grouped into the other category. Given the nature of 
disclosure among Malaysian listed companies, it is impossible to separate and develop 
separate models for each type of remuneration. However, Dogan and Smyth (2002) 
argued that the use of total executive remuneration is more appropriate to explain 
performance as the performance is determined by the whole board and not only by the 
CEO or other single executive director of the company. The same argument was put 
forward by Main et al. (1996) and Crespi-Cladera & Gispert (2003) for using total 
board directors’ remuneration in their studies.    
 
Table 4.3 summarises the variables used in this study and its definitions.  Based on the 
model described in Section 4.5, the dependent variable used in the regression is 
executive directors’ remuneration. Malaysian firms are not required by the MCCG to 
disclose the exact details of directors’ remuneration. It was found that some firms 
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disclose more than other. Due to such variations, it is only possible to use two type of 
measurements for executive directors’ remuneration; total remuneration 
(TOTALREM) and total cash remuneration (TOTALCASHREM). Total 
remuneration is the sum of salary, bonus, fees, benefits and others but not including 
shares options. Total cash remuneration only measures the sum of salary, bonus and 
fees.  Share options or other market based incentives are excluded from the study 
because of inconsistent format of reporting among the sampled firms as well as the 
details of reports varies across the forms. In order to avoid many missing data and 
inaccurate data, the market based incentives are excluded from the study. 
 
4.6.2. Independent Variables 
 
Corporate Governance Variables 
 
Corporate governance variables are mainly divided into two – board characteristics 
and ownership structure. This study identifies eleven board characteristics to be 
included into four different groups. 
1. Board size and activities is measured using the board size (BOARDSIZE) and 
frequency of board meeting (BMEET). BOARDSIZE refers to the total number of 
directors served in the board. It includes both executive and non executive 
directors. BMEET is measured as the number of board meetings held over the 
entire financial year period.  
2. Board independence is measure using three different proxies – (i) proportion of 
independent non executive directors in the board (INDPT_BOARD); (ii) 
proportion of independent directors in audit committee (INDPT_AUDIT); and (iii) 
proportion of independent directors in remuneration committee (INDPT_REM).   
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3. Board composition is measured using four proxies – (i) proportion of non 
executive directors in the board (NEXECDIR); (ii) proportion of interlocking 
directors in the board (INTERLOCK); (iii) proportion of old non executive 
directors (OLD); and (iv) proportion of busy non executive directors (BUSY). 
Both OLD and BUSY directors are considered as less effective member of the 
board. Old directors are defined as any director aged more than 70 years old while 
busy directors are directors who serve in more than three companies other than the 
company itself (Core et al. 1999).  
4. Board leadership is measured by CEO-Chairman duality roles (CEO_DUAL). In 
order to capture this variable into regression, a dummy variable was created, 
which equals to 1 if CEO serve as Chairman of the board and 0 otherwise.  
 
Ownership structure is another aspect of corporate governance variables. This study 
identify three types of ownership structure – (i) proportion of direct managerial 
ownership (DIRSHARE); (ii) proportion of indirect managerial ownership 
(INDIRECTSHARE); and (iii) proportion outside block holder ownership 
(BLOCKSHARE). Indirect managerial ownership includes ownership held by 
directors’ close relatives such as wife or husband, children and parents. An outside 
shareholder holding more than 5% of the total shares offered will be considered as 
block holder. In Malaysia scenario, most of the block holders are institutional 
shareholder, either government link companies or foreign companies.  
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Human Capital Attributes 
 
Human capital attributes are measured in three ways – (i) directors’ age (AGE); (ii) 
directors’ tenure; (iii) directors’ qualifications. Previous studies on human capital only 
look at the CEO age, tenure and qualifications only (for instance Ingham and 
Thomson (1995); Milbourne (2003); McKnights and Tomkins (2004)). On the other 
hand, this study looks at the factors affecting executive directors’ remuneration. 
Hence, for this study, AGE is defined as average age of the executive directors. 
TENURE is defined as average tenure of all executive directors and QUALIFY is 
measured by dummy variables which equals 1 if the executive director is university 
graduates or professionally qualified and 0 if he or she is a non university graduates.   
   
Firm Performance 
 
Scholars in business and management discipline had devoted extensive time to better 
proxy firm performance. In accounting, earlier studies used some basic accounting 
and accounting ratios measurements as well as stock market measurement. However, 
recent studies claimed that return on investment (ROI), residual income (RI) and 
economic value added (EVA) is a better corporate performance measurement. For 
instance, Spinner (1997) proposed that EVA is the best measure for corporate 
performance among all other measurement including activity-based costing (ABC). In 
US-based studies, Tobin’s Q is also used widely to measure corporate performance. 
Pavlik et al. (1993) argued that accounting return explains more of the variance in 
cash compensation than stock return. Accounting measures reflect many factors 
including successful role played by board. In addition, accounting measures are not 
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affected by general economy –wide shocks, thus do not suffer any uncontrollable 
factors. 
 
Very few studies adopt these new measurements in the remuneration-performance 
studies (for instance Spinner 1997). Most of the studies employ the classic accounting 
and stock market return measurements. Specifically, the remuneration-performance 
literature shows that there are at least five groups of proxy to measure company 
performance – (i) accounting measures; (ii) accounting ratios; (iii) stock market 
measures; (iv) economic value measures; and (v) a combination of these measures 
(Ewers 2002). Among the common accounting measurements and accounting ratios 
used are accounting profit (for instance Lewellen and Huntsman 1970; Ciscel and 
Caroll 1980; Jensen and Murphy 1990), sales revenue (for instance Baumol 1987; 
Coughlin and Schmidt 1985), return on assets (for instance Finkelstein and Boyd 
1998), return on equity (for instance Lambert and Larcker 1987; Larcker 1992) and 
return on capital employed (for instance Abowd 1990; Ante and Smith 1986). Only 
few studies use total assets (for instance Vafeas and Theodorou 1996) and return on 
sales (for instance Deckop 1988) as the measurement for corporate performance. 
Stock market measures are more popular among economists and finance scholars. 
Among the common measurements are shareholders’ return and stock market return 
(for instance Murphy 1985; Conyon and Gregg 1994; Main et. al 1996; Ezzamel and 
Watson 1997). Stock return explains more when compensation includes executive 
stock holdings and other stock equivalents (Pavlik et. al 1993). However, Conyon et. 
al (2000) argued market based measurements are forward looking because the 
measures emphasise on the expected return.  
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Literatures also suggest that timing of performance is important (Chen 2006; Conyon 
and Leech 1994; Gregg et. al 1993). It was argued that the use of lagged performance 
variables facilitate reduction on potential ambiguity of mutual causality that may be 
due to the endogeneity of executive remuneration and firm performance (Jensen and 
Murphy 1990). In addition, Chen (2006) also argues that the fact that directors’ 
remuneration being determined a year before make lagged performance variables 
reflect the actual timing of the impact of company performance on executive 
remuneration.   
 
This study uses both accounting based measures and market based measures. Five top 
accounting based measures are selected; return on asset (ROA), one-year lag ROA, 
return on equity (ROE), one-year lag ROE and return on sales (ROS). Two market 
based measurements are selected; Tobin’s Q and market based equity (MBE). 
However, after initial test on the correlation of all the variables, both of the market 
based variables have very low and insignificant relationship with directors’ 
remuneration. Hence, this study includes only the accounting based variables.  
 
However, it is found that these five variables have very high correlation as presented 
in Table 4.2. In order to reduce high correlation between these five accounting based 
measures, this study run a factor analysis in order to establish an index that take into 
account different measurement of performance. The principal component analysis 
extraction method was used and the result is presented in Table 4.3. Thus, only one 
final variable on performance will be included in the final regression, known as 
PERF.  
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Table 4.2. Correlation between financial performance measurement 
  Roa Lag_roa Roe Lag_roe Ros 
Roa 1.0000     
Lag_roa 0.8533 1.0000    
Roe  0.7636 0.6564 1.0000   
Lag_roe 0.3255 0.4964 0.3122 1.0000  
Ros  04327 0.5068 0.3872 0.2342 1.0000 
 
 
Table 4.3. Factor analysis results for accounting based performance measures 
Factor Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
1 3.07293 2.27343 0.6146 0.6146 
2 0.79950 0.10723 0.1599 0.7745 
3 0.69228 0.36237 0.1385 0.9129 
4 0.32990 0.22451 0.0660 0.9789 
5 0.10539 - 0.0211 1.0000 
 
Control Variables 
There are six control variables used in this study, namely firm size, firm risk, firm 
diversification, location, industry and year dummies.    
 
Firm Size 
It was widely established in the earlier studies that firm size is positively associated 
with the level of executive directors’ remuneration (Tosi et. al 2000). Most 
researchers used market capitalisation, sales and number of employees as the proxy to 
firm size (O’Reilly et. al 1988). In this study, market capitalisation is used as the main 
measurement for firm size. Sales are used as an alternative proxy for robustness 
checks.   
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Firm Risk 
Firm that financed its operation mainly through debt (borrowings) is more risky than a 
firm that financed itself through equity. If a firm acquires high amount of debt, the 
firm is obliged to fulfil the enforceable contract with creditors, thus reduce the 
possibility of directors’ opportunistic behaviour (Crespi Cladera and Gispert 2003). In 
addition, the directors will find less cash flow to allocate freely (Jensen 1986). Thus, 
if a firm is highly in debt, the discretionary power of the directors would be less and 
this is reflected in their decision on remuneration as well. This study uses leverage to 
measure firms’ risk. Leverage is defined as total book value of debt over total book 
value of equity.   
 
Diversification 
Firm diversification is one aspect of firm strategic position that may affect executive 
directors’ remuneration. Finkelstein and Hambrick (1989) argued that pay expectation 
to CEO increase as the company become more diversified due to increase in CEO’s 
responsibilities and jobs becomes more complex. Following Riahi-Belkaoui and 
Pavlik (1993) and Chen (2006), this study uses product/industry count measures. This 
measure is selected because it is less subjective and reflects accurately the 
diversification of a firm. Firm that operates in many industries would require greater 
expertise on its management as multiple product market needs to be evaluated and 
understand before resource allocation decision can be made.  
 
Industry 
BMB categorised listed companies in Malaysia into eleven industries: consumer 
product, industrial product, trading and services, technology, construction, IPC, 
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property, hotel, plantation, mining and financial services. Financial services 
companies are excluded from the study. Due to small number of companies in few 
categories, the final industries were regrouped into five main industry: consumer 
product, industrial product, trading and services/technology, construction/IPC, 
construction/hotel/plantation/mining. Accordingly, four dummies are constructed. 
Each dummy will equals to 1 if a company belongs to that particular categories and 0 
otherwise.  
  
Location 
Location is important in the context of this study because geographically, Malaysia 
consists of two main parts; the Peninsular and East Malaysia (see section 2.2). The 
development and cost of living varies even in the Peninsular itself. In particular, 
Klang Valley is the most developed region in Malaysia and the cost of living is the 
highest compared to the rest of region in Malaysia. This study breaks the location 
dummy into two categories; Klang Valley and Non Klang Valley. Accordingly, 
location dummy will equals to 1 if the corporate office of a company located in Klang 
Valley and 0 otherwise.  
 
Year   
Year dummies are constructed to factor in macroeconomic shocks. Using the year 
dummies, some effects that are constant across firms but change over time can be 
ruled out, such as inflation and the economic situation (Chen 2006).  
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Table 4.4. Summary of variables, measurements and its definition used in this study 
Variables Measurement / Proxy Definition 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES:  
Executive directors’ remuneration  Total remuneration (TOTALREM) Salary + Bonus + Fees + Benefits + Others 
Cash remuneration (CASHREM) Salary + bonus + Fees 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES:  
Board Characteristics:  
Board size and effectiveness Board size (BOARDSIZE) Total no of directors in the board  
Frequency of board meeting (BMEET) No of board meeting in the financial year 
Board Independence Proportion of independent directors in 
board (INDPT_BOARD) 
No. of independent directors/ total no of directors 
Proportion of independent directors in 
remuneration committee (INDPT_REM) 
No. of independent directors in remuneration committee / 
total no of directors in remuneration committee 
Proportion of independent directors in 
audit committee (INDPT_AUDIT) 
No. of independent directors in audit committee / total no 
of directors in audit committee 
Board Composition Proportion of non executive directors 
(NEXECDIR) 
No. of non executive directors / total no. of directors  
 Proportion of interlocked directors in the 
board (INTERLOCK) 
No. of interlocked directors / total no of directors 
 Proportion of old directors in the board 
(OLD) 
No of old directors / total number of directors 
Proportion of busy directors in the board 
(BUSY) 
No of busy directors / total number of directors 
Board leadership Dummy: CEO also chairman of the board 
(CEO_DUAL) 
Yes =1, No = 0 
Ownership Structure:   
Managerial ownership  Proportion of direct ownership by 
directors (DIRECTSHARE) 
Book Value of direct shares owned by directors/total book 
value of shares  
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Variables Measurement / Proxy Definition 
 Proportion of indirect ownership by 
directors (INDIRECTSHARE) 
Book Value of indirect shares owned by directors/total 
book value of shares 
Block holders ownership Proportion of shares owned by block 
holders (BLOCKSHARE) 
Book Value of shares owned by blockholders/total book 
value of shares 
Human Capital Attributes:   
Age Average age of executive directors in the 
board (AGE) 
Total number of executive directors age / number of 
executive directors in the board 
Tenure Average tenure of executive directors in 
the board 
Total years of tenure of executive directors / number of 
executive directors in the board 
Qualification Dummy: University graduates/ 
professional qualifications  
Yes = 1, No = 0 
Corporate Performance:   
Accounting Based performance ROA Annual earnings / total assets 
Lag ROA Annual earnings year 1 / total assets year 0 
ROE Net Income / shareholders’ equity 
Lag ROE Net Income year1 / shareholders’ equity year 0 
Return on sales (ROS) Net Income / sales 
Market Based performance Tobin’s Q   
 Market based equity (MBE) (Market Value of firms’ equity + debt) / Book Value of 
total assets 
Control Variables:    
Company size Market capitalisation (MKTVALUE) Average market capitalization for 5 years 
Risk Company leverage (LEVERAGE) Book value of total debts / Book value of total equity 
Diversification  No of industry segment (INDUSTRY) No of industry segment  
Location  Dummy: Located in Klang valley  
(LOCATION) 
Yes = 1, No = 0 
Industry  Type of industry (INDUSTRY) Dummy variables: 1 if a firm belongs to a certain industry 
or 0 otherwise 
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4.7 Data Analysis 
There are three steps of data analysis involved in this study: preliminary analysis, 
descriptive analysis and multivariate analysis. 
 
4.7.1. Preliminary Analysis 
 
 
Preliminary analysis is carried out to ensure the variables included in the regression 
are free from error and do not violate the multiple regression assumption on normality 
of the variables. Based on descriptive statistics for each variable (for instance, 
minimum and maximum value, mode and average) and scatter graph, several mistakes 
are identified and corrected. Missing data are also identified and the researcher 
reconfirm that such data is really missing.  
 
Normality test was also carried out for each variable. This is to ensure that no skewed 
variable is entered into regression model. Table 4.4 shows the list of variables that 
requires transformation. After the transformation, the variables are tested once more 
to ensure it was approximately normal.     
Table 4.5.  List of variables being transformed 
Variable Transformation 
MKT_VALUE Natural log 
LEVERAGE Natural log 
TENURE Square root 
BOARDSIZE Square root 
BMEET Natural log 
BLOCKSHARE Natural log 
  
 
This study also examines all variables using scatter graph plot and correlation in order 
to see the pattern and prediction of relationship between dependent and independent 
variables.  
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4.7.2 Descriptive Analysis  
 
Descriptive analysis aims to provide better understanding of the data. Summary 
statistics for each variable is obtained.  It highlights the general description of the 
data, thus enable for comparison between Malaysian data with data from other 
countries, particularly with the West.  The result of descriptive analysis is presented in 
Chapter 5. 
 
4.7.3. Multivariate Analysis 
 
There are three main multivariate analysis conducted in this study: multiple OLS 
regression, regression diagnostics and panel data analysis. A few models of OLS 
regressions are compared in order to find the best model. The model used total 
remuneration (TOTALREM) as its dependent variable. Total cash remuneration 
(CASHREM) was only replaced as a robustness check in order to see if there is any 
significant difference between the two measurements.     
 
The second step in the multivariate analysis is to check if there is any violation of the 
regression assumption. In OLS regression, there are a series of assumptions that need 
to be met such as linearity, normality, homogeneity, independence of errors in 
variables, model specification, influence data and collinearity (Chen 2006; Stock and 
Watson 2003). This study uses many independent variables and this will increase the 
chance the model regressed will violate many of these assumptions. In particular, 
Ciscel and Caroll (1980) named the three most common problems in examining 
executive directors’ remuneration: heteroscedasticity, simultaneous equations bias and 
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measurement error in the data. The following discussion will explain the relevant 
statistical techniques used in order to deal with the problems.    
 
First, the study identify any outliers need to be identified. Outliers can affect the 
reliability of regression model. In order to mitigate this problem, the study used 
summary statistics and scatter plot and examine each variable. Any outlier found is 
traced back to the original source of data to ensure that the data is genuine. 
Corrections are done in the case where data was wrongly entered. If the outliers are 
genuine, it will remain in the data set. Leverage versus residuals square plots are used 
after running regression in order to find influential outliers. If the outliers found to be 
influential, the outliers are removed from the data or using robust regression models. 
Robust regression models give different weights to the observations, thus are suitable 
for non-normal and heavy-tailed error distributions (Hamilton 2004). 
  
Second, in order to deal with normality problem, the study used Shapiro-Wilk W test  
to ensure the errors or residuals of the regression are normally distributed. This is 
important as normality of residuals signify valid hypothesis testing. In addition, 
residuals are visually analysed through the use of kernel density plot, QQ plot and 
histogram with normal curve plot. Any evidence of slight non-normality of residuals 
is practically acceptable in the case when N is large such as in this study (Chen 2006). 
 
Third is to test for possible heteroscedasticity problem. In the event where 
heteroscedasticity exists, tests for the significance of variables might not be reliable as 
the ordinary least squares estimate is inefficient (Wooldridge 2002). The common test 
used to detect heteroscedasticity is Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test. 
Alternatively, a plot of residuals versus fitted values may also be used to check on this 
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problem. In order to correct this problem, MacKinnon and White (1985) recommends 
using robust standard error schemes while Long and Ervin (2000) recommends the 
‘hc3’ correction. 
 
Next, the study will check for any issue on multicollinearity. Multicollinearity 
problem exists in case where independent variables are correlated with each other. 
Belsley et al (1980) explain that when multicollinearity exists, the individual p-values 
may not be correctly presented (in which important variables may have high p-value) 
and the confidence intervals on the regression coefficients will be very wide. Variance 
Inflation Factor (VIFs) is calculated in order to examine the seriousness of 
multicollinearity problem. VIFs value more than 10 indicate serious problem of 
multicollinearity. In order to deal with multicollinearity, a few factors are grouped 
together and in some cases (for instance, in this study, corporate performance), factor 
analysis is used to reduce the number of variables in the model. Factors like average 
age and average tenure are being represented by mean-centred in order to reduce the 
multicollinearity between them. 
 
Finally, a link test and a Ramsey RESET test will be conducted to test for model 
specification error. Model specification error can occur when relevant variables are 
omitted or irrelevant variables are included. The linktest is based on the idea that if a 
regression is properly specified, one should not be able to find any additional 
independent variables that are significant by chance (Chen 2006). One the other hand, 
Ramsey RESET  test performs a regression specification error test (RESET), using 
powers of fitted values for omitted variables (Chen 2006). The null hypothesis for 
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both tests is that the model has no specification error. Hence, if the null hypothesis is 
rejected, then the models need to be reconsidered.    
 
 
4.7.4 Panel data Analysis 
 
This study is based on 417 sampled firms over three-year period. Therefore, it is 
suitable to use panel data analysis in order to improve the explanation of the error 
terms of the regression. The three year period also makes the use of time series 
technique inappropriate as this method requires longer period. The multivariate 
regression fails to control for those unobservable firm specific factors that might 
affect executive directors’ remuneration. The panel data techniques are able to address 
this issue and suffer less from missing variable problem.  Specifically, panel data 
techniques such as fixed and random effects are able to distinguish between residual 
heterogeneity associated with changes over time (time effects) and across firms (firm 
effects) (Chen 2006; Stock and Watson 2003). In addition, the power of the estimators 
to detect effects can be enhanced for the same limited companies or years by 
increasing the number of cases since there are n x t observations. By using panel data, 
multicollinearity problems also will be eased off. Murphy (1985) advocates the use of 
panel data for directors’ remuneration study as he found significant difference 
between cross-sectional techniques and panel data techniques. He argued panel data 
techniques lead to better identification of the factors affecting changes in corporate 
governance and remuneration.  
 
Using panel data, there are two methods to estimate the model – fixed and random 
effects methods. Each method will produce different estimates because both of the 
methods treat the error structure differently. Fixed effects model is similar to dummy 
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variable model. It can be estimated using OLS with a set of additive dummies 
provided there are a few thousand observations on the data set (Greene 2003). The 
fixed effects model is chosen if the idiosyncratic errors are serially uncorrelated and 
homoskedastic (Wooldridge 2002). By choosing this model, the unobserved 
individual effects will be correlated with the included variables.  
 
On the other hand, the random effects method is more appropriate if the individual 
specific constant terms are strictly uncorrelated with the independent variables. By 
using this method, the number of coefficients to be estimated is reduced but the 
estimates might not be consistent if the assumptions are not valid (Greene 2003). The 
random effects method used generalised least squares (GLS) regressions to identify 
the possible correlation between the unobserved differences and the error term.  
 
In order to decide which method is appropriate, a Hausman test is conducted. This 
specification test evaluates the significance of an estimator against an alternative 
estimator. It checks a more efficient model against a less efficient but consistent 
model to make sure that the more efficient model also gives consistent results 
(Hausman 1978). Although fixed effects models are regarded as always giving 
consistent results, random effects model may provide more efficient models to run 
(Stock and Watson 2003). Hence, it is justifiable to first run random effects and using 
Hausman test to see whether it is statistically justifiable to do so (Chen 2006). If the 
null hypothesis of Hausman test is rejected, one or both estimator is inconsistent. 
Therefore, the fixed effects method should be chosen.  
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4.10 Summary 
 
This chapter starts off with explanation on the research design of this study. 
Advantages for using quantitative and qualitative approach was discussed and 
elaborated. Based on the nature of research questions of the study and sensitivity of 
the research topic, quantitative approach was adopted. Multiple regression analysis 
and panel data analysis will be used in order to test the hypotheses identified in 
Chapter 3. 
 
Several models were developed in order to test the research hypothesis. The models 
are specified in the forms of panel data but it can also applicable for multiple 
regression models. A sample of 417 listed companies was selected over the period of 
2004 to 2006 inclusive. This panel data set was run using the identified model 
specifications. Data was collected from two main sources – annual reports of 
individual companies and Datastream. Multiple regression models are run on total 
remuneration and total cash remuneration. Each determinant of directors’ 
remuneration measurement is explained in detail. Some variables are measured using 
more than one measurement. In the next section, explanation on three steps of data 
analysis was presented – namely preliminary analysis, descriptive analysis and 
multivariate analysis. The study also addressed the statistical problems related to 
regressions such as the problem of outliers, normality, multicollinearity and 
heteroskadasticity. Finally, description on panel data method – fixed and random 
effects methods was presented.  
 
The next chapter will present the descriptive findings of the research.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS RESULTS 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter described the research methodology used in this study. This 
chapter presents the descriptive and bivariate analysis of the six main variables used 
in the study. The descriptive analysis aims to explore the nature and characteristics of 
the data thus, giving us the general understanding of the data. Bivariate analysis is 
useful in detecting possibility of any violation of essential assumptions when using 
multivariate statistical technique, namely multiple regression later on to test the 
hypotheses.  
 
A total of 417 companies were used in the final sample. Data for each company are 
selected for the three years period from 2004 to 2006, resulting 1251 total 
observations. However, there are some cases where data are missing. Few data, for 
example total assets and total equity are collected for the year 2003 as well in order to 
calculate lag variables like one-year lag return on asset and one-year lag return on 
equity. Data analysis was conducted using mainly STATA statistical software 
package and in some cases, SPSS statistical software package
4
. Microsoft Excel was 
used initially for data importing and housekeeping.  
 
This chapter is divided into three sections. Section 5.2 presents the descriptive 
analysis of the six key variables used this study – executive directors’ remuneration, 
                                                 
4
 For instance, SPSS is used to do normal scores transformation and obtain r squared change and F ratio 
change. STATA cannot perform these functions.  
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board of directors’ characteristics, ownership structure, directors’ human capital 
attributes, firm performance and control variables. Section 5.3 reports the bivariate 
analysis used to identify the initial correlation between variables. The final section 
summarises the main findings from the descriptive and bivariate analysis.  
 
5.2 Descriptive analysis of the main variables 
 
This study used six main variables - executive directors’ remuneration, board of 
directors’ characteristics, ownership structure, directors’ human capital attributes, firm 
performance and control variable. Each variable will be analysed based on its type. 
Continuous variables analysis consists of mean, median, standard deviation, minimum 
and maximum value, skewness and kurtosis. Meanwhile, categorical variables is only 
analysed by examining their frequency and dispersion.  
   
5.2.1 Executive Directors’ Remuneration 
 
 
The executive directors’ remuneration is measured by total cash remuneration 
(t_cashrem) and total remuneration (totalrem). Total cash remuneration includes 
only salaries, fees and cash bonuses of executive directors; while total remuneration 
includes benefits and other form of payment such as gratuity and pension fund scheme 
but excluding share options. Share options and other long term incentives are 
excluded due to inconsistency of disclosure among the sampled firms. Kato and Kubo 
(2004) faced the same problem in their study in Japan and they removed the share 
options from their total remuneration. Table 5.1 shows the summary statistics of total 
cash remuneration and total remuneration for the year 2004 to 2006.    
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Panel 1 in Table 5.1 shows that over the three year period, the average cash 
remuneration and total remuneration received by Malaysian executive director are 
RM1,346,520 (approximately £213,733, assuming £1 = RM6.3) and RM1,694,220 
(approximately £268,923, assuming £1 = RM6.3) respectively. This shows an 
increase of over a quarter of total remuneration reported by Abdullah (2006). 
Abdullah (2006) reported that the total remuneration of directors among Malaysian 
listed companies in 2001 was RM1,307,970. However, the directors in Malaysia is 
much less compensate relative to their counterparts in the UK and the US. Ezzamel 
and Watson (2002) reported the average cash compensation alone among UK CEOs 
in their study was £387,000, almost twice higher than the Malaysian directors. The 
gap was even profound when comparison made with the average total remuneration of 
CEOs in US. Conyon and Murphy (2000) reported that in 1997, the average total 
remuneration of CEOs was £3,519,000 (after deducting the average share option and 
long term incentive plan shares of £42,000 and £4,000 respectively)
5
.  
 
Panel 2 in Table 5.1 presents the detail type of directors’ remuneration. It is found that 
more than sixty percent of total remuneration is in the form of salary. Bonus only 
accounts twelve percent of the total remuneration. This is quite low compared to other 
Asian countries like Hong Kong (26% as reported by Firth et. al 1999). Panel 2 in 
Table 5.1 also shows that the increase in average total cash remuneration and average 
total remuneration over the years are not associated with any particular type of 
remuneration but are due to increase by all types of remuneration. For example, the 
average executive directors’ salaries raised from RM1,038,900 in 2004 to 
                                                 
5
 The adjustment was made to make the figure reported by Conyon and Murphy (2000) and this study 
comparable. Note that this study did not include share options or long term incentive plan shares. 
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RM1,099,890 in 2006 and benefits in kind among directors increased from 
RM489,550 in 2004 to RM634,114 in 2006.  
 
Table 5.1 Summary statistics of total cash remuneration and total remuneration 
(in RM thousand) 
 
Panel 1          
Variable Year N Mean Median Sd Min Max Skew Kurtosis 
Total cash 
remuneration 
2004 414 1292.48 873.068 1958.01 0 29042 8.28565 104.29 
2005 416 1356.99 903.5 2129.39 0 31081 8.16777 100.222 
2006 415 1389.92 890.06 2276.61 0 31598 8.01522 88.3749 
Pooled 1245 1346.52 888 2124.14 0 31598 8.59187 97.5159 
Total 
remuneration 
2004 414 1565.52 994.407 2394.49 6 35711 8.39161 106.257 
2005 416 1686.24 1026.96 2700.36 4 40254 8.50696 107.575 
2006 415 1830.61 1089.72 3250.73 10.2 49708 9.20534 121.044 
Pooled 1245 1694.22 1044.48 2804.39 4 49708 9.06132 122.721 
Panel 2          
Salary 
2004 414 1038.90 761.185 1691.23 0 28697 11.2834 176.151 
2005 416 1080.60 765.185 1800.96 0 30751 11.3828 180.029 
2006 415 1099.89 750 1884.35 0 31273 10.9220 164.007 
Pooled 1245 1073.16 757.567 1792.75 0 31273 11.2103 173.901 
Bonus 
2004 414 192.338 0 632.497 0 8702 8.17140 91.8034 
2005 416 209.985 0 771.987 0 11944 10.0902 136.865 
2006 415 216.822 0 884.369 0 14208 11.2927 162.293 
Pooled 1245 206.396 0 769.428 0 14208 10.6151 154.464 
Fees 
2004 414 61.2454 24 105.5 0 1038 3.74280 24.9411 
2005 416 66.4106 24 114.772 0 838 3.33198 17.4298 
2006 415 73.2110 24 142.437 0 1247 4.10909 24.8422 
Pooled 1245 66.9598 24 121.924 0 1247 3.94037 24.8574 
Benefit 
2004 413 48.9550 17.4283 99.6847 0 1112 5.04104 40.5945 
2005 416 59.4744 21 140.994 0 1651 6.94747 67.4625 
2006 415 63.4114 23 158.673 0 17654 8.01522 84.2280 
Pooled 1244 57.2954 20.3125 135.475 0 17654 8.59187 106.211 
Others 
2004 414 224.204 8.7195 683.809 0 8020 6.69429 61.1768 
2005 415 270.424 10 872.273 0 9236 6.62079 56.8819 
2006 415 378.003 17.797 1350.74 0 17654 7.84932 84.2280 
Pooled 1244 290.931 11.0195 1010.25 0 17654 8.11603 106.21 
Panel 3          
n_tcashrem 
2004 414 -0.1548 -0.0277 0.9610 -2.2 2.819 0.0779 2.8216 
2005 416 0.00401 0.02865 1.0024 -2.2 2.947 0.0507 2.7003 
2006 415 0.01772 0.006 1.0062 -2.2 3.155 0.0044 2.8654 
Pooled  1245 0.00210 0.002 0.9894 -2.2 3.155 0.0444 2.7979 
n_totalrem 
2004 414 -0.0525 -0.0534 0.9735 -2.9 2.819 0.0286 2.8509 
2005 416 -0.0033 -0.0181 1.0036 -3.2 2.947 -0.0066 2.8693 
2006 415 0.05564 0.0725 1.0082 -2.8 3.155 -0.0296 3.0169 
Pooled  1245 0.00001 0 0.9954 -3.2 3.155 0.00008 2.9143 
 
 
Panel 1 and 2 also show that directors’ remuneration variables range widely. The 
large standard deviation (2,804,390) suggested that there is large variation of the 
directors’ remuneration across time and between firms. For instance, the total 
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directors’ remuneration ranges from RM4,000 to RM49,708,000. In addition, the 
directors’ remuneration variables show high level of skewness (the third central 
moment) and kurtosis
6
 (the fourth moment). This presents a potential problem in 
regression. In order to rectify this, the directors’ remuneration variable are 
transformed to a normal scores estimation using a Van der Waerden
7
 normal scores 
data transformation technique. Cooke (1998) argued this technique enable us to avoid 
data deletion due to negative value and/or extreme value problems. Panel 3 in Table 
5.1 shows that the normal transformation has reduced the skewness level to nearly 
zero and that of kurtosis to near 3, which suggest that the distribution has now 
approximately normal.  
 
5.2.2 Board of Directors’ Characteristics 
 
 
Board characteristic is one part of governance structure examined in this study. The 
board of director characteristics are further analysed into four distinctive groups -   
board size and activity, board independence, board composition and board leadership. 
Each characteristic is measured by different measurements. Table 5.2 presents the 
summary statistics of these characteristics. Each characteristic is discussed separately 
as follows. 
 
  
                                                 
6
 Stata follows Bock’s definition of kurtosis, where Kurtosis = 
2
4)(
x
xx 
 (note this formula does not 
subtract 3). Thus, following this definition normal distribution would have a kurtosis of 3.  
7
 Van der Waerden approach is one of the methods of rank transformation. This approach transforms 
the data by dividing the normal scores of each data ( in ) with the total of size of sample plus 1 (n+1) 
(i.e. 
)1( n
ni
).  
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Board Size and Activities 
 
Panel 1 in Table 5.2 shows at least three directors and at most sixteen directors were 
appointed in the board of the sampled firms. On average, the sampled firms appointed 
seven directors on board, similar to the board size reported in Norway and Sweden 
(Randoy and Nielsen 2002) but lower if compared with other Asian countries like 
Hong Kong and China (both average of nine directors as reported by Cheng & Firth 
2005 and Chen 2006 respectively) and India (average ten directors as reported by 
Ghosh 2006).  The average of board size found in this study is almost similar to other 
previous Malaysian studies, for instance Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) and Price 
Waterhouse and Coopers (1998) both reported 7.94 and 8 board size respectively. 
MCCG recommend that every board should examine its own size, with a view to 
determining the impact of the number upon its effectiveness. Larger board means 
wider diversity and expertise among its members thus can enhance boards in their 
monitoring, controlling and decision making (Haniffa and Hudaib 2006). However, 
bigger boards may become symbolic rather than being part of management process 
(Hermalin and Weisbach 2003). Lipton and Lorsch (1992) suggested an ideal board 
size is between eight and nine and any additional members to the board will not 
generate enough benefit when compared to the extra costs associated with it. Thus, the 
result suggests Malaysian companies have a reasonable number of members in their 
board, despite four observations recorded having three members in their board.  
 
Board meeting is an important platform for its members to exercise monitoring, 
controlling and important decision making in the interest of shareholders. Despite no 
exact number of meetings suggested by MCCG, the code recommends the board 
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should meet regularly. Vafeas (1999) found that the frequency of board meetings 
increase the effectiveness of board. He argued boards that meet more regularly are 
beneficial to shareholders as they have more time to carry out their duties. The result 
shows that the median board meetings held is five times a year, with only one 
observation recorded one meeting in a year and another 22 observations recorded 
board meetings of only two times per year. Majority of the sampled firms held three 
or more board meetings per year. This frequency of meeting found is lower compared 
to Vafeas (1999) whereby he found the median number of board meetings for his 
sampled firms is seven. However, Jensen (1990) suggested boards should be relatively 
inactive, by having less board meetings because the chief executive officers almost 
always setting board’s agenda, making the routine tasks dominating the time of 
meeting. Taking this argument into consideration, the average of five board meetings 
per year can be considered appropriate. 
 
Board Independence 
 
Panel 1 also exhibits that on average, three or forty two percent of board size is 
independent. There is almost no variation on the percentage of independent directors 
from year to year. The percentage of independent director ranges from 14% to 86%, 
with low standard deviation of 0.11. The result supports other previous studies in 
Malaysia (for instance Abdullah 2006). On this aspect, Malaysian firms seemed to be 
better than other emerging countries like China (30% independent directors in 2003 – 
Chen 2006). This suggests that most sampled companies have followed the MCCG 
recommendation. As stated earlier in Chapter 2, MCCG recommends companies to 
have at least one third of the board to be independent.  
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Similarly, the MCCG recommendation on the number of independent directors in 
audit and remuneration committee is observed. On average, 67% of audit and 
remuneration committee members are independent. However, note that there are 18 
observations (six companies) with no independent members in their remuneration 
committee. Separate analysis on these companies is unnecessary as the number of 
companies with this situation is not significant. However, it would be interesting if 
further study can be made on these companies to investigate what prompt them to 
behave in that way and the impact of this behaviour on directors’ remuneration.    
 
Board Composition 
 
Panel 2 in Table 5.2 presents the board composition, in particular on its non executive 
directors’ characteristics. On average, there are 64% of non executive directors in the 
sampled firms compared to 58.53% reported earlier by Haniffa and Hudaib (2006). 
Earlier researchers suggested non executive directors presence in board will help to 
monitor and control the behaviour of management thus help to alleviate the agency 
problem (Williamson 1985; Jensen and Meckling 1976). Non executive directors also 
can ensure managers not solely evaluating themselves (Baysinger and Hoskisson 
1990), provide extra strength to the board and quality decision making with their 
expertise, prestige and contacts (Grace et. al 1995).  
 
On average, there are 15% interlocked directors with small increment over the years 
compared only over 3% among US firms (Core et al 1999). Interlocked director is 
defined as any executive director of the firm who also serves on the board of that non-
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executive director’s company. Hence this study supports Dogan and Smyth’s (2002) 
assumption that Asian directors are mostly interlocked.  
Table 5.2. Summary statistics of board characteristics 
Panel 1: Board size and effectiveness 
Variable Year N Mean Median Sd Min Max Skew Kurtosis 
board_size 
2004 417 7.6 8 1.92 4 16 0.678 4.198 
2005 417 7.6 7 1.93 3 15 0.597 3.961 
2006 417 7.5 7 1.88 3 15 0.537 3.853 
Pooled 1251 7.6 7 1.91 3 16 0.607 4.017 
Frequency of 
board meetings 
2004 417 5.3 5 2.10 2 27 4.237 35.35 
2005 417 5.2 5 2.03 2 24 4.055 29.05 
2006 417 5.3 5 2.26 1 27 4.293 32.39 
Pooled 1251 5.3 5 2.13 1 27 4.220 32.66 
Panel 2: Board independence 
tid 
2004 417 3.1 3 0.96 1 9 1.398 7.912 
2005 417 3.1 3 0.98 1 9 1.369 7.539 
2006 417 3.1 3 0.90 1 7 0.858 4.169 
Pooled 1251 3.1 3 0.95 1 9 1.237 6.799 
Indpt_dir 
2004 417 0.41 0.38 0.11 0.14 0.86 1.063 4.413 
2005 417 0.42 0.4 0.11 0.14 0.83 1.053 4.371 
2006 417 0.42 0.4 0.11 0.14 0.83 0.834 3.835 
Pooled 1251 0.42 0.4 0.11 0.14 0.85 0.988 4.219 
Indpt_audit 
2004 417 0.70 0.67 0.09 0.33 1 1.172 8.388 
2005 417 0.71 0.67 0.09 0.33 1 1.484 7.738 
2006 417 0.71 0.67 0.09 0.33 1 1.226 7.575 
Pooled 1251 0.71 0.67 0.09 0.33 1 1.280 7.896 
Indpt_rem 
2004 375 0.67 0.67 0.17 0 1 -0.89 6.748 
2005 379 0.67 0.67 0.17 0 1 -0.86 6.251 
2006 377 0.67 0.67 0.17 0 1 -0.72 6.190 
Pooled 1131 0.67 0.67 0.17 0 1 -0.83 6.399 
Panel 3: Board composition 
Non-Executive 
2004 417 0.64 0.66 0.17 0.28 0.91 -0.22 1.955 
2005 417 0.64 0.66 0.16 0.28 0.93 -0.20 2.004 
2006 417 0.64 0.66 0.17 0.20 0.91 -0.23 1.993 
Pooled 1251 0.64 0.66 0.17 0.20 0.93 -0.22 1.985 
Interlock 
 
2004 417 0.15 0 0.09 0 1 9.561 113.6 
2005 417 0.14 0 0.09 0 1 9.895 124.1 
2006 417 0.17 0 0.10 0 1 8.388 90.89 
Pooled 1251 0.15 0 0.09 0 1 9.229 108.1 
Busy 
2004 417 0.22 0.14 0.25 0 1 0.969 3.023 
2005 417 0.22 0.16 0.25 0 1 0.997 3.141 
2006 417 0.21 0.16 0.24 0 1 0.965 3.071 
Pooled 1251 0.22 0.16 0.25 0 1 0.978 3.082 
Old 
2004 417 0.09 0 0.16 0 0.8 1.826 6.045 
2005 417 0.10 0 0.16 0 1 1.991 8.404 
2006 417 0.10 0 0.16 0 0 1.676 5.675 
Pooled 1251 0.10 0 0.16 0 1 1.829 6.698 
Panel 4: Board leadership 
  2004 2005 2006 Pooled 
Non 
Ceo_duality 
Freq. 368 368 369 1105 
Percent 88.25 88.25 88.49 88.33 
Ceo_duality 
Freq. 49 49 48 146 
Percent 11.75 11.75 11.51 11.67 
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Table 5.2 also shows that on average twenty two percent of the non executive 
directors are classified as busy. This figure is almost half of the percentage (over 
45%) found by Core et al (1999) using 205 public companies in US but  more  higher 
(six percent) than what reported by Ferris et al (2003), which also using US sampled 
firms.   Comparatively, Malaysian capital market are far less small than the US, thus 
explains the variation of busy directors in both countries. Busy directors are defined 
as directors who hold directorships in three or more other listed companies, excluding 
the present company (Core et. al 1999). This also the limit set by the Council of 
Institutional Investors in the US (Ferris et al 2003). Retired directors (i.e. age 70 years 
and above) are considered busy if they serve six or more other listed companies, 
excluding the present companies. Fich and Shivdasani (2004) provide evidence to 
show that busy directors are associated with weak corporate governance.  
 
Finally, Panel 2 also shows that on average around ten percent of the non executive 
board members are ‘old’ compared to only eight percent among US companies (Core 
et al 1999). ‘Old’ directors are defined as directors who reached the age of 70 or over. 
One reasonable explanation to this is that many Malaysian listed firms are originally 
formed as family businesses but later become public limited companies. Hence, the 
founders of the companies are likely to remain in the board longer due to their 
influence over the companies. In addition, Malaysian human expertise in some area is 
less than the US.  This limits the choice of individuals to serve on the board and hence 
affect the length of service for directors.     
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Board Leadership 
 
Panel 3 in Table 5.2 shows the percentage of CEO and chairman duality on the board 
of sampled firms. It is found that on average, over 88 percent of the sampled firms 
have separation of CEO and chairman duty. It is noted that there are only very little 
improvement over the three years period, although it can be considered better than the 
year 2000 (15.1% duality) and 2001 (13.9% duality) (Abdullah 2006). Again, it would 
be interesting to focus on these remaining 11 percent of the sampled firms to study the   
reasons for not following the MCCG recommendation on this matter. 
 
5.2.3 Ownership Structure 
 
 
Another part of governance structure considered in this study is ownership structure 
of the firms. Table 5.3 shows that the average direct shareholdings by directors are 
found to be around 10% per year with slight increment every year. This shows that 
Malaysian directors owned higher proportion of shares compared to their counterparts 
in other countries. For example, Clarkson et al (2005) and Merhebi et al (2006) 
reported CEO in Australia hold only 4% and 7.96% of company’s shares. However, 
the percentage of management ownership in other Asian companies is also high. For 
example, Cheng and Firth (2005) reported that average CEO ownership alone among 
Hong Kong companies alone is 22.9%, chairman ownership is at 29.5% while 31.4% 
shares are owned by independent non executive directors.  
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Table 5.3. Summary statistics of ownership structure 
Variable Year N Mean Median Sd Min Max Skew Kurtosis 
Directors’ direct 
shareholding 
2004 416 9.51 3.37 13.41 0 61.85 1.78 5.60 
2005 416 9.91 3.31 13.86 0 61.58 1.67 5.05 
2006 416 10.11 3.62 13.70 0 61.16 1.57 4.70 
Pooled 1248 9.84 3.38 13.65 0 61.85 1.67 5.11 
Directors’ 
indirect 
shareholding 
2004 416 24.45 25.01 21.63 0 76.04 0.28 1.80 
2005 416 23.46 22.59 22.13 0 74.99 0.38 1.79 
2006 416 23.10 19.92 22.45 0 89.19 0.45 1.89 
Pooled 1248 23.67 22.77 22.06 0 89.19 0.37 1.82 
Total directors 
shareholding 
2004 416 33.96 36.82 21.74 0 78.11 -0.22 1.94 
2005 416 33.37 36.54 22.17 0 77.78 -0.14 1.89 
2006 416 33.22 35.44 22.41 0 89.19 -0.12 1.89 
Pooled 1248 33.52 36.51 22.10 0 89.19 -0.16 1.90 
Block 
shareholding  
2004 416 14.52 6.66 19.29 0 90.62 1.65 5.20 
2005 416 15.09 7.89 19.53 0 90.62 1.56 4.81 
2006 416 15.58 7.7 20.12 0 82.02 1.39 3.95 
Pooled 1248 15.06 7.51 19.64 0 90.62 1.53 4.62 
 
 
Table 5.3 also shows that the mean of directors’ indirect shareholding is around 23%.  
The directors’ indirect shareholding includes any companies’ equities owned by 
directors’ close relatives or various other entities in which he or she has interest in 
them.  This finding supports the claim by earlier studies (for instance Haniffa and 
Hudaib 2006; Dogan and Smyth 2002) that Asian corporate ownership structure, 
particularly Malaysia is mostly concentrated. In addition, the average percentage of 
blockholders (i.e. corporation or individual that owned more than 5% of the total 
equities of a company) is found to be around 15%. Again, this is consistent with 
earlier studies that most of the Asian corporate environment are found to be 
concentrated among few shareholders (Dogan and Smyth 2002; Tricker 2001). This 
finding signified the difference between Malaysian market and its counterparts in the 
Western countries.  
 
Dogan and Smyth (2002) explained that the high level of ownership concentration in 
Malaysian is due to the fact that many companies are founded and run by close family 
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– making family control more prevalent in these companies compared to other 
companies in other countries. In addition, there is also significant level of state 
involvement in many of the listed companies. Claessens et al. (2001) quoted three 
main political parties such as United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), 
Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) as the 
examples of state-related organisations that own substantial shareholdings in 
Malaysia. 
 
Block shareholder is any individual or entity that owns more than 5% of the firm’s 
total shares. It is found that the mean block shareholder shareholdings is around 15%, 
much lower than reported elsewhere, for instance Mangel and Singh (1993) reported 
52% block shareholder among their sampled US firms. In Malaysia, most of the block 
shareholders are government related organisation. Private sector in Malaysia is much 
smaller compared to the US, thus explain the low percentage of block shareholders in 
Malaysia compared to US.   
 
5.2.4 Human capital Attributes 
 
 
There are three aspects of human capital attributes considered by this study – age, 
tenure and qualification.  Panel 1 of table 5.4 shows that the mean of directors’ age 
did not vary much over the years, with pooled mean age of 51.2 year. This finding is 
similar to McKnight and Tomkins (2004), where the mean age of directors in the UK 
is found to be 53.5 year. However, big difference is found for the range of directors’ 
age in Malaysia and the UK. In this study, the minimum age of directors is 28 while 
the maximum age of directors is 85. McKnight and Tomkins (2004) reported that the 
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minimum and maximum age of directors in their sampled firms are 40 and 69 year 
respectively.  This wide range of directors’ age in Malaysia may possibly due to high 
concentrated ownership of the sampled companies. Most directors tend to hold its 
position as long as possible with retirement from the position being replaced with his 
or her young siblings. It is also possible to argue that Malaysia has limited pool of 
expertise to become directors of the companies. This is evident with the large number 
of interlocking directors, ‘old’ directors and ‘busy’ directors in Malaysia.  
 
Directors’ tenure averaged between eight to nine years, with a median of seven years 
for 2004 and 2005 but increased to eight years in 2006. Agency theory propose that 
longer tenure might reflect greater organisation-specific investment by CEO or 
chairman, and the board should compensate the CEO or chairman for his or her risky 
investment (Mangel and Singh 1993).  
 
Table 5.4 Summary statistics of human capital attributes 
Panel 1 
Variable Year N Mean Median Sd Min Max Skew Kurtosis 
Age 2004 417 50.6 50.3 6.46 32.5 83 0.295 4.411 
2005 417 51.2 51 6.61 32 84 0.332 4.602 
2006 417 51.7 52 6.61 28 85 0.208 4.855 
Pooled 1251 51.2 51 6.57 28 85 0.280 4.606 
Tenure 2004 417 8.1 7 5.95 0 36 1.464 5.391 
2005 417 8.6 7 6.12 0 37 1.435 5.374 
2006 417 9.1 8 6.27 0 38 1.354 5.130 
Pooled 1251 8.6 7 6.12 0 38 1.414 5.288 
Panel 2: Qualification 
  2004 2005 2006 Pooled 
University/Professional 
Graduate 
Freq 298 302 306 906 
Percent 72.3 72.9 73.9 73.1 
Non-University Graduate 
Freq 114 112 108 334 
Percent 27.7 27.1 26.1 26.9 
 
Panel 2 of table 5.4 shows that on average, more than 72% of the board directors 
obtained university or professional qualification. There is slight increment over the 
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three years period among the university and professionally qualified directors. In 
Malaysian context, very much emphasis is being made on education. This 
phenomenon is common in developing countries. In Malaysian, a significant amount 
of national’s budget is on education, for instance in 2009’s budget, RM 47.7 billion 
was allocated for education and training, accounting 23% from the total 2009 budget
8
. 
  
5.2.5 Firm Performance 
 
 
Previous studies used different types of firm performance measures. Table 5.5 shows 
the summary of different types of firm performance measures used in this study.  Four 
different types of performance measurement – return on equity (ROE), return on asset 
(ROA), Tobin’s Q and market based equity (MBE). The first two measurements 
represent accounting based performance measurement and the later two represent 
market based performance measurement.    
 
Table 5.5 Summary statistics of corporate performance measurements 
Variable Year N Mean Median Sd Min Max Skew Kurtosis 
ROE 2004 378 0.00052 0.00065 0.000031 -0.0189 0.036 2.312 59.35 
2005 379 0.00041 0.00060 0.000020 -0.0114 0.023 2.943 58.44 
2006 380 0.00031 0.00057 0.000018 -0.0147 0.010 -3.17 26.05 
Pooled 1137 0.00041 0.00061 0.000024 -0.0189 0.036 1.838 70.75 
ROA 2004 381 0.05748 0.05620 0.08303 -0.3267 0.6644 0.370 14.222 
2005 386 0.05259 0.05405 0.07008 -0.1909 0.4526 0.264 7.040 
2006 385 0.04845 0.04966 0.07210 -0.8174 0.3016 -0.817 6.343 
Pooled 1152 0.05284 0.05432 0.10592 -0.3267 0.6644 -2.848 10.591 
Tobin Q 2004 343 0.543 0.395 0.6212 0.017 6.329 4.783 36.603 
2005 341 0.536 0.373 0.6015 0.011 5.125 3.744 21.775 
2006 329 0.596 0.395 0.7215 0.024 7.283 4.784 35.428 
Pooled 1013 0.558 0.392 0.6491 0.011 7.283 4.562 33.470 
MBE 2004 343 1.059 0.706 1.8993 -6.521 24.66 7.692 85.818 
2005 341 0.930 0.696 1.7895 -5.331 13.98 4.757 48.922 
2006 329 1.074 0.738 1.3059 -1.690 13.60 4.619 35.428 
Pooled 1013 1.020 0.707 1.5055 -6.521 24.66 7.047 87.083 
                                                 
8
 Source: The Malaysian Budget speech by Datuk Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, (former) Prime 
Minister and Finance Minister. 
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The findings show a declining pattern of ROE and ROA over the three years period. 
However, the average ROA of 5.28% is doubled than ROA reported in Dogan and 
Smyth (2002). The result also indicates that Malaysian firms perform better than firms 
in other developing countries such as Hong Kong (Cheung et al. 2005) and China 
(Chen 2006). Cheung et al (2005) and Chen (2006) reported ROA of their sampled 
firms at 3.2% and 0.7% respectively. However, the dispersion for ROA is high 
whereby the minimum ROA recorded was – 32.67% to 66.44%.   
 
Table 5.5 also shows that all corporate performance measurements have high level of 
kurtosis, and on certain years, high level of skewness as well. This will present 
problem to regression analysis to be carried out later. In order to rectify the problem, 
the measurements are being transformed to a normal scores data using the same 
technique as described earlier in section 5.2.1.  
   
5.2.6 Other control variables 
 
 
This study uses five control variables – firm size, firm risk, firm diversification, 
industry and location. Table 5.6 and 5.7 shows the summary statistics of the control 
variables. The average sampled firms market value increases over the three year 
period from RM618,596,300 in year 2004 to RM684,085,900 in 2006. Table 5.6 
shows high dispersion of firm size based on high standard deviation between 
2,106,725 and 2,559,849 with the minimum firm value of RM3,400,000 and the 
maximum of RM37,500,000,000. This dispersion results high kurtosis and skewness 
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for all three periods. It is therefore necessary to carry out transformation on the 
variable before including them in regression.   
Table 5.6 Summary statistics of other control variables 
Variable Year N Mean Median Sd Min Max Skew Kurtosis 
Market 
Value of 
Firm (in 
RM‘000) 
2004  385 618596.3 128560 2106725 5650 29700000 8.852 105.01 
2005 387 647274.8 112060 2329430 5270 34000000 9.467 118.4 
2006 386 684085.9 120330 2559849 3400 37500000 9.698 122.0 
Pooled 1158 650010.4 123335 2337635 3400 37500000 9.509 120.2 
Debt 
ratio (%) 
2004  384 6.04 4.46 0.103 0.022 151.8 9.118 113.2 
2005 386 6.14 4.23 0.102 0.000 116.7 7.062 63.50 
2006 385 6.42 4.31 0.142 0.008 240.4 12.45 194.4 
Pooled 1155 6.20 4.36 0.117 0.000 240.4 10.99 174.09 
Diversifi
cation 
(number 
of 
industry)  
2004 414 3.03 3 1.724 1 11 0.751 4.156 
2005 416 3.03 3 1.721 1 11 0.743 4.156 
2006 415 3.01 3 1.700 1 11 0.690 3.895 
Pooled 1245 3.02 3 1.713 1 11 0.729 4.074 
 
Table 5.6 shows that mean debt ratio increases over the three years to record 6.42% in 
2006. Cheng et al (2005) reported much higher mean debt to asset ratio (9%) among 
Hong Kong companies in 1995 to 1998. Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) reported the mean 
gearing ratio for the year 1996 to 2000 is between 41% and 44% with one exception   
in 1999 whereby the gearing ratio is recorded at 39%.  
 
Table 5.6 shows that there were little discrepancies with regards to firm 
diversification in Malaysia. The average and median diversification among the 
sampled firms is three, suggesting that the level of diversification in Malaysia is not 
particularly high compared to the developed countries such as the US or the UK. 
However, the maximum industry that the sampled firms diversified is eleven. Based 
on this finding, it is expected that there will be less impact of the diversification on the 
level of directors’ remuneration.      
 
141 
 
Table 5.7 (panel 1) shows that executive directors in construction and IPC firms 
receive the highest pay, both in terms of total remuneration and total cash 
remuneration. The average director’s remuneration in construction and IPC firms is 
also reported highest than any other industry. Executive directors in industrial product 
recorded the lowest average pay among all directors. This support the earlier studies 
(for instance Merhebi 2006 and Ewers 2002) that argue firm size and industry act as 
differentiating factor in labour market. The finding also consistent with Deck (1988) 
that reported directors’ remuneration varies from industry to industry.  
 
In terms of location, more than half of the sampled firms are situated in the Klang 
Valley. Table 5.7 (panel 2) shows almost 66% of the firms’ head office are located in 
the Klang Valley while the remaining 34% are located all over the place in Malaysia. 
The result indicates that the Klang Valley area is still the favourite location to 
companies due to its strategic and well established business area. On average, total 
remuneration per director in companies located in Klang Valley is RM236,503 per 
year, much higher than their counterparts in other areas in the country, RM178,575 
per year. This reflects the different living cost in the Klang Valley area as compared 
to other location in the country.   
 
5.3 Summary and Conclusion 
 
This chapter reported the descriptive findings of the sampled firms in Malaysia over 
the period of 2004 to 2006. 424 firms were included in the sample, representing 
approximately 50% companies from each industry.  This study only includes non-
financial firms listed in Bursa Malaysia Berhad.   
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Table 5.7. Summary statisctics of industry and location 
Panel 1       
Type of Industry Freq % 
Mean Total 
Cash 
Remuneration 
Mean Total 
Remuneration 
Mean cash 
remuneration 
per director 
Mean total 
remuneration 
per director 
Consumer Product 183 14.69 RM1,282,457 RM1,714,579 RM171,207 RM208,078 
Industrial Product 406 32.61 RM1,124. 970 RM1,383,783 RM151,051 RM184,966 
Trading and services 
/ Technology 
311 24.97 RM1,385,194 RM1,855,087 RM170,146 RM231,413 
Construction / IPC 87 6.98 RM2,331,510 RM2,714,220 RM248,342 RM288,702 
Property/ Hotel/ 
Plantation / Mining 
258 20.72 RM1,361,817 RM1,728,673 RM184,005 RM230,876 
Panel 2       
Location       
Klang Valley 820 65.9 RM1,500,049 RM1,872,219 RM189,410 RM236503 
Other Place 425 34.1 RM1,050,290 RM1,350,793 RM139,613 RM178,575 
 
 
Descriptive statistics provides information on the nature of the data and the 
background of the sample data. Based on the descriptive analysis, the reliability of the 
data can be improved in certain ways. For instance, errors or mistakes can be 
minimised by looking at the extreme value of the variables. In case where a variable is 
not normally distributed, certain kinds of data transformation are needed. Traditional 
transformation such as log or square root is adopted in order to improve the 
distribution of the variable. By improving the variables at the initial analysis, the 
subsequent multivariate analysis would become much reliable, thus contribute 
towards the final conclusion. 
 
The descriptive analysis also provides avenue for comparison between firms in other 
countries as well as changes over the time.  For instance, firm performance such as 
ROA was showing a decreasing trend over the three year period and high ownership 
among directors is comparable to other Asian countries. 
 
The following chapter will present the results of multivariate analysis.   
143 
 
CHAPTER SIX 
 
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS RESULTS 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter six reports the results of multivariate analysis conducted in this study. The 
two main analyses are multiple regression and panel data analysis. To recall, this 
thesis aims to determine the factors that affect executive directors’ remuneration in 
Malaysia. The results would determine the acceptance or rejection of hypotheses 
developed earlier in chapter three. Discussions on the results obtained are presented 
concurrently within this chapter, with reference made to the existing literature and 
Malaysian environment context.   
 
The results indicate that most of the three main variables used in this thesis are 
significant. Corporate governance variables measured by board size, CEO and 
chairman duality roles, proportion of independent directors in board, proportion of 
non executive directors, proportion of interlock directors and block holder ownership 
are significantly related to directors’ remuneration. Only directors’ tenure was found 
significantly related to directors’ remuneration among the human capital attributes. 
Firm performance is also found to be significant in one of the models. Other control 
variables used in this thesis are also significantly affect directors’ remuneration. In 
particular, firm size, leverage and firms diversification are all found to be positively 
related to directors’ remuneration.  
       
This chapter is divided into seven sections. Section 6.2 presents the results of multiple 
regression analysis for total cash remuneration model. Section 6.3 presents the 
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regression diagnostics results for the model. Section 6.4 presents the other robustness 
tests result, followed by panel data analysis results in Section 6.5. Finally, discussion 
and summary of findings are presented in Section 6.6. 
 
6.2 Executive Directors’ Remuneration Model 
 
This model was run using multiple regression in order to test the hypotheses related to 
the variables identified earlier in Chapter 3 of this study. In the first model, total cash 
remuneration is the proxy used to measure executive directors’ remuneration. To 
recall, there are fifteen hypotheses to be tested in this study – eleven hypotheses are 
related to corporate governance mechanisms, three hypotheses related to human 
capital attributes and one hypothesis on firm performance. These hypotheses are 
summarised in Table 3.1 in chapter 3. 
 
 
In order to test the hypotheses, four models were examined. Panel 2 in Table 6.1 
shows that F-ratios values for all four models examined are significant at 1% level. 
The first model includes only traditional variables used by earlier studies, namely firm 
performance, log of firm’s market value, log of leverage, type of industry, 
diversification, location and year dummies as independent variables. This model 
however only explains 16.65% of variation in directors’ remuneration level in 
Malaysia.  
 
The second model includes directors’ age, tenure and qualification as additional 
independent variables. The explanatory power of this second model improves to 
19.95%. The third model incorporates corporate governance variables as additional 
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independent variables. The results show further improvement in explanatory power of 
directors’ remuneration level. In comparison with the second model, the adjusted r 
square improved from 0.1995 to 0.4359. The last model takes into account the 
interaction terms between corporate governance variables and firm performance. The 
adjusted r square again rose to 0.4443. Panel 2 in Table 6.1 also shows that the F 
change ratios from one model to another are all significant at 1% level except the last 
model which is significant at 5% level.  This indicates that the increase in r squared is 
not merely caused by additional number of variables added to the later models but 
significantly improve the variation explanation power of the model.  Hence, model 4 
is the best model and it will be used for further discussion on each of the explanatory 
variables in the following sections. Note that the possible issues such as outliers, 
normality of residuals, heteroskasdasticity and multicollinearity has been addressed 
and will be explained in details in section 6.3.   
 
In order to test the robustness of the model, the same steps are repeated by replacing 
the proxy for executive directors’ remuneration by total remuneration. The results are 
shown in Table 6.2. For comparison purpose, the result of each variable from both 
models is summarised in Table 6.3.  
 
6.2.1. Corporate Governance Variables 
 
This thesis looks at two main corporate governance variables – board characteristics 
and ownership structure. The board characteristics are further divided into board size 
and activity, board independence, board composition and board leadership. Each 
characteristic is discussed separately below followed by two types of ownership 
structure – directors’ shareholdings and outside block shareholdings.  
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Table 6.1. Multiple regression results when using total cash remuneration as dependent variable 
PANEL 1    
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Coef t Sig Coef t Sig Coef t Sig Coef t Sig 
Constant -20.17 -4.30 0.000** -18.74 -3.25 0.001** -20.73 -2.12 0.034* -20.77 -2.11 0.035* 
Performance 0.050 0.10 0.924 0.152 0.29 0.769 -0.081 -0.14 0.888 1.536 1.75 0.080# 
Ln_mktvalue 4.874 12.55 0.000** 4.743 12.26 0.000** 3.753 7.8 0.000** 3.619 7.27 0.000** 
Ln_leverage 2.067 4.43 0.000** 2.003 4.37 0.000** 1.278 2.41 0.016* 0.954 1.76 0.079# 
Industry2 -0.400 -0.26 0.794 -0.185 -0.12 0.902 2.687 1.43 0.152 2.701 1.44 0.151 
Industry3 -4.107 -2.46 0.014* -3.807 -2.31 0.021* -1.660 -0.81 0.417 -1.153 -0.54 0.590 
Industry4 6.220 2.65 0.008** 5.330 2.30 0.021* 4.493 1.65 0.099# 4.535 1.64 0.101 
Industry5 -4.653 -2.73 0.006** -4.084 -2.42 0.016* 2.167 1.04 0.298 2.439 1.16 0.245 
Location2 0.649 0.59 0.554 1.141 1.04 0.299 0.923 0.69 0.488 0.889 0.66 0.509 
Yr_dummy2 0.949 0.78 0.435 0.808 0.68 0.499 0.829 0.61 0.545 0.613 0.45 0.654 
Yr_dummy3 0.827 0.68 0.496 0.363 0.30 0.762 0.558 0.64 0.521 0.559 0.40 0.687 
Diversify 0.569 1.90 0.058# 0.470 1.59 0.112 -0.179 1.54 0.124 0.744 2.04 0.042* 
Age - - - -0.220 -2.69 0.007** 2.609 -1.76 0.078# -0.147 -1.44 0.150 
Sqrt_tenure - - - 3.823 7.08 0.000** 0.705 3.66 0.000** 2.480 3.49 0.001** 
Qualify - - - 0.8334 0.72 0.437 16.69 0.48 0.634 0.416 0.28 0.781 
Sqrt_boardsize - - - - - - 4.089 9.01 0.000** 16.82 9.02 0.000** 
Ceo_dual1 - - - - - - -1.127 2.01 0.045* 3.738 1.80 0.073# 
Ln_bmeeting - - - - - - 15.36 -0.58 0.563 -1.346 -0.69 0.493 
Indpt_board - - - - - - -9.082 2.51 0.012* 17.209 2.74 0.006** 
Indpt_audit - - - - - - -0.775 -1.45 0.148 -9.864 -1.56 0.119 
Indpt_rem - - - - - - -45.93 -0.23 0.815 -1.864 -0.56 0.574 
P_nexecdir - - - - - - 10.936 -11.02 0.000** -46.25 -10.84 0.000** 
P_interlock - - - - - - 3.058 1.98 0.049* 11.762 1.76 0.078# 
P_old - - - - - - 3.0352 -0.70 0.482 -5.120 -1.17 0.241 
P_busy - - - - - - -0.133 1.14 0.255 4.3475 1.58 0.115 
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PANEL 1    
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Coef t Sig Coef t Sig Coef t Sig Coef t Sig 
Indirectshare - - - - - - -0.057 -3.64 0.000** -0.138 -3.76 0.000** 
Directshare - - - - - - -2.033 -1.07 0.285 -0.056 -1.04 0.299 
Ln_blockshare - - - - - - -20.73 -2.30 0.022* -2.117 -2.39 0.017* 
Perf x boardsize - - - - - - - - - 2.8109 1.17 0.243 
Perf x ceodual - - - - - - - - - -0.702 -0.29 0.773 
Perf x bmeeting - - - - - - - - - 4.1460 1.95 0.051# 
Perf x indptboard - - - - - - - - - 6.7602 1.24 0.214 
Perf x pnexecdir - - - - - - - - - -6.940 -1.28 0.201 
Perf x pinterlock - - - - - - - - - -9.183 -1.24 0.217 
Perf x pold - - - - - - - - - 7.1953 1.86 0.063# 
Perf x pbusy - - - - - - - - - 5.4200 1.78 0.075# 
Perf x indirectshare - - - - - - - - - 0.1010 2.17 0.031* 
Perf x directshare - - - - - - - - - 0.0685 1.07 0.286 
Perf x blockshare - - - - - - - - - 1.1678 0.92 0.357 
PANEL 2 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
F ratio 21.63 21.14 18.43 13.82 
Sig F 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
R-squared 0.1746 0.2094 0.4609 0.4790 
Adj R-squared 0.1665 0.1995 0.4359 0.4443 
R-squared change 0.186 0.035 0.237 0.024 
F change 12.384 8.917 19.606 2.167 
Sig. F change 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.012* 
** significant at 1% level  * significant at 5% level   # significant at 10% level 
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Table 6.2. Multiple regression results when using total remuneration as dependent variable 
PANEL 1     
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Coef t Sig Coef t Sig Coef t Sig Coef t Sig 
Constant 4.5634 18.13 0.000 4.7207 15.44 0.000 4.3541  8.24 0.000* 4.3385 8.20 0.000** 
Performance -0.008 -0.28 0.776 -0.002 -0.11 0.915 -0.063 -2.03 0.043* 0.0488 1.04 0.300 
Ln_mktvalue 0.2362 11.33 0.000** 0.2297 11.21 0.000** 0.1840 7.07 0.000** 0.1649 6.17 0.000** 
Ln_leverage 0.1318 5.26 0.000** 0.128 5.28 0.000** 0.0802 2.80 0.005** 0.0626 2.15 0.032* 
Industry2 -0.051 -0.62 0.533 -0.028 -0.35 0.725 0.0548 0.54 0.588 0.0452 0.45 0.655 
Industry3 -0.177 -1.98 0.048* -0.158 -1.82 0.070# 0.0783 0.71 0.479 0.1036 0.93 0.352 
Industry4 0.2377 1.88 0.060# 0.1866 1.52 0.128 0.0482 0.33 0.742 0.0900 0.61 0.544 
Industry5 -0.323 -3.54 0.000** -0.283 -3.17 0.002** 0.0098 0.09 0.930 0.0137 0.12 0.903 
Location2 -0.034 -0.59 0.557 0.0056 0.10 0.923 -0.020 -0.29 0.774 -0.015 -0.22 0.826 
Yr_dummy2 0.0836 1.28 0.200 0.0834 1.32 0.188 0.0541 0.73 0.465 0.0450 0.61 0.541 
Yr_dummy3 0.1227 1.88 0.060# 0.0968 1.52 0.128 0.0683 0.91 0.363 0.0527 0.71 0.479 
Diversify 0.0256 1.59 0.112 0.0226 1.44 0.150 0.0066 0.34 0.735 0.0193 0.99 0.322 
Age - - - -0.014 -3.35 0.001** -0.017 -3.27 0.001** -0.016 -2.95 0.003** 
Sqrt_tenure - - - 0.2243 7.85 0.000** 0.1861 4.84 0.000** 0.1827 4.78 0.000** 
Qualify - - - 0.0107 0.17 0.862 0.0464 0.58 0.563 0.0437 0.54 0.586 
Sqrt_boardsize - - - - - - 0.8566 8.55 0.000** 0.8586 8.57 0.000** 
Ceo_dual1 - - - - - - 0.2159 1.96 0.050* 0.1588 1.42 0.156 
Ln_bmeeting - - - - - - 0.0875 0.83 0.406 0.0534 0.51 0.612 
Indpt_board - - - - - - 0.3478 1.05 0.294 0.4483 1.33 0.184 
Indpt_audit - - - - - - -0.286 -0.84 0.399 -0.226 -0.67 0.505 
Indpt_rem - - - - - - -0.068 -0.38 0.701 -0.094 -0.53 0.596 
P_nexecdir - - - - - - -2.519 -11.19 0.000** -2.404 -10.49 0.000** 
P_interlock - - - - - - 0.5149 1.72 0.086# 0.4572 1.28 0.202 
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PANEL 1     
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Coef t Sig Coef t Sig Coef t Sig Coef t Sig 
P_old - - - - - - 0.1983 0.84 0.399 0.0930 0.40 0.692 
P_busy - - - - - - -0.081 -0.56 0.572 -0.018 -0.13 0.900 
Indirectshare - - - - - - -0.001 -0.90 0.370 -0.002 -1.04 0.301 
Directshare - - - - - - 0.0029 1.000 0.318 0.0030 1.06 0.292 
Ln_blockshare - - - - - - -0.008 -0.17 0.866 -0.004 -0.10 0.923 
Perf x boardsize - - - - - - - - - 0.2272 1.76 0.079# 
Perf x ceodual - - - - - - - - - 0.0545 0.42 0.677 
Perf x bmeeting - - - - - - - - - 0.1652 1.45 0.148 
Perf x indptboard - - - - - - - - - 0.3175 1.09 0.277 
Perf x pnexecdir - - - - - - - - - -0.626 -2.15 0.032* 
Perf x pinterlock - - - - - - - - - -0.311 -0.78 0.435 
Perf x pold - - - - - - - - - 0.5939 2.86 0.004** 
Perf x pbusy - - - - - - - - - -0.028 -0.18 0.861 
Perf x indirectshare - - - - - - - - - 0.0041 1.68 0.094# 
Perf x directshare - - - - - - - - - 0.0038 1.11 0.267 
Perf x blockshare - - - - - - - - - 0.0178 0.26 0.793 
PANEL 2 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
F ratio 17.64 19.07 17.16 13.27 
Sig F 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
R-squared 0.1471 0.1929 0.4678 0.4689 
Adj R-squared 0.1387 0.1828 0.4324 0.4335 
R-squared change 0.130 0.068 0.245 0.026 
F change 8.115 16.875 19.712 2.293 
Sig. F change 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.007** 
** significant at 1% level  * significant at 5% level   # significant at 10% level 
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Table 6.3 Summary of results of total cash remuneration model and total remuneration model 
Variable  Total cash remuneration model  Total remuneration model 
 Result Hypothesis Predict 
sign 
Actual 
sign 
Decision Result Hypothesis Predict 
sign 
Actual 
Sign 
Decision 
Sqrt_boardsize Significant at 
1% 
1a ? + Support Significant 
at 1% 
1a ? + Support 
Ln_bmeeting Not significant 2a ? - Reject Not 
significant 
2a ? + Reject 
Indpt_board Significant at 
1% 
3a - + Reject Not 
significant 
3a - + Reject 
P_nexecdir Significant at 
1% 
4a ? - Support Significant 
at 1% 
4a ? - Support 
P_interlock Significant at 
10% 
5a + + Support Not 
significant 
5a + + Reject 
P_old Not significant 6a + - Reject Not 
significant 
6a + + Reject 
P_busy Not significant 7a ? + Reject Not 
significant 
7a ? - Reject 
Ceo_dual1 Significant at 
10% 
8a + + Support Not 
significant 
8a + + Reject 
Directshare Not significant 9a - - Reject Not 
significant 
9a - + Reject 
Indirectshare Significant at 
1% 
10a - - Support Not 
significant 
10a - - Reject 
Ln_blockshare Significant at 
5% 
11a - - Support Not 
significant 
11a - - Reject 
Age Not significant 12 ? - Reject Significant 
at 1% 
12 ? - Support 
Sqrt_tenure Significant at 
1% 
13 ? + Support Significant 
at 1% 
13 ? + Support 
Qualify Not significant 14 ? + Reject Not 
significant 
14 ? + Reject 
Performance Significant at 
10% 
15 + + Support Not 
significant 
15 + + Reject 
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Variable  Total cash remuneration model  Total remuneration model 
 Result Hypothesis Predict 
sign 
Actual 
sign 
Decision Result Hypothesis Predict 
sign 
Actual 
Sign 
Decision 
Perf x boardsize Not significant 1b ? + Reject Significant 
at 10% 
1b ? + Support 
Perf x bmeeting Significant at 
10% 
2b ? + Support Not 
significant 
2b ? + Reject 
Perf x indptboard Not significant 3b + + Reject Not 
significant 
3b + + Reject 
Perf x pnexecdir Not significant 4b ? - Reject Significant 
at 5% 
4b ? - Support 
Perf x pinterlock Not significant 5b - - Reject Not 
significant 
5b - - Reject 
Perf x pold Significant at 
10% 
6b - + Support Significant 
at 1% 
6b - + Support 
Perf x pbusy Significant at 
10% 
7b ? + Support Not 
significant 
7b ? - Reject 
Perf x ceodual Not significant 8b - - Reject Not 
significant 
8b - + Reject 
Perf x directshare Not significant 9b + + Reject Not 
significant 
9b + + Reject 
Perf x 
indirectshare 
Significant at 
5% 
10b + + Support Significant 
at 10% 
10b + + Support 
Perf x blockshare Not significant 11b + + Reject Not 
significant 
11b + + Reject 
Ln_mktvalue Significant at 
1% 
N/A N/A N/A N/A Significant 
at 1% 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Ln_leverage Significant at 
10% 
N/A N/A N/A N/A Significant 
at 5% 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Industry2 Not significant N/A N/A N/A N/A Not 
significant 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Industry3 Not significant N/A N/A N/A N/A Not 
significant 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Industry4 Not significant N/A N/A N/A N/A Not 
significant 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 
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Variable  Total cash remuneration model  Total remuneration model 
 Result Hypothesis Predict 
sign 
Actual 
sign 
Decision Result Hypothesis Predict 
sign 
Actual 
Sign 
Decision 
Industry5 Not significant N/A N/A N/A N/A Not 
significant 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Location2 Not significant N/A N/A N/A N/A Not 
significant 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Yr_dummy2 Not significant N/A N/A N/A N/A Not 
significant 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Yr_dummy3 Not significant N/A N/A N/A N/A Not 
significant 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Diversify Significant at 
5% 
N/A N/A N/A N/A Not 
significant 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 
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Board size and activities 
 
Panel 1 in Table 6.1 shows that the coefficient and t statistics of square root of board 
size in model 4 is significant at 1% level. This result suggests a positive relationship 
between executive directors’ remuneration and board size hence supports hypothesis 
1a. The result is consistent when total remuneration was used instead of total cash 
remuneration (refer to Table 6.2 Panel 1). This finding is consistent with agency 
theory and earlier studies such as Core et al (1999), Randoy and Nielsen (2002) and 
Abdullah (2006). It implies that the current board size in the sampled firms is 
effective to monitor the board decisions on executive directors’ remuneration. On 
average, the sampled firms have seven board members (refer to Table 5.2). The 
MCCG did not specify the exact number of board members. The code leaves the 
companies to decide the appropriate number of board members that they think will 
work effectively in the board.   
 
However, the result does not support the relationship between the frequency of board 
meeting and the level of directors’ remuneration. Both total cash remuneration model 
as well as total remuneration model reported insignificant effect of the variable (refer 
to Table 6.3). Thus, hypothesis 2a is not supported. It implies that frequency of board 
meeting is not considered a way to increase board effectiveness, contradicting with 
earlier studies (for instance Davila & Penalva 2006; Adams 2000; Vafeas 1999) and 
the MCCG’ recommendation for the boards to meet regularly to discharge their duties 
and responsibilities. There are two reasons to explain this result. First, the frequency 
of meetings will not increase the monitoring effort by board if the board itself is not 
effective. A board becomes ineffective if the board culture discourages conflict, the 
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CEO determines the agenda and information given in the board, poor attendance of 
board members or if the CEO and chairman is the same person (Jensen 1993). If the 
board is effective, then only the frequency of board meetings will influence the board 
monitoring effort. Second, the details of meetings’ agenda may also contribute 
towards making the board meeting ineffective way of monitoring the board’s 
decision. However, such information is not publicly available thus cannot be justified 
empirically.   
 
Board Independence 
 
This thesis examines board independence at three levels – proportion of independent 
directors in the board as a whole, proportion of independent directors in audit 
committee and proportion of independent directors in remuneration committee. For 
total cash remuneration model, the result shows that only t statistics and coefficient of 
proportion of independent directors in the board as a whole is statistically significant 
at 1% level. However, the direction of the result suggests that the proportion of 
independent directors in the board is positively related to directors’ remuneration, 
hence leads to rejection of hypothesis 3a. In total remuneration model, the result 
shows none of the independence variable tested is significant. Although the 
coefficient is not significant, the direction of the coefficient is similar to the 
coefficient in total cash remuneration model. Thus, the result is consistent. Note 
however both models show a negative relationship between directors’ remuneration 
and proportion of independent directors in audit and remuneration committee, 
although all results are not significant. Similar results were found when each variable 
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is included separately in the regression. The results is consistent with Chen (2006) but 
contradict with Abdullah (2006) and Conyon and Peck (1998).  
 
This finding suggests the lack of effectiveness of independent directors in the board. 
As independent directors are selected and recruited by chairman or CEOs, it is most 
likely those recruited are among people that will go along with him or her. In addition, 
the title and the prestige of the independent directors are among the primary 
consideration in the selection process (Mace 1986). Thus, based on the result above, 
the independent directors in the sampled companies may not ready to use their powers 
to monitor and discipline managers, resulting increase in directors’ remuneration.   
 
Board composition 
 
This study looks at four aspects of board composition – proportion of non executive 
directors in the board, proportion of interlocking directors, proportion of ‘old’ non 
executive directors and proportion of ‘busy’ non executive directors.  Panel 1 in Table 
6.1 shows two out of four hypotheses are supported in total cash remuneration model. 
The proportion of non executive directors in the board is found negatively related to 
directors’ remuneration, thus supporting hypothesis 4a. It was also found that the 
proportion of interlocking directors is positively related to directors’ remuneration at 
10% level, thus supports hypothesis 5a. Two other variables – proportion of old and 
busy directors are found not significantly related to directors’ remuneration. In the 
total remuneration model, proportion of interlocked directors is no longer significance 
(Table 6.2 Panel 1). The results of other variables are consistent. 
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The results suggest that the lack of non executive directors in a board will lead to 
higher level of executive directors’ remuneration. This fits well with the agency 
theory and previous studies such as Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990). The result implies 
that the presence of non executive directors in the board is effective and they managed 
to monitor the board through their professional and independent advice to the board. 
As a result, board decisions, in particular on executive directors’ remuneration are 
monitored by the presence of non executive directors.   
 
The above result also suggests that high number of interlocking directors in a board 
will lead to high level of executive directors’ remuneration. The result is consistent 
with Core et al. (1999) and Hallock (1997). Chen (2002) argued one possible 
explanation for this is that there is a quid pro quo between such directors and the 
executive directors. It was argued that interlocked directors may be inclined to support 
CEO and other executive members in the hope to get the same support in their own 
board meetings. When executive members possess more direct influence over the non 
executive directors, it will affect their effectiveness and involvement (Long, Dulewicz & 
Gay 2005). In other words, it was found that interlocked directors are not likely to be 
independent, including in making decisions of executive directors’ remuneration.   
 
Hypotheses 6a and 7a were not supported. The less effective non executive directors 
measured by ‘old’ and ‘busy’ non executive directors are found not significantly 
related to directors’ remuneration. The findings suggest that age and multiple 
directorships hold by a non executive director does not affect executive directors’ 
remuneration. Contrary to the findings reported by Core et al. (1999), it implies that 
less effective directors are not being penalised by the board in terms of remuneration. 
However, this findings support Ferris et al. (2003) whereby they found no evidence 
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that multiple directors shirk their responsibility to serve on board committees. Hence, 
‘old’ and ‘busy’ directors may not be appropriate measure of less effective non 
executive directors. Other measures such as level of expertise on the business area 
may be more accurate to measure the level of effectiveness of non executive directors. 
Future studies may want to incorporate these measures.   
 
Board leadership 
The t statistics and coefficient of duality role of CEO and chairman is found to be 
significant at 10% in total cash remuneration model. Hence, hypothesis 8a is accepted. 
This suggests that when CEO and chairman is the same person, it will positively 
affect the level of directors’ remuneration. The finding is consistent with other studies 
such as Kanagaretnam et. al (2008), Dogan and Smyth (2002) and Chen (2006). This 
finding supports the notion that when the CEO holds the position as chairman of the 
board, it will have influence on the board decision making, in particular on the 
remuneration package for the directors. Jensen (1993) argued CEO-chairman duality 
gives the CEO too much power over the decision making process and scope to pursue 
personal interests at the expense of shareholders’ interests. Chen (2006) argues the 
CEO-chairman duality leads to failure of internal control systems because the board 
cannot effectively perform its key control functions. This will result higher chance of 
incurring executive entrenchment by overpaying themselves and not linking their pay 
to firm performance.  
 
However, the results became insignificant when total remuneration is used as the 
dependant variable. This is consistent with few studies conducted earlier such as 
Conyon (1997) and Conyon and Leech (1994) which claim no evidence to support the 
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association between CEO-chairman duality and directors’ remuneration. It implies 
that the CEO-chairman duality plays little role in mitigating agency problems 
associated with directors remuneration settings.   
 
Directors’ Shareholdings 
 
This thesis distinguished the directors’ shareholdings into two groups – direct 
shareholdings and indirect shareholdings. The result for the total cash remuneration 
model shows there is a weak negative relationship between direct directors’ 
shareholding and directors’ remuneration but strong negative relationship between 
indirect directors’ ownership and directors’ remuneration. In Table 6.1, the t-statistics 
and coefficient of proportion of indirect directors’ ownership is significant at 1% 
level. Thus only hypothesis 10a is supported. Proportion of directors’ direct 
ownership is found not to be significant, thus hypothesis 9a is not supported. The 
findings are consistent with Holderness and Sheehan (1988) and Mehran (1995) but 
contradict with Cheung et. al (2005), Chen (2006) and Randy and Nielsen (2002). 
Cheung et al. (2005) reported that a strong positive relationship between percentage of 
directors’ ownership with their cash emoluments received. However, they observed 
that this relationship is mainly among the CEO or chairman that own low level of 
ownership in their respective firms. 
 
Mehran (1995) explains that the negative relationship between directors’ ownership 
and directors’ remuneration is due to less importance of cash remuneration for 
directors holdings significant equity stakes in the firm since the majority of their 
income would come from their equity stakes. In my case, the percentage of ownership 
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based on directors’ indirect ownership (i.e. family) provide significant impact on total 
directors’ ownership. However, in total remuneration model, both of the variables are 
no longer significance at 5% level.  This further confirms Mehran’s (1995) argument 
that cash remuneration must be used rather than total remuneration when linking 
between directors’ ownership and directors’ remuneration.  
 
Outside Blockholders 
 
Panel 1 in Table 6.1 also shows that hypothesis 11a is supported. It is found that block 
holders’ shareholding is negatively related to directors’ remuneration and significant 
at 5% level. This support the argument that the higher the percentage of block holders, 
the lower the directors’ remuneration. This is due to the pressure made by the block 
holders to ensure directors show good performance in order to earn higher income. In 
Malaysia, the block holders are normally institutional firms, mostly government 
linked companies. Thus, they have more reasons to be responsible to their 
shareholders and people in general. It is their fiduciary duties to monitor the 
managerial opportunistic behaviour, including level of executive directors’ 
remuneration. Besides, institutional investors have the resources to do so.  
    
This result further supports the existing evidence on block holder ownership and 
directors’ remuneration. For example, Yeo et al. (2002) found similar result when 
investigating the impact of block holder ownership on directors’ pay among 
Singaporean firms. However, the result changed in the total remuneration model 
whereby block holder ownership is not significantly related to the directors’ 
remuneration. Again, as explained earlier, this result may be due to inclusion of other 
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types of remuneration that is not sensitive to directors’ performance. Dogan and 
Smyth (2002) also found insignificant result due to the use of total remuneration as 
their measure of directors’ remuneration.  
 
 
6.2.2. Human Capital Attributes 
 
This thesis examines three types of human capital attributes – age, tenure and 
qualification. The result shows that only directors’ tenure is significantly related to 
directors’ remuneration for both models. The t statistics and coefficient of square root 
of tenure are significant at 1% level, thus making hypothesis 13 valid. However, 
directors’ age is found to be significantly related to directors’ total remuneration but 
not to directors’ cash remuneration. Hence, hypothesis 12 is partially supported by 
one model. Directors’ qualification is not significantly related to any of the models. 
Hence, hypothesis 14 is rejected.  
 
The findings are interesting because earlier on, total cash remuneration model 
suggests many corporate governance variables to be associated with directors’ 
remuneration. However, total remuneration model better explains better the role of 
human capital attributes towards directors’ remuneration. To recall, total remuneration 
includes payment in the form of gratuity and pension fund scheme. These two types of 
remuneration are clearly associated with the directors’ age and tenure of the firm. 
Pension fund scheme and gratuity do increase with the length of tenure and age of the 
directors. Hence, this study will use total remuneration model in order to decide which 
human capital attributes are related to directors’ remuneration. 
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According to human capital theory, age and tenure reflect experience and expertise of 
a person. Senior directors would have undergone various training and experience that 
enhances their productivity, knowledge and skills (Becker 1994). Directors who 
served longer also gain enough respect and confidence over the board members that it 
may influence their decisions. This study supports the aforementioned argument. 
Other previous studies such as Ingham and Thomson (1995) and Hogan and 
McPheters (1980) reported the similar findings.  
 
The last human capital attribute considered in this thesis is the level of qualification of 
the directors. It is found that no significant evidence to link between directors’ 
remuneration and directors’ qualification. This indicates that the level of directors’ 
remuneration is no longer related to their qualifications. The relationship would 
probably hold when explaining the lower level of jobs in business, such as junior or 
senior management level. At the directors’ level, experience and skills is proven more 
important than qualification. It is also found around 73% of directors in the sampled 
firms obtained university or professional qualifications (refer to Table 5.4). This may 
explain why the relationship between directors’ remuneration and qualifications is not 
significant.      
 
6.2.3 Corporate Performance  
 
There is another conflicting result between total cash remuneration and total 
remuneration model on the association between corporate performance and directors’ 
remuneration. Corporate performance is measured using performance index generated 
by factor analysis (described in chapter 4). It is found that corporate performance has 
a positive relationship with directors’ remuneration in total cash remuneration model. 
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Table 6.1 shows that the additional insertion of interaction variables in model 4 does 
not affect the significance level of corporate performance variable. This finding is 
consistent with the agency theory which states that directors should be compensated 
based on the firm’s performance.        
 
In total remuneration model, firm performance was initially found to be significantly 
related to directors’ remuneration at 5% level (refer to Panel 1 table 6.2). However, 
after including the interactions between performance and corporate governance 
variables, it is found that performance is no longer has significant influence over 
directors’ remuneration. Based on this, the result does not support the agency theory. 
This finding is consistent with Ozkan (2007) and Gregg et al. (2004). Previous studies 
using Malaysian sample also found no evidence to link between performance and 
directors’ remuneration (Abdullah 2006; Hassan et. al 2003). In fact, Nurani and 
Sakan (2003) concluded in their study that Malaysian companies are significantly far-
off from linking directors’ remuneration with their performance. Their conclusion was 
made based on interviews survey among several human resource experts in Malaysian 
companies. In order to test the robustness of the result, performance index is replaced 
by each of individual performance measurement such as ROA, ROE, ROS, Tobin’s Q 
and MBE. The results remain consistent. Alternatively, one year lag of ROA and ROE 
were used to represent performance. Again, the results remain insignificant. Hence 
hypothesis 15 is not supported. 
 
However, the inconsistency of results among previous studies is well acknowledged. 
Tosi et al. (2000) explained the inconsistent evidence of the association between firm 
performance and directors’ remuneration is due to difference in variable 
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measurements, statistical techniques, data sets and the way constructs are studied. 
This study seems to support this argument. In my case, only one measurement 
variable (that is remuneration) is changed while the statistical techniques, data sets 
and the way construct are studied remain the same.  
 
6.2.4 Other control variables 
 
Firm size is significantly related to total cash directors’ remuneration and total 
directors’ remuneration model at 1% level. This is consistent with most of the 
previous studies (for instance Jensen and Murphy 1990; Tosi et al. 2001; Greg et al. 
1993; Chen 2006).  The result suggests directors’ managing big firms should be 
rewarded higher than directors in small firms.     
 
Another control variable used in this study is firm risk, measured by firms’ leverage. 
Directors managing risky companies should be rewarded higher in order to 
compensate for the risk that they have to take. The result shows that leverage 
significantly affects directors’ remuneration at 10% and 5% level for total cash 
remuneration and total remuneration model respectively. This is consistent with other 
previous studies such as Smith and Watts (1992), Core (1997) and Miller et al. (2002).  
 
Firm diversification will affect the complexity of the tasks and role of the directors. 
Directors in a diversified firms needs to make strategic allocation decisions based on 
in depth understanding of different market, competitors and environment. Thus, firm 
diversification should have an effect on the directors’ remuneration. The results in 
Table 6.1 show that firm diversification is significantly related to directors’ 
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remuneration at 5% level. This is consistent with previous studies such as Finkelstein 
and Hambrick (1989) and Riahi-Belkaoui and Pavlik (1993).  
 
The study also control for industrial effects. The industrial effect is significant in the 
Model 1 and 2 (refer to Table 6.1) but becomes no longer significant when corporate 
governance variables and interaction terms are included in the model. This indicates 
that with the presence of corporate governance mechanisms, industrial effects no 
longer significant towards the determination of directors’ remuneration. Similarly, 
there are very little effects of location of the firms and year dummies on directors’ 
remuneration.    
 
6.2.5 Interaction Terms 
 
Interactions terms are added in model 4 to take into account the fact that certain 
corporate governance variables increase the pay performance sensitivity. The results 
are related to Hypotheses 1b, 2b, 3b, 4b, 5b, 6b, 7b, 8b, 9b 10b and 11b. All of these 
hypotheses relate to test the existence of corporate governance mechanisms enhance 
pay-performance sensitivity. In total cash remuneration model, it is found that adding 
these interactions increase the adjusted r squared from 0.4359 to 0.4443. The 
interaction term between performance and percentage of indirect directors’ 
shareholdings shows a significant impact at 5% level. The other three interactions 
term – between performance and frequency of board meeting, proportion of old non 
executive directors and proportion of busy non executive directors are all have a 
significant effect on directors’ remuneration at 10%. Other interactions are found to 
have no significant impact on directors’ remuneration. Hence, hypothesis 2b, 6b, 7b 
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and 10b are supported while hypothesis 1b, 3b, 4b, 5b, 8b, 9b, 11b are rejected (refer 
to Table 6.3). 
 
In total remuneration model, adjusted r square rose from 0.4324 to 0.4335 due to 
insertion of the interaction variables. Four interactions are found to be statistically 
significant. Two out of four significant interactions are similar to the previous model 
– interactions between performance and proportion of old directors and interaction 
between performance and directors’ indirect ownership, both significant at 1% and 
10% respectively. Two other interactions found to be significantly affecting directors’ 
remuneration are interaction terms between performance and board size and 
interaction term between performance and proportion of non executive directors. 
Other interaction terms are not significantly related to directors’ remuneration. Hence, 
hypothesis 1b, 4b, 6b and 10b are supported while hypothesis 2b, 3b, 5b, 7b, 8b, 9b 
and 11b are rejected (refer to Table 6.3).  
 
To summarise, the results show that large number of old directors would positively 
leads to pay performance sensitivity. This finding is interesting because it is expected 
that the old non executive directors would be ineffective member of the board, thus 
enable the other executive members to influence them and leads to less pay-
performance sensitivity (Core et al 1999). The contradicting findings suggest that old 
directors are effective enough to affect decisions in the board. This may be due to 
their vast experience, knowledge and skills. Alternatively, old directors may not easily 
influenced by the CEO or other executive directors.      
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Second, high percentage of indirect directors’ ownership leads to pay performance 
sensitivity. This is consistent with the earlier argument on the negative relationship 
between directors’ indirect ownership and directors’ remuneration. The result 
indicates that in Malaysia, directors’ family who owns shares in the company pay less 
importance on the cash remuneration of the directors but rather focus to earn their 
income through their equity stakes (Mehran 1995).  This is good news to other 
investors, particularly minority shareholders because to a certain extent, the evidence 
found in this study suggests that family members of the directors have the same 
interest as them.  
 
Next, the study found that the addition of board size and frequency of board meeting 
leads to higher pay-performance sensitivity. This indicates that although frequency of 
board meeting did not directly relate to directors’ level of pay, it has a positive impact 
on pay performance sensitivity. Hence, the code of corporate governance in Malaysia 
is right in encouraging regular board meetings for members to discuss and make 
decision. In terms of board size, previous studies (for instance Chen 2006) found that 
the board size will affect positively pay performance up to a certain point only and 
thereafter it will have a negative impact on pay performance. Chen (2006 reported 
that the average board size in China is 9.8 compared to 7.6 found in this study. Hence, 
Malaysian firms need to be aware of the possible inverse affect of the size of the 
board on pay performance sensitivity. 
 
Finally, the result also suggests that inclusion of more non executive members has 
reduced the pay performance sensitivity. Since non executive members are usually 
expected to be independent, this finding is consistent with the earlier discussion that 
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non executive directors do not effectively play their role to represent the interest of 
shareholders. On the other hand, the inclusion of more busy non executive members 
leads to increase in pay performance sensitivity. This is an interesting result where 
busy directors, similar to old directors are regarded as ineffective directors because 
their multiple directorships will lead towards less commitment and lack of 
responsibilities on their role as directors of the firm. This is not true for this study. In 
fact, the finding is consistent with Ferris et al. (2003). They found no evidence that 
multiple directors shirk their responsibility to serve on board committees. The result 
indicates that busy directors are effective directors possibly due to their experience 
and expertise that they gained through multiple directorships.    
  
6.3 Regression Diagnostics 
 
This section reports the results of research diagnostics carried out on model 4, prior to 
the final result presented in Table 6.1 and 6.2. Research diagnostics are carried out in 
order to make sure the model used are robust and free from regression related 
problems such as non-linearity, non-normality, heteroscedasticity, dependence of 
errors in variables, influencial data and collinearity.  In short, the regression 
diagnostics strengthen the validity of the results presented earlier.  
 
First, the study used the leverage versus residual–squared plot (lvr2plot) in order to 
detect any outliers. The model was re-estimated by deleting a few outliers (four firms 
in this case). This has resulted adjusted R square to improve from 0.4386 to 0.4790 
for total cash remuneration model and 0.4307 to 0.4335 for total remuneration model. 
The exclusion of the outliers does not change substantially the effects of the 
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explanatory variables. The study did not run a robust regression models because the 
distribution of data is normal (see discussion on normality below). Robust regression 
models are suitable for non-normal and heavy-tailed error distributions (Hamilton 
2004). 
 
Second, a Shapiro-Wilk W test was run to check for the normality of the residuals of 
the final model (Model 4) for both total cash remuneration model and total 
remuneration model. The result for total cash remuneration model (W= 0.9544, p = 
0.0000) suggests that the residuals of the model are not normally distributed. 
Similarly, the result for total remuneration model (W = 0.95607, p = 0.0000)
9
 also 
indicates problem of normality. This is further illustrated in the Kernel density plot of 
residual for total cash remuneration model and total remuneration model shown in 
Figure 6.1 and 6.2 respectively. However, in practical, it is acceptable to have non 
normal residual when N is large (Chen 2006). 
Figure 6.1 Kernel density plot of residual for total cash remuneration model 
 
                                                 
9
 The null hypothesis for the test is that the distribution is normal 
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Figure 6.2 Kernel density plot of residual for total remuneration model 
 
The next test is to check on the heteroscedasticity problem in the model. The Breusch-
Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test was conducted in order to detect this problem. The results 
show that there is a no problem of heteroscedasticity problem in both models. The 
result for total cash remuneration model and total remuneration model are (χ (1) = 
73.83, p = 0.000) and (χ (1) = 7.76, p = 0.0053) respectively. Due to no evidence of 
heteroscedasticity found in both model, the study carried did not pursue on the ‘hc3’ 
correction as suggested by Long and Ervin (2000).  The residuals versus fitted values 
plot further confirms that the variance of residuals is quite homogenous as shown in 
Figure 6.3. 
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Figure 6.3 Residual versus Fitted Values plot of total remuneration model 4 
 
 
Next, the issue of multicollinearity is being addressed. Multicollinearity is a common 
problem in multiple regression. Initial multicollinearity test suggests multicollinearity 
problem exists between a few of variables, in particular between interaction terms. 
However, this problem is dealt with by using the mean centred of each variable used 
in calculating interaction variable. Table 6.4 shows the variance inflation factor (VIF) 
for all variables used in the final model. It was found that all of VIF do not exceed 
five. Mason and Pereault (1991) suggested that if VIF is more than 10, it signals 
multicollinearity problem in the model tested. Based on the results presented, there is 
no evidence of multicollinearity problem in the final model.  
 
Finally, the linktest and Ramsey RESET test were conducted. The linktest is used in 
order to test for model specification error while Ramsey RESET test is used for 
testing omitted variables. Both of the test do not found any reason to reject null 
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hypotheses (p-value =0.4130 and p-value =0.3203 respectively) for total cash 
remuneration model. Similarly, there is no issue for total remuneration model 
whereby both of the null hypotheses are not rejected (p-value = 0.8321 and p-value = 
0.1218 respectively).      
 
Table 6.4 Multicollinearity among independent variables 
 Total Cash Remuneration Model 
   Variable  VIF 1/VIF 
Perf x indptboard           4.27 0.234253 
Perf x ceodual           3.80 0.262995 
Perf x indirectshare        3.66 0.273166 
Perf x nexecdir        3.19 0.313629 
Perf x pold        3.01 0.331855 
Perf x boardsize        2.85 0.351077 
industry3        2.80 0.357334 
Performance        2.78 0.359378 
Perf x blockshare        2.57 0.389510 
industry2        2.47 0.404497 
industry5       2.33 0.428915 
Perf x bmeeting        2.21 0.452732 
Perf x pintelock        2.21 0.452937 
industry4        1.96 0.509290 
ln_mktvalue        1.96 0.510057 
Perf x directshare        1.93 0.516864 
indirectshare        1.80 0.554589 
nexecdir        1.74 0.573852 
pinterlock        1.71 0.584905 
directshare        1.69 0.592657 
ln_blockshare        1.64 0.610842 
Perf x pbusy        1.63 0.613125 
indpt_board        1.58 0.632049 
sqrt_tenure        1.52 0.659944 
sqrt_boardsize        1.51 0.660714 
pbusy        1.48 0.674788 
age        1.45 0.690875 
yr_dummy3        1.41 0.710088 
yr_dummy2        1.38 0.723276 
location2        1.36 0.734910 
qualify        1.32 0.759575 
ln_bmeeting        1.31 0.761655 
pold        1.28 0.784175 
diversify        1.27 0.789588 
indpt_rem        1.26 0.795712 
indpt_audit        1.25 0.800924 
ln_leverage        1.22 0.816427 
ceo_dual1        1.21 0.828124 
Mean VIF        2.00  
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6.5 Panel Data Analysis – Fixed Effects Models 
 
OLS regressions are not able to control for unobserved and time-constant firm effects. 
Hence, this study used panel data techniques – fixed effects model and random effects 
model to address this issue. The Hausman test was performed in order to decise 
whether a fixed or random effects model is more appropriate to treat the error 
structure (Hausman 1978). The null hypothesis of Hausman test is that estimates with 
random effects model are more efficient. Hence, the rejection of null hypothesis 
would lead to a conclusion that fixed effects estimates are more consistent and 
therefore it should be used. If fixed effects regression is used, any variables such as 
industry and location that do not varies over time should be excluded. Year dummies 
were retained in order to control for time effects. 
 
The results of Hausman test on both total cash remuneration model and total 
remuneration model are presented in table 6.5. In both cases, the null hypothesis of 
Hausman test is rejected. This indicates that fixed effects models are more efficient 
than OLS models with pooled data. The results of fixed effect model show that firms 
effects are significant (F(227,348) = 12.96, p < 0.0001) and (F(227,348) = 14.07, 
p<0.0001). This indicates that fixed effects models are more efficient than OLS 
models with pooled data. In total cash remuneration model, the performance 
coefficient remains significant and positive at 10% level, while year dummies became 
significant at 10% level. However, the other governance variables and human capital 
variables including those significant variables such as boardsize, proportion of non 
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executive directors, proportion of interlocked directors and directors’ tenure are no 
longer significant under the fixed effects model.  
 
 Table 6.5 Hausman test results 
 Total Cash 
Remuneration Model 
Total Remuneration 
Model 
   (33) 95.88 108.12 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 
  
Chen (2006) and Himmelberg et al. (1999) also found similar result when comparing 
the results between fixed effects model and the cross sectional OLS models. For 
instance, Chen (2006) found that board structure, supervisory board size, duality 
dummies, ownership concentration is no longer significant under fixed effects model. 
Similarly, Himmelberg et al. (1999) found managerial ownership no longer explain 
performance when the both observed firm characteristics and firm specific effects is 
controlled. One reason for such discrepancies is that there was very little variation 
among governance variables and human capital variables over time. Stock and 
Watson (2003) pointed out that insufficient variation in a variable can adversely affect 
statistical power, resulting in Type II errors (failing to reject a null hypothesis when 
the null hypothesis is false). However, since this study aim is to identify the individual 
effect of these governance variables and human capital variables, the OLS models are 
used as main models, though the firm specific effects should also be borne in mind.      
 
6.6 Discussions and Conclusions                          
 
This chapter presents the main empirical findings of the study using 417 sample non-
financial firms listed in Bursa Malaysia Berhad over the period 2004 to 2006. The 
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main objective of the study is to determine the key variables that explain the level of 
executive directors’ in Malaysia. Three focal variables examined in this study are 
governance mechanisms, human capital attributes and firm performance. Three steps 
of multivariate analysis were performed in order to test the hypotheses presented in 
chapter 3. Two models were tested, namely total cash remuneration model and total 
remuneration model.  
 
In terms of corporate governance mechanism, a number of board characteristics and 
ownership were found to be significantly related to directors’ remuneration. Board 
size was found to be positively related to directors’ remuneration for both of the 
models. The result supports agency theory and consistent with the literature (Jensen 
1993; Randoy and Nielsen 2002; Core et al. 1999; Abdullah 2006). However, no 
evidence was found to support the relationship between frequency of board meetings 
and directors’ remuneration. This contradicts with the findings by Adams (2000); 
Vafeas 1999 and Davila and Penalva (2006). It implies that frequency of meetings 
does not function as an effective monitoring tool for the managers to exercise their 
role of protecting shareholders. The presence of board size and frequency of board 
meeting however does have a positive impact on pay performance sensitivity. This 
implies that large board size and frequent board meetings enhance the pay-
performance sensitivity. In Malaysia, companies are encouraged to regularly meet but 
no indication was made to encourage larger board size. However, the code of 
governance states that the board members should be balanced between executive and 
non executive. This can be interpreted as encouragement for larger board size. 
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From the perspective of board independence, the study found that proportion of 
independent directors is significantly related to directors’ remuneration, but in the 
wrong direction. This study found the increase in independent directors in the board 
leads to higher directors’ remuneration. This indicate that the lack of effectiveness of 
the independent directors, possibly due to appointments of directors that go along with 
the CEO or the main criteria for choosing independent directors are set to be those 
with title and prestige (Mace 1986). Further, it is found that large number of 
independent directors has no positive impact on pay-performance sensitivity.  
 
In terms of board composition, this study found that the proportion of non executive 
directors significantly reduced the level of directors’ cash remuneration. It implies 
that the non executive directors play a monitoring role in the board to protect the 
shareholders. This findings is consistent with the agency theory and literature (for 
instance Rosenstein and Wyatt 1990; Core et al. 1999; Hallock 1997). However, it is 
also found that the non executive directors have a negative effect on pay performance 
sensitivity in total remuneration model. This conflicting results may possibly caused 
by different definition of remuneration used in the model. Non executive directors are 
considered effective when compared against cash remuneration but not for the total 
remuneration.     
 
Busy and old directors are found not to be significantly related to directors’ 
remuneration. However, both busy and old directors are found to be positively related 
to pay performance sensitivity. This finding indicates that busy and old directors are 
effective and responsible members of the board (Ferris et al 2003). The notion that 
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assumes old directors or directors with multiple directorships are not effective should 
be relooked.  
 
CEO-chairman duality is found to positively (though weakly) relate to directors’ total 
cash remuneration. The finding is consistent with other studies such as Kanagaretnam 
et al. (2008), Dogan and Smyth (2002) and Chen (2006). This finding supports the 
notion that when the CEO holds the position as chairman of the board, it will have 
influence on the board decision making, in particular on the remuneration package for 
the directors. However, the result is not significant when total directors’ remuneration 
is used as dependant variable. The inclusion of other types of remuneration such as 
gratuity and pension fund scheme arguably has further reduced the CEO-chairman 
and pay performance sensitivity.   
 
In terms of directors’ ownership, the empirical suggest that the indirect directors’ 
ownership is negatively related to the level of directors’ remuneration at 1% level. 
Indirect directors’ remuneration refers to the director’s close family ownership (i.e. 
spouse, children and parents). The result indicates that directors’ family placed less 
importance of directors’ cash remuneration but focuses more on income derived from 
their equity stakes (Mehran 1995). This is further supported by hypothesis 10b, where 
directors’ family ownership is positively affect the pay performance sensitivity. 
However, not enough evidence to support the relationship holds for the direct 
directors’ ownership. 
 
The relationship between block holders’ ownership and directors’ remuneration 
revealed mixed results. In total cash remuneration model, hypothesis 11a is supported, 
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where increase in block holders’ ownership leads to lower directors’ remuneration. 
However, the relationship is no longer supported in total remuneration model. 
Similarly, the study did not have enough evidence to link the block holders’ 
ownership with pay performance sensitivity. Again, I would argue the inclusion of 
other types of remuneration such as gratuity and pension fund scheme has further 
diluted the pay performance relationship between the variables.  
 
From the perspective of human capital attributes, the study found that most of the 
significant results are derived from total remuneration model, with the exception on 
directors’ tenure where the results is also significant for total cash remuneration 
model. It is argued that the other types of remuneration such as gratuity and pension 
fund scheme are related to years of service (thus relates to directors’ tenure and age) 
rather than performance. Hence, it is found that total remuneration is significantly 
related to directors’ age and tenure at 1%. This finding is consistent with the literature 
(for instance McKnight and Tomkins 2004; Hitt and Tyler 1991; Hill and Phan 1991). 
They argued increased in directors’ age and tenure enable them to exercise influence 
over board’s decision, provide enough time for them to acquire respect and 
confidence over the board members and enable them to accumulated enough shares 
(mainly through stock options). These factors therefore will increase the directors’ 
remuneration.   
  
The models used for the above discussions are subjected to vigorous statistical tests. 
The results of regression diagnostics show that the associated problems with OLS 
regressions model have been taken care off. It is found that the model presented is 
free from non normality problems, influence data, heteroscedasticity, 
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multicollinearity, and measurement and specification errors. The study further extends 
the OLS results to fixed effects panel data analysis in order to control for unobserved 
and time-constant firm effects. It was found that fixed effects models are more 
efficient than OLS models with pooled data. Both models reported significant and 
positive coefficient for performance but not on all other governance variables and 
human capital variables including those significant variables such as board size, 
proportion of non executive directors, proportion of interlocked directors and 
directors’ tenure.  Stock and Watson (2003) explains that one reason for such 
discrepancies is that there was very little variation among governance variables and 
human capital variables over time resulting in Type II errors (failing to reject a null 
hypothesis when the null hypothesis is false). Nevertheless, the OLS models are used 
as main models because the aim of this study is to identify the individual effect of 
these governance variables and human capital variables.      
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
At this stage, most of the main parts of the thesis have been covered.  In the beginning 
of this thesis, the aims and motivation for the author to embark on this study has been 
explained. Chapter two provides the institutional hindsight of Malaysia. Then, an 
extensive review of the literature, from both developed and developing countries were 
critically assessed and based on that, several numbers of hypotheses were developed. 
In the following chapter, the research methodology of the study is presented followed 
by the descriptive and multivariate findings of the study. This chapter aims to 
summarise the main themes of the study and draws the conclusions of the study. 
 
The main objective of this study is to determine the key variables that explain the 
level of directors’ remuneration in Malaysia. In particular, this study intends to know 
whether governance mechanisms, human capital attributes and firm performance 
affects the level of directors’ remuneration. Previous literature found inconsistent 
results despite the fact that this topic has been widely researched (Tosi et al. 2000). It 
is also noted that not enough research has been done in the developing countries like 
Malaysia. Malaysia has its own unique institutional settings such as concentrated 
ownership that warrants enough interest for the investors, policy makers as well as the 
academia world. The empirical analyses were conducted on a sample of 417 non 
financial companies listed in Bursa Malaysia Berhad for the period of 2004 to 2006.  
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The results show that governance mechanisms – both board characteristics and 
ownership concentration are significantly affects directors’ remuneration level. 
Human capital attributes and performance are also found to be significantly related to 
directors’ remuneration among Malaysian companies. The findings of this study will 
benefit the investors, policy makers, business practitioners as well as contributes 
towards the body of knowledge on this matter. This final chapter will recaps the 
research objectives and hypotheses of the study, summarise the main findings and 
discuss the contributions, implications and limitations of this study, as well as 
potential future research.   
 
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 7.2 reviews the research objectives, 
hypotheses and methods. Section 7.3 will discuss the main findings of this research. 
Next section will discuss about contributions and implications of the study. Section 
7.5 identifies the limitations of the thesis as well as suggestions for future research. 
Final section will conclude this chapter.         
 
7.2 Reviews of research objectives, hypotheses and methods 
 
The motivation to embark on this research is based on three factors. First, major 
reformation has taken place on the corporate governance settings in Malaysia after the 
Asian financial crisis. In many instances, for example the introduction of code of 
corporate governance was made based on the code of corporate governance in the 
West (i.e. the UK). Thus, its applicability is somehow questionable. Second, the 
Malaysian government has invested billions of ringgit in education and training, 
aiming to develop human capital among its people. It is therefore interesting to see to 
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what extent the human capital attributes affect the level of directors’ pay in Malaysia. 
Third, there has been a public concern over the directors pay that do not being 
reflected in the firms’ performance.  
 
The aim of this study is to investigate the determining factors of directors’ 
remuneration. Specifically, the study examined three focal variables – corporate 
governance variables, human capital attributes and performance. The study also 
incorporates other traditional factors such as firm size, firm risk, diversification, 
location and industrial effects.  
      
Based on the literature, agency theory, human capital theory and the specific 
institutional settings in Malaysia, the following fifteen hypotheses were developed:  
 
H1a: There is a relationship between directors’ remuneration and board size. 
H1b: There is a relationship between directors’ pay-performance sensitivity and board 
size.   
 
H2a: There is a relationship between directors’ remuneration and frequency of board 
meeting. 
H2b: There is a relationship between directors’ pay-performance sensitivity and board 
meeting. 
 
H3a: There is a negative relationship between directors’ remuneration and the 
proportion of independent directors in the board of directors. 
H3b: There is a positive relationship between directors’ pay-performance sensitivity 
and the proportion of independent directors in the board of directors. 
 
H4a: There is a relationship between directors’ remuneration and the proportion of 
non executive directors. 
182 
 
H4b: There is a relationship between directors’ pay-performance sensitivity and the 
proportion of non executive directors in the board of directors. 
 
H5a: There is a positive relationship between directors’ remuneration and the 
proportion of interlocked directors in the board of directors. 
H5b: There is a negative relationship between directors’ pay-performance sensitivity 
and the proportion of interlocked directors in the board of directors. 
 
H6a: There is a positive relationship between directors’ remuneration and the 
proportion of old directors in the board of directors. 
H6b: There is a negative relationship between directors’ pay-performance sensitivity 
and the proportion of old directors in the board of directors. 
 
H7a: There is a relationship between directors’ remuneration and the proportion of 
busy directors in the board of directors. 
H7b: There is a relationship between directors’ pay-performance sensitivity and the 
proportion of busy directors in the board of directors. 
 
H8a: There is a positive relationship between directors’ remuneration and CEO 
duality role. 
H8b: There is a negative relationship between directors’ pay-performance sensitivity 
and the CEO duality role. 
 
H9a: There is a negative relationship between directors’ remuneration and directors’ 
direct shareholdings. 
H9b: There is a positive relationship between directors’ pay-performance sensitivity 
and directors’ direct shareholdings. 
 
H10a: There is a negative relationship between directors’ remuneration and directors’ 
indirect shareholdings. 
H10b: There is a positive relationship between directors’ pay-performance sensitivity 
and directors’ indirect shareholdings. 
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H11a: There is a negative relationship between directors’ remuneration and block 
shareholdings. 
H11b: There is a positive relationship between directors’ pay-performance sensitivity 
and block shareholdings. 
 
H12: There is a relationship between directors’ remuneration and average directors’ 
age. 
 
H13: There is a relationship between directors’ remuneration and average directors’ 
tenure. 
 
H14: There is a relationship between directors’ remuneration and directors’ 
qualifications. 
 
H15: There is a positive relationship between directors’ remuneration and firm 
performance. 
 
To test these hypotheses, several multiple regression models were run with a panel 
data consisting of 417 non-financial companies listed in Bursa Malaysia Berhad over 
3 years period. Two models were run namely total cash remuneration model and total 
remuneration model. In order to check the robustness of the final results, various 
techniques were employed.   
 
7.3. Summary of Discussion and Findings. 
 
In general, all three focal variables of this study were found to be significantly related 
to the level of directors’ remuneration. The detailed discussions were presented in 
Chapter 6. Interestingly, the study found few findings on the relationship between 
corporate governance mechanisms and directors’ executive remuneration. First, the 
study reveals that in Malaysia, independence of director is questionable. The study 
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found that the increased number of independent directors in the board leads to higher 
directors’ remuneration level. It is found that the incremental number of independent 
directors has no positive impact on pay-performance sensitivity. This suggests that the 
independent directors in the sampled firms may not ready to use their powers to 
monitor and discipline managers, resulting increase in directors’ remuneration. Mace 
(1986) suspects the selection of directors are according to the CEO’s wish or the main 
criteria to be appointed as directors is based on title and prestige.   
 
The study found that board size is positively related to directors’ remuneration and 
pay performance sensitivity. This finding is consistent with the literature and agency 
theory. However, there is no evidence to support the role of board meetings in 
monitoring the level of directors’ remuneration. However, it is found that frequency 
of board meetings has a positive impact on pay performance sensitivity. In other 
words, the findings support the recommendation by the Malaysian code of corporate 
governance for board to meet regularly in a year.    
 
There is one contradicting result found. The non executive directors are found to be 
negatively related to directors’ cash remuneration. On the other hand, non executive 
directors are negatively related to the performance pay sensitivity in total 
remuneration model. The results indicate two conflicting ideas of the effectiveness of 
non executive directors. However, this conflict may possibly caused by different 
definition of remuneration. Non executive directors are considered effective when 
compared against cash remuneration but not for the total remuneration.     
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Another interesting result from the study is the contradicting relationship between old 
and busy directors on directors’ remuneration. This study found that the existence of 
old and busy directors leads towards better pay-performance sensitivity. This indicates 
that the old and busy directors are effectively functions in the board. This is contrary 
to the calls by policy maker to impose mandatory retirement ages or term limits and to 
limit the number of other boards on which a board member may serve. Ferris et al. 
(2003) found no evidence to support multiple directorships are not effective and not 
responsible members of the board (Ferris et al 2003). Hence, this study suggests the 
policy maker to relook again their preposition on old and busy directors.  
 
It is interesting to find that directors’ remuneration is negatively related to directors’ 
family ownership. This result implies that directors’ family are no longer concern 
about the cash remuneration but rather interested to get their rewards through equity 
based stake. If this is true, other shareholders of the company would be very pleased 
to see their interest is in line with the majority of shareholders – that is the directors’ 
family members. However, the study did not found enough evidence to support the 
same interest on directors himself because the directors’ direct ownership is not 
significantly related to directors’ remuneration. However, note (refer to Table 6.3) 
that direction of this relationship is also negative.      
 
From the perspective of human capital attributes, the study found that most of the 
significant results are derived from total remuneration model, with the exception on 
directors’ tenure where the results is also significant for total cash remuneration 
model. It is argued that the other types of remuneration such as gratuity and pension 
fund scheme are related to years of service (thus relates to directors’ tenure and age) 
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rather than performance. Hence, it is found that total remuneration is significantly 
related to directors’ age and tenure at 1%. This finding is consistent with the literature 
(for instance McKnight and Tomkins 2004; Hitt and Tyler 1991; Hill and Phan 1991). 
They argued increased in directors’ age and tenure enable them to exercise influence 
over board’s decision, provide enough time for them to acquire respect and 
confidence over the board members and enable them to accumulated enough shares 
(mainly through stock options). These factors therefore will increase the directors’ 
remuneration.   
 
The rest of the findings is consistent with the agency theory and the literature, 
including those of control variables such as firm size, firm risk and diversification. 
The summary of results and the decision to reject or support the hyptheses is 
presented in Table 6.3. In summary, the empirical results of the data analyses show 
mixed support for hypotheses (hence mixed support to agency theory and human 
capital theory). Hypotheses 1a, 2b, 3a, 4a, 5a, 6b, 7b, 8a, 10a, 10b, 11a, 13 and 15 is 
supported in total cash remuneration model while hypotheses 1b, 2a, 3b, 4b, 5b, 
6a,7a,8b, 9b, 11b, 12 and 14 is not supported. For total remuneration model, only 
hypotheses 1a, 1b, 4a, 4b, 6b, 10b 12 and 13 is supported while the rest of the 
hypotheses is rejected. Hence, from theoretical perspective, agency theory and human 
capital theory cannot probably provide full guidelines for corproate governance 
reform. Additional perspectives as laid out by Bender (2003) in Figure 3.1 may be of 
relevance. However, this requires more research work to be done.     
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7.4 Contributions and Implications of the Study 
 
This study contributes towards the literature on determinants of executive directors’ 
remuneration, specifically on corporate governance variables, human capital attributes 
and firm performance. It also provides inputs towards policy makers, investors as well 
as business practitioners in Malaysia and internationally.  
 
This study contributes to the body of literature on directors’ remuneration in a number 
of ways. First, the study contributes towards the relationship between directors’ 
executive remuneration and corporate governance mechanisms, namely the board of 
directors and ownership structure. This study examined various aspects of board 
characteristics in depth   such as board size and activities, board independence, board 
composition and board leadership. In each of the aspect considered, several 
dimensions were explored. For instance, in board size and activities, two variables 
were examined – board size and frequency of board meetings. Board independence 
looks at proportion of independent directors in the board, proportion of independent 
directors in remuneration committee and proportion of independent directors in audit 
committee. Board composition explores four dimensions – proportion of non 
executive directors, proportion of interlocked directors, proportion of old directors 
and proportion of busy directors in the board. Finally, board leadership examined the 
effect of CEO-chairman duality roles on directors’ remuneration. The study also 
separate the effect of directors’ ownership and family ownership in order to gauge 
better understanding of the determinants of directors’ remuneration.   
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Second, this study also explores the relationship between human capital attributes and 
directors remuneration. The current literature does not explore much of this area, 
especially in the developing countries like Malaysia. Most of the studies were 
conducted in the US and UK (for instance Ingham and Thomson (1995); McKnight 
and Tomkins 2004). Thus, this study becomes among the first to study on the link 
between directors’ remuneration and human capital attributes in Malaysia. The 
findings of this study should shed light to the policy makers and business practitioners 
on the importance of human capital attributes in determining directors’ pay level.  
Interestingly, it is also found that human capital attributes are more related to the total 
directors’ remuneration rather than total cash remuneration. The inclusion of other 
types of remuneration such as pension fund scheme and gratuity has lead the 
improvement of relationship between human capital attributes and directors’ 
remuneration. Qualification is no longer play a role in determining the level of pay for 
directors.    
 
Third, the results of this thesis yield robust results due to the use of various statistical 
techniques to check the validity and reliability of the findings. The results of other 
control variables also provide useful information on how executive remuneration is 
determined in Malaysia.  Fourth, this study also uses human capital theory as part of 
theories to explain the determination of directors’ remuneration. Since this study is 
based on sampled firms in Malaysia, the application of this theory has now extended 
to Malaysia. It was found that human capital theory did apply to the Malaysian 
context.     
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On the practicality side, this study has a number of applications to the policy makers, 
investors and business practitioners. Some of the findings contradict to with the policy 
makers’ recommendation. For instance, calls have been made for limiting the multiple 
directorships among directors and imposing age limit for the non executive directors. 
My results show otherwise.   
  
7.5 Limitations and future research 
 
One of the limitations of this research is the exclusion of stock options from directors’ 
remuneration. This is unavoidable due to inconsistent reporting and valuation of 
options among Malaysian firms. Some firms opt to report in detail on stock options in 
their annual reports. Thus, unless requirement or standard is imposed for all firms to 
disclose the information on stock option owned by managers, the exclusion of stock 
options from directors’ remuneration is here to stay.  
 
This study excludes the foreign-owned firms from the sample. Future research should 
include foreign firms in order to see further understands the effect of corporate 
governance variables on directors’ remuneration. Future studies also can extend the 
number of observation years in order to expand the choice of statistical techniques to 
analyse the data.  
  
Finally, this study used only two main theories – agency theory and human capital 
theory. It was highlighted earlier in Figure 3.1 that there are other theories to explain 
the level of remuneration. Future studies should consider this in order to better 
understand what affects directors remuneration level.  
190 
 
7.6 Conclusion 
 
To conclude, many of the findings of this study is consistent with the guidelines 
proposed by Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG). For instance, 
recommendations for improving corporate governance by separating the Chairman 
and CEO, relying on smaller boards, eliminate gray directors are all consistent with 
my results. While my results indicate that, on average, these guidelines have identified 
substantive issues in the creation of effective governance mechanisms, the evidence 
does not imply that it is appropriate to adopt strict rules for the composition of the 
board or ownership structure. Contrary to MCCG, I found no evidence that 
independent outside directors create a more effective board than inside directors, nor 
do I found that greater equity ownership by outside directors results in improved 
governance systems. Given the prior mixed evidence on the importance of outside 
directors and the evidence that inside directors may be superior to outside directors, 
the attention focused on the importance of outside directors and their ownership 
stakes appears to be misplaced. 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
 
Bender (2004) outlined three main categories of theory used to study directors’ 
remuneration, namely economic theories, social-psychological theories and 
organisational theories (see Figure 3.1).  All theories attempt to explain the same 
phenomenon but these theories differ in several ways. For instance, economic theories 
tend to emphasise on the operation of the firm or market while psychological theories 
tend to focus on the motivation of individuals within the firm or market.  
 
Economic Theories 
 
Economic theories dominate the remuneration related literature. Basically, economic 
theories are derived from two assumptions.  First, the economists assume the real 
world is a perfect market whereby prices are determined by the influences of supply 
and demand. Second, the economists assume that rational individual always acts to 
achieve his or her maximum utility. Accordingly, the economic theories used in 
remuneration related studies can be divided into two – one which emphasis on market 
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forces as the significant influence and the other one which regard individual rational 
behaviour as significant influence on managerial remuneration (Bender 2004). 
 
Labour Market Theory 
This theory is based on the fundamental principles of perfect market. In a perfect 
market, ‘equilibrium price’ is achieved when the quantity of demands equal to 
quantity of supplies (Begg et. al 1991). If demands are greater than supplies or vice 
versa, the market will adjust itself until it reaches its equilibrium state. The labour 
market theory assumes the labour market also follows the same principle. In the 
context of executive directors’ remuneration studies, proponents of labour market 
theory suggest that companies had to pay high remuneration to the executive directors 
because there is a shortage of individuals who has the capability to lead and run 
corporate successfully (Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman 1997; Finkelstein and Hambrick 
1996).       
 
The application of labour market theory can be clearly illustrated when the director’s 
market itself is further segmented. For instance, it is shown by previous studies that 
director’s remuneration will vary according to industry (Deckop 1988) and size 
(Ewers 2002; Merhebi 2006). They argued that both industry and size act as a 
differentiating factor in the labour market. Therefore, directors of large companies 
need to be highly paid due to the fact that they are highly skilled (Gomez-Mejia 
(1994). This phenomenon leads labour market to be segmented. Similarly, directors of 
companies in certain industry like information technology (IT) and manufacturing that 
are very competitive and volatile would need to be compensated more than other 
established industries such as plantation or agricultural industries.         
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Bender (2004) argued that as a result of remuneration survey conducted by various 
parties to provide justification for suffice remuneration to retain and motivate 
directors’ in UK companies, the directors can compare their salaries with the average 
in the industry hence push up the remuneration even further.   
 
Human Capital Theory 
The human capital of individuals includes their age, qualifications and experience. It 
provides justification to employer to accept a prospective employee, including 
director that the employee is capable of delivering whatever the tasks he or she 
required to do. Thus, human capital theory argues that directors’ remuneration is 
determined not solely on the job itself but rather incorporates the human capital that 
he or she owns. Agrawal (1981) argued that directors with greater amount of human 
capital should be able to perform his or her job thus should be paid more.  
  
Both labour market theory and human capital theory implicitly believe that there is a 
‘true value’ for remuneration, captured in some way by using market forces or human 
capital (Bender 2004). Both theories provide reasons and justification for the level of 
director’s pay by companies. Hence, this study incorporates the human capital 
attributes of the directors and the firm size and industry.  
 
Agency Theory 
Agency theory is used by majority of the research on directors’ remuneration 
(Murphy 1999; Bender 2003). It was first developed from risk-sharing literature 
discovered by economists during 1960s and the early 1970s (Eisenhardt 1989). This 
205 
 
theory emphasis that rational individual will behave in manner that maximise its 
utility function. In the context of managerial-company relationship, whereby there is 
separation of ownership from decision-making, management tends to pursue their 
own interests instead of increasing the owners’ wealth. The underlying assumption of 
agency theory is that the goal of shareholders is to maximize their wealth, while the 
goals of management is to maximize a utility function that includes pay, prestige, size 
and power. Clearly, this theory assumes that there is a conflict of interest between 
management (agent) and its owners (shareholders). Agency problems arise because 
the agent cannot possibly contract for every possible action whose outcome affects 
both his own welfare and he welfare of the principal (Brennan 1995).  
 
The theory also assumes that the directors can be motivated to perform according to 
shareholders’ goals by using a form of performance-related pay and their contracts are 
written in such a way as to facilitate this (Prendergast 1999). The performance-related 
pay is believed to induce the management so that their interests coincide with the 
shareholders’ goals. Other mechanisms to align the interests of managers and 
shareholders include improving the roles of board of directors (Fama and Jensen 
1983) through appointment of independent directors and separation between chairman 
and chief executive director (CEO).  In other words, governance structure of the 
company will assist the owner in aligning their interest with the management of the 
company.   
 
Relative Performance Theory 
Relative performance theory stems from agency theory. Agency theory suggests that 
directors’ remuneration should be based on company’s performance. However, it is 
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argued that company performance is not entirely within the control of directors, for 
there may be external factors that may accelerate or deteriorate performance. For 
instance, company performance may be affected by macroeconomic factors or 
political factors. In such case, reward based solely on corporate performance is no 
longer appropriate.      
 
Relative performance evaluation (RPE) incorporates the fact that due to anomalies, an 
individual director’s or company’s success or failure alone is not appropriate measure 
of performance. The effects of such anomalies can be reduced or eliminated by 
looking at the comparative results to those of suitable peer groups. This idea was first 
developed by Holmstrom (1982). Using RPE, shareholders are able to evaluate 
directors fairly and directors are not penalised or rewarded for uncontrollable factors.  
 
Tournament Theory 
Tournament theory differs from the previous theories described earlier. This theory 
was first developed by Lazear and Rosen (1981). Tournament theory argued that the 
level of individual executive’s remuneration is a reflection of his or her position in the 
company. Proponents of tournament theory believe that organisational hierarchy is a 
form of tournament, whereby each individual compete for prize of promotion and a 
higher salary. Due to the fact that organisational hierarchy is mostly pyramid shaped, 
each level provides fewer opportunities thus warrant for an increase pay for each 
level.  It is therefore argued that the level of pay at the director’s level must be high so 
that it will motivate the lower level people of the hierarchy to compete and obtain the 
highest level.  
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Social-psychological Theories 
 
Social-psychological theories provide alternative views from economic theories. In 
economic theories, variation in remuneration (i.e. money – a form of extrinsic reward) 
is seen to be a motivating factor to directors to act according to the aspiration of 
shareholders. However, some authors challenged this idea and argued that intrinsic 
reward (such as job satisfaction) may be important as well. Bender (2004) 
distinguishes the social-psychological into two categories: (i) theories that relate 
directly to the individuals (directors), and (ii) theories that relate to remuneration 
committee and the remuneration process itself.         
 
Expectancy Theory 
Expectancy theory argues that individual’s motivation depends on two factors: (i) how 
he or she perceived the probability of success in achieving the expected target; and (ii) 
how one perceived the level of attractiveness of the final reward (Vroom 1964). Thus, 
expectancy theory recognises different preferences of each individual and assumes 
that different structured packages will motivate different set of people.  
 
Equity Theory 
Equity theory states that employees always consider how they are treated as compared 
to others and how well rewarded they are as compared to the amount of effort they 
have put in. If they perceived themselves to be treated unfavourably, they will become 
less motivated to work in order to restore equality. Alternatively, they could change 
their level of pay, influence the others to work less or change their reference point to 
other employees whose more alike them.                          
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Both expectancy and equity theory explain individual’s motivation towards work. 
However, Bender (2004) argued that these motivational theories are insufficient to 
explain how final remuneration packages are decided. 
     
Social Influence Theory 
 ‘Social influence’ in the context of director’s remuneration settings refers to several 
different types of relationship among board of directors. These relationships may be in 
the form of seeking way to return favours among directors, a way to demand respect 
for the power and authority one’s possessed, a plain social interactions between two 
good friends or a relationship that exists due to common or differences in social 
status. Whatever type of relationship that exists between the remuneration 
committees, it will affect the level of pay of directors. Main et. al (1995) discovered 
that CEO compensation was significantly higher if the non-executive director who 
serve as chair of the remuneration committee had been appointed after the CEO joined 
the company. They conclude that this is evident of the first type of relationship.  This 
relations.hip  
 
Social Comparison Theory 
Social comparison theory assumes that individuals make evaluation based on their 
comparative judgement with other people whom they believe have similar abilities 
with them. Considering the fact that most of the non-executive directors who sit in the 
remuneration committee are also directors of other companies, it is inevitable for them 
to make comparison and judgement based on their own experiences. This theory is 
supported by empirical findings (for instance O’Reilly et. al 1995).   
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Organisational Theories 
 
Previous sections explain remuneration based on economic and social-psychological 
perspectives. Organisational theories seek to explain phenomenon from organisational 
point of view.   
 
Institutional and Legitimacy Theory 
Institutional theory argues the impact of isomorphic pressures on companies force 
them to act in the similar ways as other companies. According to DiMaggio and 
Powell (1983), there are types of isomorphic: (i) coercive; (ii) mimetic; and (iii) 
normative. Coercive isomorphic is pressures from other organisations, which the 
company is dependent upon, and the cultural expectations of society. Mimetic 
isomorphism is pressures to imitate others when the future direction is not clear and 
other organisations seem to know better. Finally, normative isomorphic results from 
the pressure created by professionals to control and legitimised their professional 
practices. In the context of  
 
This theory provides good explanation of homogeneity of remuneration practices 
between companies, specifically within the same industry. For instance, Bender 
(2004) found that utilities companies in UK have similar remuneration structure and 
level of pay due to isomorphic pressures, thus support institutional theory.  In other 
words, companies are seeking to gain acceptance from the society and make 
themselves legitimate. Given that the society in general demands greater disclosure on 
directors’ remuneration matters, it is important for companies to gain legitimacy from 
the society in which their shareholders reside.  
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Decision Theory 
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) specify two aspects of decision theory that are 
relevant to remuneration setting process: adjustment and anchoring heuristic. They 
argued that in most circumstances, people make numerical estimates based on an 
initial value (anchor) and make insufficient adjustment to reach a biased final figure 
towards initial value. In the remuneration setting process, remuneration may use 
current pay levels, what he or she feels is reasonable based on his or her experience 
(equity) or even figures from remuneration surveys.   
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Power and Politics 
Another aspect of decision theory that is relevant to consider here is power and 
politics. It is argued that in a decision-making process, specifically in the context of 
deciding the level of director’s pay, there are negotiations between top management 
and remuneration committee members and among the committee members itself. The 
final decision will support the most powerful protagonist. According to the literature, 
the sources of power include executive share ownership, executive tenure, the 
proportion of non-executive appointed by the CEO and CEO’s social capital (Bender 
2004).      
 
Contingency Theory 
Contingency theory states that there is no universal and ideal pay structure for all 
organisations. Rather, the proponents of this theory believe that each organisation 
requires unique remuneration packages that suited its own characteristics and reflects 
its own operating external environment. If organisation follows other remuneration 
structure, it may not match its strategy thus cannot achieve high performance.  
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APPENDIX 2 
 
Summary of selected studies on directors’ remuneration in developed countries 
 
Author/Year Country Methodology Sample Dependent Variable Independent Variables Results 
Murphy (1985) US Regression  All (more 
than 100) 
publicly held 
corporations 
in Fortune 
500 (1964-
1981)  
Salary, Bonus, 
Salary + bonus, 
deferred 
compensation, ex-
ante value of stock, 
total compensation 
(inclusive of fringe 
benefits & saving 
plans but exclude 
annual accruals of 
penions benefit. 
Firm size, growth, postion 
dummies (chairman, 
CEO, president, vice 
president), firms variables 
(sales, stock index, stock 
variance, industry relative 
and abnormal 
performance indices) 
Firm performance is 
strongly and positively 
related to managerial 
compensation. Growth of 
firm sales (also measure of 
firm performance strongly 
related to compensation. 
Bilimoria 
(1997) 
US Chi- square  300 
companies of 
the 1984 
Fortune list 
CEO compensation Stockhodling, 
interlocking board, 
performance 
Board interlocked is 
positively related to CEO 
compensation, 5% 
stockholding is negatively 
associated with CEO 
compensation 
Daily et. al 
(1998) 
US Multiple 
regression 
200 firms 
from Fortune 
500 (1992-
1994) 
Non-contingent pay 
(salary and other 
cash 
compensation), 
contingent pay 
(stock options, 
Non managment 
compensation committee 
(affiliated, 
interdependence, 
proportion of CEO in 
compensation 
High proportion of CEOs 
on a compensation 
committee is associated 
with a lower level of 
change in total pay.  
No evidence to support 
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Author/Year Country Methodology Sample Dependent Variable Independent Variables Results 
bonus & long term 
incentives), total 
pay 
committee), 
Control variables (firm 
size, performance, 
ownership structure, ceo 
tenure and industry 
average CEO 
compensation). 
relationship between 
compensation with any of 
the key variables. 
Agrawal (1981)  US Multiple 
regression 
168 US life 
insurance 
companies 
Compensation Job complexity (span of 
control, functional 
divisions, management 
levels, geographical 
diversity), employers’ 
ability to pay (profit, rate 
of return) and executive 
human capital 
(educational level, field of 
study and work 
experience) 
All three factors account 
almost 80% of variation in 
executive compensation. 
All three factors have 
significant effect on 
compensation.  
Kato and Kubo 
(2006) 
Japan Panel data 
analysis 
51 Japanese 
companies 
(10 years 
period) 
CEO base salary, 
CEO total annual 
cash compensation  
ROA, sales, growth of 
sales, profit, negative 
profit (dummy), number 
of employee, stock 
returns 
Positive relationship 
between CEO pay and 
performance (ROA)   
Randoy and 
Nielsen (2002) 
Norway 
and 
Sweden 
Cross 
sectional OLS 
regression 
224companies 
(120 Norway 
and 104 
Sweden) 
CEO compensation Financial performance, 
CEO tenure, board size, 
foreign board 
membership, ceo 
ownership, debt ratio, 
Significant positive 
relationship between board 
size, foreign board 
membership and market 
capitalisation with CEO 
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market capitalisation, 
firm age, nationality and 
industry dummies 
compensation 
Significant negative 
relationship between 
company performance and 
CEO tenure with CEO 
compensation.   
Vafeas (1999) US OLS and 2-
Stage Least 
Square 
regression 
307 firms 
(1990-1994) 
Board frequency,  Board size, inside 
ownership, % of 
independent directors 
Board frequency is related 
to corporate governance 
and ownership 
characteristics 
McKnight and 
Tomkins (2004) 
UK Regression  228  UK 
firms 
Salary annual 
performance, 
change in the value 
options held 
CEO tenure, CEO age, 
size, performance 
Positive relationship 
between shareholder return 
and increases in the value 
of executive options held 
decreases with CEO 
tenure. Suggest non linear 
functions as CEO 
influence over pay setting 
process may not significant 
until about the 6
th
 year of 
tenure. 
Mangel and 
Singh (1993) 
US OLS 
regression  
100 largest 
industrial 
companies 
(1988  
Cash compensation  
(salary + bonus) 
Firm size, performance, 
tenure, board 
composition, external 
ownership, institutional 
ownership, director equity 
Institutional investors do 
limit the payment of 
unearned compensation to 
CEO but the presence of 
5% equity owner does not 
have significant effect. 
Also found longer tenure 
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lead to greater 
compensation, but no 
significant relationship 
between compensation and 
percentage of outside 
director, director retainer, 
CEO’s year of company 
service   
Crespi_Cladera 
& Gispert 
(2003) 
Spain Regression 113 listed 
Spanish 
companies 
(1990-1995)  
Board member 
remuneration, total 
cboard 
remuneration 
Company performance, 
leverage, ownership 
structure.  
Positive relationship 
between board 
remuneration and company 
performance. Governance 
structure of companies is 
relevant when explaining 
the power of the 
compensation-performance 
relationship 
Cheung et al 
(2005) 
Hong 
Kong 
Regression, 
fixed effects 
412 firms 
(1995-1998) 
Cash remuneration  Ownership concentration, 
CEO duality, firm 
performance, audit 
committee, % of 
independent non 
executive directors  
Positive relationship 
between managerial 
ownership and cash 
remuneration 
       
Li et. al (2006) China OLS 
regression, 
iteratively 
reweighted 
296 
observations 
(206 firms 
listed in 
CEO compensation Corporate governance 
(CEO duality, ownership 
structure), control 
variables (CEO age, 
Little evidence to show 
Chinese companies take 
advantage of weaker board 
structures or less 
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least square 
(IRLS) 
regressionOLS 
regression, 
iteratively 
reweighted 
least square 
(IRLS) 
regression 
Shanghai 
stock 
exchange and 
Shenzen stock 
exchange) 
tenure, firm size and 
growth rate).  
demanding shareholdings 
to get higher compensation 
package. Compensation is 
more related to 
increasingly global 
managerial labour market 
and compensation standard 
Ghosh (2006) India Pooled 
Regression 
with fixed 
effects  
462 firms 
(1997-2002) 
Board 
compensation,  
CEO compensation 
Firm performance, board 
size, proportion of NED, 
CEO duality, firm 
diversification 
Board compensation 
largely related to current 
and past year performance 
and diversification 
CEO compensation 
depends on current 
performance only. Also 
significant are age, 
experience and education 
Firth et. al 
(1999) 
Hong 
Kong 
Regression 351 
companies 
(1994 and 
1995) 
CEO, average 
director pay, 
average bonus per 
director pay, 
average bonus per 
average pay 
Performance (stock 
return), return on 
shareholder equity, 
valuation ratio, firm size, 
growth, directors 
shareholdings, proportion 
of NED, institutional 
investors 
Corporate size & 
accounting profitability are 
significantly related to 
remuneration. Stock return 
(performance) is not 
significant. Corporate 
governance variables has 
little association with 
change in pay 
Dogan and Malaysia  Regression Range from Total board Firm performance, sector Positive relationship 
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Smyth (2002) 45 to 222 
comapnies for 
1989 to 2000 
remuneration performance,  firm size 
(Sales turnover), 
ownership concentration 
(% of shares owned by 
largest stockholder 
between directors 
remuneration and sales 
turnover & negative 
relationship between 
directors’ remuneration 
and ownership 
concentration 
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APPENDIX 3 
 
 
 
Factor analysis results  
 
This analysis was carried out in order to establish an index that take into account different measurement of performance. An index is needed as 
the variables measuring performance are highly correlated 9see correlation results below. 
 
 
             |      roa  lag_roa      roe  lag_roe      ros 
-------------+--------------------------------------------- 
         roa |   1.0000 
     lag_roa |   0.8533   1.0000 
         roe |   0.7636   0.6564   1.0000 
     lag_roe |   0.3255   0.4964   0.3122   1.0000 
         ros |   0.4327   0.5068   0.3872   0.2342   1.0000 
 
 
 
 In this analysis, five different types of performance measurement were used; ROA, one-year lag ROA, ROE, one-year lag ROE and ROS. The 
principal component analysis extraction method was used.  
 
  
            (principal component factors; 1 factor retained) 
  Factor     Eigenvalue     Difference    Proportion    Cumulative 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     1        3.07293         2.27343      0.6146         0.6146 
     2        0.79950         0.10723      0.1599         0.7745 
     3        0.69228         0.36237      0.1385         0.9129 
     4        0.32990         0.22451      0.0660         0.9789 
     5        0.10539               .      0.0211         1.0000 
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               Factor Loadings 
    Variable |      1    Uniqueness 
-------------+--------------------- 
         roa |   0.90537    0.18030 
     lag_roa |   0.92372    0.14674 
         roe |   0.82848    0.31362 
     lag_roe |   0.55963    0.68682 
         ros |   0.63277    0.59960 
 
The result of KMO and Bartlett’s test is significance, indicating suitability of factor analysis as a method of data reduction.  
  
 KMO and Bartlett's Test 
 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling 
Adequacy. .711 
Bartlett's Test of 
Sphericity 
Approx. Chi-Square 3205.448 
df 10 
Sig. .000 
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APPENDIX 4 
 
Regression results for Total Cash remuneration model (Model 1-4) 
 
Model 1 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    1137 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 11,  1125) =   21.63 
       Model |  66434.0202    11  6039.45638           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  314084.662  1125  279.186367           R-squared     =  0.1746 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.1665 
       Total |  380518.683  1136  334.963629           Root MSE      =  16.709 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
sqrt_tcash~m |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Performance |   .0505363   .5308034     0.10   0.924    -.9909398    1.092012 
 ln_mktvalue |   4.874506   .3884101    12.55   0.000     4.112416    5.636596 
 ln_leverage |   2.067691   .4670488     4.43   0.000     1.151307    2.984076 
   industry2 |  -.4003868   1.530669    -0.26   0.794    -3.403673      2.6029 
   industry3 |   -4.10767   1.669221    -2.46   0.014    -7.382806   -.8325335 
   industry4 |   6.220608   2.350617     2.65   0.008     1.608522    10.83269 
   industry5 |   -4.65371   1.702303    -2.73   0.006    -7.993756   -1.313664 
   location2 |   .6495949    1.09735     0.59   0.554    -1.503488    2.802678 
   yr_dummy2 |   .9498769   1.215424     0.78   0.435    -1.434876     3.33463 
   yr_dummy3 |   .8279751    1.21559     0.68   0.496    -1.557104    3.213054 
   diversify |   .5691297   .2998232     1.90   0.058     -.019146    1.157405 
       _cons |  -20.17556   4.689463    -4.30   0.000    -29.37663   -10.97448 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Model 2 
     Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    1132 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 14,  1117) =   21.14 
       Model |  79318.9223    14  5665.63731           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  299432.065  1117  268.068098           R-squared     =  0.2094 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.1995 
       Total |  378750.988  1131   334.88151           Root MSE      =  16.373 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
sqrt_tcash~m |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Performance |   .1526336   .5205832     0.29   0.769    -.8687974    1.174065 
 ln_mktvalue |    4.74391   .3869047    12.26   0.000     3.984769    5.503052 
 ln_leverage |   2.003953   .4586353     4.37   0.000      1.10407    2.903837 
   industry2 |  -.1858851    1.50577    -0.12   0.902    -3.140342    2.768572 
   industry3 |  -3.807662   1.647787    -2.31   0.021    -7.040769   -.5745556 
   industry4 |   5.330472   2.313925     2.30   0.021     .7903435    9.870601 
   industry5 |  -4.084741   1.688597    -2.42   0.016    -7.397919   -.7715619 
   location2 |   1.141985   1.098281     1.04   0.299    -1.012941    3.296912 
   yr_dummy2 |   .8080247   1.195891     0.68   0.499    -1.538421     3.15447 
   yr_dummy3 |   .3637522   1.199697     0.30   0.762    -1.990161    2.717666 
   diversify |   .4707072   .2960799     1.59   0.112    -.1102282    1.051643 
         age |  -.2208295   .0819819    -2.69   0.007    -.3816853   -.0599737 
 sqrt_tenure |   3.823078   .5396059     7.08   0.000     2.764323    4.881833 
     qualify |   .8344034   1.163365     0.72   0.473    -1.448224    3.117031 
       _cons |  -18.74901   5.770662    -3.25   0.001    -30.07157   -7.426455 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Model 3 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     610 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 27,   582) =   18.43 
       Model |  93493.0453    27  3462.70538           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  109334.567   582  187.860081           R-squared     =  0.4609 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.4359 
       Total |  202827.613   609  333.050267           Root MSE      =  13.706 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
sqrt_tcash~m |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Performance |   -.081463    .576278    -0.14   0.888    -1.213301    1.050375 
 ln_mktvalue |   3.753838   .4815676     7.80   0.000     2.808016     4.69966 
 ln_leverage |   1.278693   .5309094     2.41   0.016     .2359615    2.321425 
   industry2 |   2.687826   1.874067     1.43   0.152     -.992932    6.368585 
   industry3 |  -1.660973   2.045435    -0.81   0.417    -5.678306     2.35636 
   industry4 |   4.493681    2.71684     1.65   0.099    -.8423237    9.829686 
   industry5 |   2.167425   2.081788     1.04   0.298    -1.921307    6.256157 
   location2 |   .9234872   1.329699     0.69   0.488    -1.688106     3.53508 
   yr_dummy2 |    .829877   1.371133     0.61   0.545    -1.863095    3.522849 
   yr_dummy3 |   .8923513   1.389097     0.64   0.521    -1.835901    3.620604 
   diversify |   .5587717   .3631754     1.54   0.124    -.1545223    1.272066 
         age |  -.1790532   .1014668    -1.76   0.078    -.3783389    .0202325 
 sqrt_tenure |   2.609023   .7123997     3.66   0.000     1.209836    4.008211 
     qualify |   .7054733   1.482349     0.48   0.634    -2.205932    3.616878 
sqrt_board~e |   16.69896    1.85308     9.01   0.000     13.05942     20.3385 
   ceo_dual1 |   4.089378   2.037733     2.01   0.045      .087171    8.091585 
 ln_bmeeting |  -1.127828   1.949669    -0.58   0.563    -4.957072    2.701415 
 indpt_board |    15.3686   6.124276     2.51   0.012     3.340221    27.39697 
 indpt_audit |  -9.082413   6.275623    -1.45   0.148    -21.40804    3.243215 
   indpt_rem |  -.7757386   3.312061    -0.23   0.815    -7.280787     5.72931 
    nexecdir |  -45.93401   4.167496   -11.02   0.000    -54.11917   -37.74884 
  pinterlock |    10.9361   5.531949     1.98   0.049     .0710799    21.80111 
        pold |  -3.058083   4.342798    -0.70   0.482    -11.58755    5.471382 
       pbusy |   3.035223   2.665666     1.14   0.255    -2.200273    8.270719 
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indirects~re |  -.1338802   .0367839    -3.64   0.000    -.2061255   -.0616349 
 directshare |  -.0575624   .0538278    -1.07   0.285    -.1632829    .0481581 
ln_blocksh~e |  -2.033825   .8842911    -2.30   0.022    -3.770616   -.2970347 
       _cons |  -20.73185    9.77648    -2.12   0.034    -39.93333   -1.530371 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
Model 4 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     610 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 38,   571) =   13.82 
       Model |  97158.4134    38  2556.80035           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  105669.199   571  185.059894           R-squared     =  0.4790 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.4443 
       Total |  202827.613   609  333.050267           Root MSE      =  13.604 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
sqrt_tcash~m |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Performance |   1.536044   .8771278     1.75   0.080    -.1867468    3.258835 
 ln_mktvalue |   3.619297   .4979756     7.27   0.000      2.64121    4.597385 
 ln_leverage |   .9541591   .5418421     1.76   0.079    -.1100876    2.018406 
   industry2 |    2.70171   1.881152     1.44   0.151    -.9931119    6.396532 
   industry3 |  -1.115366   2.070325    -0.54   0.590    -5.181748    2.951016 
   industry4 |   4.535622   2.763884     1.64   0.101    -.8929982    9.964243 
   industry5 |   2.439328    2.09613     1.16   0.245    -1.677739    6.556394 
   location2 |   .8898401    1.34778     0.66   0.509    -1.757371    3.537052 
   yr_dummy2 |   .6139275   1.369446     0.45   0.654    -2.075838    3.303693 
   yr_dummy3 |   .5594029   1.388863     0.40   0.687      -2.1685    3.287306 
   diversify |   .7448193   .3646634     2.04   0.042     .0285739    1.461065 
         age |  -.1478595   .1024917    -1.44   0.150    -.3491663    .0534473 
 sqrt_tenure |    2.48061    .711319     3.49   0.001     1.083489    3.877731 
     qualify |   .4161137   1.495439     0.28   0.781    -2.521119    3.353346 
sqrt_board~e |   16.82889   1.866321     9.02   0.000      13.1632    20.49458 
   ceo_dual1 |   3.738789    2.07957     1.80   0.073    -.3457513    7.823329 
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 ln_bmeeting |  -1.346369   1.963218    -0.69   0.493     -5.20238    2.509642 
 indpt_board |   17.20928   6.277122     2.74   0.006     4.880215    29.53835 
 indpt_audit |  -9.864401   6.312382    -1.56   0.119    -22.26272    2.533921 
   indpt_rem |  -1.864358   3.313721    -0.56   0.574    -8.372927    4.644211 
    nexecdir |  -46.25226   4.267213   -10.84   0.000    -54.63361   -37.87091 
  pinterlock |   11.76238   6.665066     1.76   0.078    -1.328662    24.85341 
        pold |   -5.12002   4.365444    -1.17   0.241    -13.69431    3.454267 
       pbusy |   4.347503   2.756214     1.58   0.115    -1.066053    9.761059 
indirects~re |  -.1383546   .0368246    -3.76   0.000    -.2106828   -.0660263 
 directshare |  -.0563882   .0542388    -1.04   0.299    -.1629202    .0501437 
ln_blocksh~e |  -2.117107   .8857933    -2.39   0.017    -3.856917    -.377296 
perfXboars~e |   2.810934   2.404348     1.17   0.243    -1.911512     7.53338 
perfXindpt~d |   6.760215   5.430993     1.24   0.214    -3.906947    17.42738 
perfXnexec~r |  -6.940543   5.420361    -1.28   0.201    -17.58682    3.705737 
perfXpinte~k |  -9.183159   7.427255    -1.24   0.217    -23.77123    5.404914 
   perfXpold |   7.195317   3.860963     1.86   0.063    -.3881064    14.77874 
  perfXpbusy |   5.420029   3.043365     1.78   0.075    -.5575276    11.39759 
perfXindir~e |   .1010468   .0466261     2.17   0.031     .0094672    .1926263 
perfXdirec~e |   .0685048   .0640849     1.07   0.286    -.0573661    .1943757 
perfXblock~e |    1.16781   1.266849     0.92   0.357    -1.320443    3.656063 
perfXceodual |  -.7029436   2.437135    -0.29   0.773    -5.489787      4.0839 
perfXbmeet~g |   4.146064   2.124319     1.95   0.051    -.0263687    8.318497 
       _cons |  -20.77062   9.853339    -2.11   0.035    -40.12383   -1.417405 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Model 4 is the best model to use. See r square change result below: 
 
 Model Summary 
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2 Sig. F Change 
1 .431(a) .186 .171 16.62076 .186 12.384 11 598 .000 
2 .470(b) .221 .202 16.30023 .035 8.917 3 595 .000 
3 .677(c) .458 .433 13.74425 .237 19.606 13 582 .000 
4 .694(d) .482 .446 13.58176 .024 2.167 12 570 .012 
a  Predictors: (Constant), diversif, yr_dumm1, industr3, performa, ln_lever, industr4, locatio1, industr5, ln_mktva, yr_dumm2, industr2 
b  Predictors: (Constant), diversif, yr_dumm1, industr3, performa, ln_lever, industr4, locatio1, industr5, ln_mktva, yr_dumm2, industr2, sqrt_ten, qualify, age 
c  Predictors: (Constant), diversif, yr_dumm1, industr3, performa, ln_lever, industr4, locatio1, industr5, ln_mktva, yr_dumm2, industr2, sqrt_ten, qualify, age, pinterlo, indpt_re, 
ceo_dual, indpt_au, pold, directsh, indpt_bo, ln_bmeet, blocksha, pbusy, sqrt_boa, nexecdir, indirect 
d  Predictors: (Constant), diversif, yr_dumm1, industr3, performa, ln_lever, industr4, locatio1, industr5, ln_mktva, yr_dumm2, industr2, sqrt_ten, qualify, age, pinterlo, indpt_re, 
ceo_dual, indpt_au, pold, directsh, indpt_bo, ln_bmeet, blocksha, pbusy, sqrt_boa, nexecdir, indirect, perfxbmeeting, perfxpbusy, perfxdirectshare, perfxpold, perfxblockshare, 
perfxpinterlock, perfxnexedir, perfxboardsize, perfxceodual, perfxindirecshare, perfxindptboard, ln_block 
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Regression Diagnostics For Model 4 (final version) 
 
 
Multicollinearity 
 
   Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
perfXindpt~d |      4.27    0.234253 
perfXceodual |      3.80    0.262995 
perfXindir~e |      3.66    0.273166 
perfXnexec~r |      3.19    0.313629 
   perfXpold |      3.01    0.331855 
perfXboars~e |      2.85    0.351077 
   industry3 |      2.80    0.357334 
 Performance |      2.78    0.359378 
perfXblock~e |      2.57    0.389510 
   industry2 |      2.47    0.404497 
   industry5 |      2.33    0.428915 
perfXbmeet~g |      2.21    0.452732 
perfXpinte~k |      2.21    0.452937 
   industry4 |      1.96    0.509290 
 ln_mktvalue |      1.96    0.510057 
perfXdirec~e |      1.93    0.516864 
indirects~re |      1.80    0.554589 
    nexecdir |      1.74    0.573852 
  pinterlock |      1.71    0.584905 
 directshare |      1.69    0.592657 
ln_blocksh~e |      1.64    0.610842 
  perfXpbusy |      1.63    0.613125 
 indpt_board |      1.58    0.632049 
 sqrt_tenure |      1.52    0.659944 
sqrt_board~e |      1.51    0.660714 
       pbusy |      1.48    0.674788 
         age |      1.45    0.690875 
   yr_dummy3 |      1.41    0.710088 
   yr_dummy2 |      1.38    0.723276 
   location2 |      1.36    0.734910 
     qualify |      1.32    0.759575 
 ln_bmeeting |      1.31    0.761655 
        pold |      1.28    0.784175 
   diversify |      1.27    0.789588 
   indpt_rem |      1.26    0.795712 
 indpt_audit |      1.25    0.800924 
 ln_leverage |      1.22    0.816427 
   ceo_dual1 |      1.21    0.828124 
-------------+---------------------- 
Mean VIF |      2.00 
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Heteroscedasticity 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroscedasticity  
         Ho: Constant variance 
         Variables: fitted values of sqrt_tcashrem 
 
         chi2(1)      =    73.83 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.0000 
 
Running HC3 correctiom: 
 
Regression with robust standard errors                 Number of obs =     610 
                                                       F( 38,   571) =    9.86 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.4790 
                                                       Root MSE      =  13.604 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |             Robust HC3 
sqrt_tcash~m |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Performance |   1.536044   1.008486     1.52   0.128     -.444751    3.516839 
 ln_mktvalue |   3.619297   .8225238     4.40   0.000     2.003756    5.234839 
 ln_leverage |   .9541591   .6349533     1.50   0.133      -.29297    2.201288 
   industry2 |    2.70171   1.833561     1.47   0.141    -.8996378    6.303058 
   industry3 |  -1.115366    2.06201    -0.54   0.589    -5.165415    2.934684 
   industry4 |   4.535622   3.228055     1.41   0.161    -1.804688    10.87593 
   industry5 |   2.439328   2.142562     1.14   0.255    -1.768936    6.647591 
   location2 |   .8898401   1.218265     0.73   0.465    -1.502987    3.282667 
   yr_dummy2 |   .6139275   1.333381     0.46   0.645    -2.005002    3.232857 
   yr_dummy3 |   .5594029   1.408935     0.40   0.691    -2.207924     3.32673 
   diversify |   .7448193   .4928634     1.51   0.131    -.2232272    1.712866 
         age |  -.1478595   .1018321    -1.45   0.147    -.3478707    .0521517 
 sqrt_tenure |    2.48061   .8547139     2.90   0.004      .801843    4.159377 
     qualify |   .4161137   1.299019     0.32   0.749    -2.135325    2.967552 
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sqrt_board~e |   16.82889   2.448877     6.87   0.000     12.01899     21.6388 
   ceo_dual1 |   3.738789   2.257877     1.66   0.098    -.6959695    8.173547 
 ln_bmeeting |  -1.346369   2.321308    -0.58   0.562    -5.905714    3.212975 
 indpt_board |   17.20928   6.248356     2.75   0.006     4.936714    29.48185 
 indpt_audit |  -9.864401   6.784191    -1.45   0.146    -23.18942    3.460614 
   indpt_rem |  -1.864358   3.292591    -0.57   0.571    -8.331426    4.602711 
    nexecdir |  -46.25226   4.646173    -9.95   0.000    -55.37793   -37.12659 
  pinterlock |   11.76238   14.02094     0.84   0.402    -15.77653    39.30128 
        pold |   -5.12002   5.157709    -0.99   0.321    -15.25042    5.010376 
       pbusy |   4.347503   2.741339     1.59   0.113    -1.036836    9.731842 
indirects~re |  -.1383546   .0407732    -3.39   0.001    -.2184383   -.0582708 
 directshare |  -.0563882   .0498895    -1.13   0.259    -.1543775     .041601 
ln_blocksh~e |  -2.117107   .9125864    -2.32   0.021    -3.909542   -.3246709 
perfXboars~e |   2.810934   3.574674     0.79   0.432    -4.210181    9.832048 
perfXindpt~d |   6.760215   5.235493     1.29   0.197     -3.52296    17.04339 
perfXnexec~r |  -6.940543   6.449547    -1.08   0.282    -19.60827    5.727188 
perfXpinte~k |  -9.183159   11.63388    -0.79   0.430    -32.03359    13.66727 
   perfXpold |   7.195317   5.010482     1.44   0.152    -2.645908    17.03654 
  perfXpbusy |   5.420029   3.312294     1.64   0.102    -1.085738     11.9258 
perfXindir~e |   .1010468   .0604391     1.67   0.095    -.0176634    .2197569 
perfXdirec~e |   .0685048   .0772779     0.89   0.376    -.0832789    .2202885 
perfXblock~e |    1.16781   1.492388     0.78   0.434    -1.763429    4.099049 
perfXceodual |  -.7029436   2.269975    -0.31   0.757    -5.161463    3.755576 
perfXbmeet~g |   4.146064   3.155648     1.31   0.189    -2.052031    10.34416 
       _cons |  -20.77062   11.81628    -1.76   0.079     -43.9793    2.438067 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
  
229 
 
Normality of residuals: 
                 Shapiro-Wilk W test for normal data 
    Variable |    Obs        W          V          z     Prob>z 
-------------+------------------------------------------------- 
          e3 |    610    0.95440     18.356      7.057  0.00000 
  
 
 
Based on corrections using robust regression, no difference is found on the Shapiro wilk test 
 
                  Shapiro-Wilk W test for normal data 
    Variable |    Obs        W          V          z     Prob>z 
-------------+------------------------------------------------- 
          e4 |    610    0.95440     18.356      7.057  0.00000 
 
 
 
linktest 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     610 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  2,   607) =  308.69 
       Model |  102274.179     2  51137.0897           Prob > F      =  0.4130 
    Residual |  100553.433   607  165.656397           R-squared     =  0.5042 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.5026 
       Total |  202827.613   609  333.050267           Root MSE      =  12.871 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
sqrt_tcash~m |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        _hat |   .2094972   .1481218     1.41   0.658    -.0813962    .5003906 
      _hatsq |   .0102438   .0018434     5.56   0.427     .0066237     .013864 
       _cons |   13.14223   2.754016     4.77   0.000     7.733671    18.55078 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of sqrt_tcashrem 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                 F(3, 568) =     12.72 
                  Prob > F =      0.3203 
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Panel data analysis 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       610 
Group variable (i): id_company                  Number of groups   =       228 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.1063                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.0309                                        avg =       2.7 
       overall = 0.0252                                        max =         4 
 
                                                F(34,348)          =      1.22 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.1883                        Prob > F           =    0.1936 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
sqrt_tcash~m |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Performance |   1.285824    .697877     1.84   0.066    -.0867637    2.658411 
 ln_mktvalue |   .6886097   .5950074     1.16   0.248    -.4816533    1.858873 
 ln_leverage |   -.839559   .5059315    -1.66   0.098    -1.834627    .1555092 
   industry2 |  -.0549635   33.57347    -0.00   0.999    -66.08741    65.97748 
   industry3 |  (dropped) 
   industry4 |  (dropped) 
   industry5 |  (dropped) 
   location2 |  (dropped) 
   yr_dummy2 |   1.125311   .6210861     1.81   0.071    -.0962439    2.346866 
   yr_dummy3 |   .9783453   .6818723     1.43   0.152     -.362764    2.319455 
   diversify |  -2.021808   8.135693    -0.25   0.804    -18.02312    13.97951 
         age |  -.0198051   .1542928    -0.13   0.898    -.3232689    .2836587 
 sqrt_tenure |  -.0134283   1.054283    -0.01   0.990    -2.086997    2.060141 
     qualify |   1.407231   2.433291     0.58   0.563    -3.378576    6.193037 
sqrt_board~e |   1.232571   2.659712     0.46   0.643    -3.998561    6.463702 
   ceo_dual1 |  -3.487564   4.544311    -0.77   0.443    -12.42533    5.450206 
 ln_bmeeting |   1.215516   1.824453     0.67   0.506    -2.372825    4.803857 
 indpt_board |   .2437664   7.203213     0.03   0.973    -13.92354    14.41108 
 indpt_audit |  -5.399336   6.422995    -0.84   0.401    -18.03211    7.233438 
   indpt_rem |   -10.3518   7.442276    -1.39   0.165     -24.9893    4.285705 
    nexecdir |  -7.681661   6.265421    -1.23   0.221    -20.00452    4.641195 
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  pinterlock |   30.90489   12.69346     2.43   0.015     5.939338    55.87045 
        pold |   .6722659   7.629967     0.09   0.930    -14.33439    15.67892 
       pbusy |  -2.224401   5.575543    -0.40   0.690     -13.1904    8.741601 
indirects~re |  -.0019166    .061938    -0.03   0.975    -.1237365    .1199033 
 directshare |  -.1357408   .1538486    -0.88   0.378    -.4383309    .1668493 
ln_blocksh~e |  -.0780553    1.22285    -0.06   0.949    -2.483161    2.327051 
perfXboars~e |   3.529282   1.741264     2.03   0.043     .1045566    6.954007 
perfXindpt~d |   2.075141   4.005434     0.52   0.605    -5.802763    9.953045 
perfXnexec~r |  -7.248848   4.044705    -1.79   0.074    -15.20399    .7062956 
perfXpinte~k |  -4.455131   10.27214    -0.43   0.665    -24.65842    15.74816 
   perfXpold |    8.64301   4.468654     1.93   0.054     -.145957    17.43198 
  perfXpbusy |  -.8375467   2.226049    -0.38   0.707     -5.21575    3.540657 
perfXindir~e |   .0201749   .0337178     0.60   0.550    -.0461413    .0864911 
perfXdirec~e |   .0883079   .0513573     1.72   0.086    -.0127018    .1893176 
perfXblock~e |   .9227046   .8857032     1.04   0.298    -.8193002    2.664709 
perfXceodual |  -3.410138   1.647649    -2.07   0.039    -6.650742   -.1695347 
perfXbmeet~g |   2.715449   1.474686     1.84   0.066    -.1849691    5.615867 
       _cons |   40.25856   36.28647     1.11   0.268    -31.10982    111.6269 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |   18.25852 
     sigma_e |  5.6669228 
         rho |  .91213377   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(227, 348) =    12.96            Prob > F = 0.0000 
 
 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       610 
Group variable (i): id_company                  Number of groups   =       228 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0580                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.4751                                        avg =       2.7 
       overall = 0.4266                                        max =         4 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(38)      =    178.78 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
sqrt_tcash~m |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Performance |   1.886733   .6382928     2.96   0.003     .6357019    3.137764 
 ln_mktvalue |   2.086592   .4767763     4.38   0.000     1.152127    3.021056 
 ln_leverage |  -.2284453   .4530021    -0.50   0.614    -1.116313    .6594226 
   industry2 |   2.218275   2.892976     0.77   0.443    -3.451854    7.888404 
   industry3 |  -.9512388   3.193977    -0.30   0.766    -7.211319    5.308841 
   industry4 |   8.240515   4.344791     1.90   0.058    -.2751188    16.75615 
   industry5 |   3.674173   3.271678     1.12   0.261    -2.738198    10.08654 
   location2 |   1.356941   2.122036     0.64   0.523    -2.802173    5.516056 
   yr_dummy2 |   .6831365   .6272085     1.09   0.276    -.5461696    1.912443 
   yr_dummy3 |   .5228718   .6655536     0.79   0.432    -.7815893    1.827333 
   diversify |   .9831744   .5656947     1.74   0.082    -.1255668    2.091916 
         age |  -.1110408   .1134015    -0.98   0.327    -.3333036     .111222 
 sqrt_tenure |   2.008144   .7932318     2.53   0.011     .4534386     3.56285 
     qualify |   .3076437    1.73678     0.18   0.859    -3.096383     3.71167 
sqrt_board~e |   9.283431   1.966864     4.72   0.000     5.428449    13.13841 
   ceo_dual1 |   1.070022   2.623508     0.41   0.683    -4.071959    6.212003 
 ln_bmeeting |   .9202582   1.671748     0.55   0.582    -2.356308    4.196824 
 indpt_board |   5.786125    5.91034     0.98   0.328    -5.797929    17.37018 
 indpt_audit |  -1.120633   5.614593    -0.20   0.842    -12.12503    9.883768 
   indpt_rem |  -3.978606   4.364759    -0.91   0.362    -12.53338    4.576165 
    nexecdir |  -27.25064   4.447308    -6.13   0.000    -35.96721   -18.53408 
  pinterlock |    23.1156   7.616153     3.04   0.002     8.188213    38.04298 
        pold |  -2.473546   5.003518    -0.49   0.621    -12.28026    7.333169 
       pbusy |   2.794565   3.406117     0.82   0.412    -3.881303    9.470432 
indirects~re |  -.0796849   .0423876    -1.88   0.060     -.162763    .0033933 
 directshare |  -.0210055   .0736665    -0.29   0.776    -.1653893    .1233783 
ln_blocksh~e |  -1.581245   .9418829    -1.68   0.093    -3.427302    .2648116 
perfXboars~e |   4.664206   1.601337     2.91   0.004     1.525642     7.80277 
perfXindpt~d |   4.320552   3.648658     1.18   0.236    -2.830685    11.47179 
perfXnexec~r |  -11.34624   3.744965    -3.03   0.002    -18.68624   -4.006245 
perfXpinte~k |  -9.899984   7.218776    -1.37   0.170    -24.04853    4.248558 
   perfXpold |   9.146422   2.913909     3.14   0.002     3.435265    14.85758 
  perfXpbusy |   .3711693   2.056682     0.18   0.857    -3.659854    4.402192 
234 
 
perfXindir~e |   .0435601   .0316889     1.37   0.169    -.0185489    .1056692 
perfXdirec~e |   .1059926   .0465751     2.28   0.023      .014707    .1972781 
perfXblock~e |   1.010787   .8365138     1.21   0.227    -.6287501    2.650324 
perfXceodual |  -3.567663   1.577072    -2.26   0.024    -6.658667   -.4766596 
perfXbmeet~g |   3.461346   1.357095     2.55   0.011     .8014882    6.121203 
       _cons |  -4.010732   11.36406    -0.35   0.724    -26.28388    18.26242 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  12.599049 
     sigma_e |  5.6669228 
         rho |  .83173168   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Hausman test 
 
                 ---- Coefficients ---- 
             |      (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
             |     fixed2         .          Difference          S.E. 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Performance |    1.285824     1.886733       -.6009089        .2821607 
 ln_mktvalue |    .6886097     2.086592       -1.397982        .3559749 
 ln_leverage |    -.839559    -.2284453       -.6111138        .2252904 
   industry2 |   -.0549635     2.218275       -2.273239         33.4486 
   yr_dummy2 |    1.125311     .6831365        .4421743               . 
   yr_dummy3 |    .9783453     .5228718        .4554735        .1482842 
   diversify |   -2.021808     .9831744       -3.004983        8.116003 
         age |   -.0198051    -.1110408        .0912357        .1046249 
 sqrt_tenure |   -.0134283     2.008144       -2.021573         .694476 
     qualify |    1.407231     .3076437        1.099587        1.704259 
sqrt_board~e |    1.232571     9.283431       -8.050861        1.790394 
   ceo_dual1 |   -3.487564     1.070022       -4.557586        3.710521 
 ln_bmeeting |    1.215516     .9202582        .2952583        .7306748 
 indpt_board |    .2437664     5.786125       -5.542358        4.117543 
 indpt_audit |   -5.399336    -1.120633       -4.278703        3.119489 
   indpt_rem |    -10.3518    -3.978606        -6.37319        6.027964 
    nexecdir |   -7.681661    -27.25064        19.56898         4.41327 
  pinterlock |    30.90489      23.1156        7.789297        10.15471 
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        pold |    .6722659    -2.473546        3.145812        5.760313 
       pbusy |   -2.224401     2.794565       -5.018966        4.414187 
indirects~re |   -.0019166    -.0796849        .0777683         .045162 
 directshare |   -.1357408    -.0210055       -.1147353        .1350653 
ln_blocksh~e |   -.0780553    -1.581245         1.50319        .7798833 
perfXboars~e |    3.529282     4.664206       -1.134924        .6838991 
perfXindpt~d |    2.075141     4.320552       -2.245411        1.652513 
perfXnexec~r |   -7.248848    -11.34624        4.097393        1.528031 
perfXpinte~k |   -4.455131    -9.899984        5.444853        7.307953 
   perfXpold |     8.64301     9.146422       -.5034123         3.38792 
  perfXpbusy |   -.8375467     .3711693       -1.208716        .8516777 
perfXindir~e |    .0201749     .0435601       -.0233852        .0115197 
perfXdirec~e |    .0883079     .1059926       -.0176847        .0216409 
perfXblock~e |    .9227046     1.010787       -.0880823        .2910581 
perfXceodual |   -3.410138    -3.567663        .1575251         .477067 
perfXbmeet~g |    2.715449     3.461346       -.7458966        .5770537 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
 
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
 
                 chi2(33) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                          =       95.88 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0000 
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite) 
 
. 
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Regression results for Total Remuneration Model (Model 1-4) 
 
Model 1: performance, mkt value, leverage, industry, location, year and diversification 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    1137 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 11,  1125) =   17.64 
       Model |  156.034065    11   14.184915           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  904.805367  1125  .804271437           R-squared     =  0.1471 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.1387 
       Total |  1060.83943  1136  .933837528           Root MSE      =  .89681 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 ln_totalrem |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Performance |  -.0081089   .0284897    -0.28   0.776    -.0640078      .04779 
 ln_mktvalue |   .2362001   .0208471    11.33   0.000     .1952966    .2771036 
 ln_leverage |   .1318112   .0250678     5.26   0.000     .0826263    .1809962 
   industry2 |  -.0511948   .0821553    -0.62   0.533    -.2123896         .11 
   industry3 |  -.1775169   .0895917    -1.98   0.048    -.3533026   -.0017312 
   industry4 |   .2377531   .1261642     1.88   0.060    -.0097904    .4852967 
   industry5 |  -.3231039   .0913674    -3.54   0.000    -.5023736   -.1438343 
   location2 |  -.0345696   .0588978    -0.59   0.557    -.1501316    .0809924 
   yr_dummy2 |   .0836392   .0652352     1.28   0.200    -.0443572    .2116356 
   yr_dummy3 |   .1227976   .0652441     1.88   0.060    -.0052163    .2508114 
   diversify |   .0256048   .0160924     1.59   0.112    -.0059696    .0571792 
       _cons |   4.563487   .2516966    18.13   0.000     4.069639    5.057334 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
  
237 
 
Model 2: Model 1 + human capital attributes 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    1132 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 14,  1117) =   19.07 
       Model |  200.882065    14  14.3487189           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  840.635989  1117  .752583696           R-squared     =  0.1929 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.1828 
       Total |  1041.51805  1131  .920882452           Root MSE      =  .86752 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 ln_totalrem |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Performance |  -.0029451   .0275832    -0.11   0.915    -.0570659    .0511757 
 ln_mktvalue |   .2297367   .0205002    11.21   0.000     .1895134      .26996 
 ln_leverage |   .1283067   .0243009     5.28   0.000     .0806262    .1759873 
   industry2 |  -.0280808   .0797836    -0.35   0.725    -.1846234    .1284618 
   industry3 |  -.1585689   .0873084    -1.82   0.070    -.3298758     .012738 
   industry4 |   .1866704   .1226038     1.52   0.128    -.0538894    .4272302 
   industry5 |   -.283785   .0894707    -3.17   0.002    -.4593345   -.1082355 
   location2 |   .0056592   .0581927     0.10   0.923    -.1085201    .1198385 
   yr_dummy2 |   .0834857   .0633645     1.32   0.188    -.0408413    .2078126 
   yr_dummy3 |    .096836   .0635662     1.52   0.128    -.0278866    .2215587 
   diversify |   .0226011   .0156879     1.44   0.150    -.0081799    .0533821 
         age |  -.0145513   .0043438    -3.35   0.001    -.0230743   -.0060283 
 sqrt_tenure |   .2243819   .0285911     7.85   0.000     .1682836    .2804803 
     qualify |   .0107282   .0616412     0.17   0.862    -.1102174    .1316737 
       _cons |   4.720786   .3057599    15.44   0.000     4.120857    5.320714 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Model 3: Model 2 + corporate governance variables 
 
     Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     610 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 27,   582) =   17.16 
       Model |  254.291065    27  9.41818759           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  319.405788   582  .548807195           R-squared     =  0.4432 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.4174 
       Total |  573.696852   609  .942030956           Root MSE      =  .74082 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 ln_totalrem |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Performance |  -.0632453   .0311476    -2.03   0.043    -.1244207   -.0020699 
 ln_mktvalue |   .1840274   .0260285     7.07   0.000      .132906    .2351487 
 ln_leverage |   .0802143   .0286955     2.80   0.005      .023855    .1365735 
   industry2 |   .0548574   .1012926     0.54   0.588    -.1440862     .253801 
   industry3 |   .0783359    .110555     0.71   0.479    -.1387994    .2954713 
   industry4 |   .0482697   .1468442     0.33   0.742    -.2401393    .3366788 
   industry5 |   .0098386   .1125198     0.09   0.930    -.2111559     .230833 
   location2 |  -.0206362   .0718697    -0.29   0.774    -.1617918    .1205194 
   yr_dummy2 |   .0541426   .0741092     0.73   0.465    -.0914115    .1996967 
   yr_dummy3 |   .0683227   .0750801     0.91   0.363    -.0791384    .2157837 
   diversify |   .0066422   .0196295     0.34   0.735    -.0319111    .0451955 
         age |  -.0179548   .0054842    -3.27   0.001    -.0287261   -.0071835 
 sqrt_tenure |   .1861888   .0385049     4.84   0.000     .1105633    .2618144 
     qualify |   .0464016   .0801204     0.58   0.563    -.1109587    .2037619 
sqrt_board~e |   .8566594   .1001583     8.55   0.000     .6599436    1.053375 
   ceo_dual1 |   .2159839   .1101387     1.96   0.050    -.0003339    .4323016 
 ln_bmeeting |   .0875735   .1053788     0.83   0.406    -.1193956    .2945427 
 indpt_board |   .3478597   .3310148     1.05   0.294    -.3022694    .9979887 
 indpt_audit |  -.2864418   .3391951    -0.84   0.399    -.9526373    .3797537 
   indpt_rem |  -.0687455   .1790157    -0.38   0.701    -.4203409    .2828499 
    nexecdir |  -2.519582   .2252516   -11.19   0.000    -2.961987   -2.077177 
  pinterlock |   .5149867   .2989997     1.72   0.086    -.0722633    1.102237 
        pold |   .1983122   .2347266     0.84   0.399    -.2627021    .6593265 
       pbusy |  -.0813811   .1440782    -0.56   0.572    -.3643576    .2015955 
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indirects~re |  -.0017842   .0019882    -0.90   0.370     -.005689    .0021207 
 directshare |   .0029068   .0029094     1.00   0.318    -.0028073     .008621 
ln_blocksh~e |  -.0080898   .0477956    -0.17   0.866    -.1019627    .0857831 
       _cons |   4.354116    .528415     8.24   0.000     3.316283    5.391949 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
Model 4: model 3 + interactions 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     610 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 38,   571) =   13.27 
       Model |  268.996761    38  7.07886213           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  304.700092   571  .533625379           R-squared     =  0.4689 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.4335 
       Total |  573.696852   609  .942030956           Root MSE      =   .7305 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 ln_totalrem |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Performance |   .0488265   .0471004     1.04   0.300    -.0436848    .1413378 
 ln_mktvalue |   .1649522   .0267405     6.17   0.000     .1124304     .217474 
 ln_leverage |   .0626044   .0290961     2.15   0.032     .0054559    .1197528 
   industry2 |   .0452146    .101015     0.45   0.655    -.1531918     .243621 
   industry3 |   .1036604   .1111733     0.93   0.352    -.1146982     .322019 
   industry4 |   .0900654   .1484164     0.61   0.544    -.2014433    .3815741 
   industry5 |   .0137633    .112559     0.12   0.903     -.207317    .2348436 
   location2 |  -.0159034   .0723738    -0.22   0.826    -.1580547    .1262478 
   yr_dummy2 |   .0450347   .0735372     0.61   0.541    -.0994017    .1894711 
   yr_dummy3 |   .0527797   .0745798     0.71   0.479    -.0937046     .199264 
   diversify |   .0193941   .0195819     0.99   0.322    -.0190672    .0578554 
         age |  -.0162134   .0055037    -2.95   0.003    -.0270233   -.0054035 
 sqrt_tenure |   .1827105   .0381968     4.78   0.000     .1076872    .2577338 
     qualify |   .0437486   .0803028     0.54   0.586    -.1139763    .2014736 
sqrt_board~e |   .8586108   .1002186     8.57   0.000     .6617687    1.055453 
   ceo_dual1 |   .1588216   .1116698     1.42   0.156    -.0605121    .3781552 
 ln_bmeeting |   .0534985   .1054219     0.51   0.612    -.1535635    .2605604 
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 indpt_board |   .4483193    .337072     1.33   0.184    -.2137329    1.110372 
 indpt_audit |  -.2262536   .3389654    -0.67   0.505    -.8920248    .4395176 
   indpt_rem |  -.0942936   .1779418    -0.53   0.596    -.4437939    .2552068 
    nexecdir |  -2.404453   .2291429   -10.49   0.000    -2.854518   -1.954387 
  pinterlock |   .4572922    .357904     1.28   0.202    -.2456768    1.160261 
        pold |   .0930222   .2344177     0.40   0.692    -.3674041    .5534485 
       pbusy |   -.018657   .1480046    -0.13   0.900    -.3093568    .2720428 
indirects~re |  -.0020474   .0019774    -1.04   0.301    -.0059313    .0018365 
 directshare |   .0030741   .0029125     1.06   0.292    -.0026465    .0087947 
ln_blocksh~e |  -.0046167   .0475658    -0.10   0.923    -.0980419    .0888085 
perfXboars~e |   .2272081   .1291099     1.76   0.079    -.0263802    .4807963 
perfXindpt~d |    .317569   .2916361     1.09   0.277    -.2552415    .8903795 
perfXnexec~r |   -.626259   .2910652    -2.15   0.032    -1.197948   -.0545699 
perfXpinte~k |  -.3116088   .3988324    -0.78   0.435    -1.094966    .4717487 
   perfXpold |   .5939944   .2073279     2.86   0.004      .186776    1.001213 
  perfXpbusy |  -.0285999   .1634241    -0.18   0.861    -.3495857    .2923859 
perfXindir~e |   .0041964   .0025038     1.68   0.094    -.0007213     .009114 
perfXdirec~e |   .0038259   .0034413     1.11   0.267    -.0029332     .010585 
perfXblock~e |   .0178235   .0680279     0.26   0.793     -.115792    .1514389 
perfXceodual |   .0545585   .1308705     0.42   0.677    -.2024878    .3116048 
perfXbmeet~g |    .165209   .1140727     1.45   0.148    -.0588444    .3892623 
       _cons |   4.338544   .5291094     8.20   0.000     3.299305    5.377782 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
Note: two interactions, perfXindptrem and perfXindptaudit were dropped form the regression as it shows high degree 
of collinearity. Other interactions variables had been mean-centered in order to reduce the multicollinearity 
between the independent variables.  
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Based on the result presented below, it is found that model 4 is the best model (r square change is significant). 
 
 Model Summary 
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2 Sig. F Change 
1 .360(a) .130 .114 .91365 .130 8.115 11 598 .000 
2 .445(b) .198 .179 .87930 .068 16.875 3 595 .000 
3 .666(c) .443 .417 .74082 .245 19.712 13 582 .000 
4 .685(d) .469 .433 .73114 .026 2.293 12 570 .007 
a  Predictors: (Constant), diversif, yr_dumm1, industr3, performa, ln_lever, industr4, locatio1, industr5, ln_mktva, yr_dumm2, industr2 
b  Predictors: (Constant), diversif, yr_dumm1, industr3, performa, ln_lever, industr4, locatio1, industr5, ln_mktva, yr_dumm2, industr2, sqrt_ten, qualify, age 
c  Predictors: (Constant), diversif, yr_dumm1, industr3, performa, ln_lever, industr4, locatio1, industr5, ln_mktva, yr_dumm2, industr2, sqrt_ten, qualify, age, pinterlo, indpt_re, 
ceo_dual, indpt_au, pold, directsh, indpt_bo, ln_bmeet, blocksha, pbusy, sqrt_boa, nexecdir, indirect 
d  Predictors: (Constant), diversif, yr_dumm1, industr3, performa, ln_lever, industr4, locatio1, industr5, ln_mktva, yr_dumm2, industr2, sqrt_ten, qualify, age, pinterlo, indpt_re, 
ceo_dual, indpt_au, pold, directsh, indpt_bo, ln_bmeet, blocksha, pbusy, sqrt_boa, nexecdir, indirect, perfxbmeeting, perfxpbusy, perfxdirectshare, perfxpold, perfxblockshare, 
perfxpinterlock, perfxnexedir, perfxboardsize, perfxceodual, perfxindirecshare, perfxindptboard, ln_block 
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Multicollinearity test 
 
 
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
perfXindpt~d |      4.27    0.234253 
perfXceodual |      3.80    0.262995 
perfXindir~e |      3.66    0.273166 
perfXnexec~r |      3.19    0.313629 
   perfXpold |      3.01    0.331855 
perfXboars~e |      2.85    0.351077 
   industry3 |      2.80    0.357334 
 Performance |      2.78    0.359378 
perfXblock~e |      2.57    0.389510 
   industry2 |      2.47    0.404497 
   industry5 |      2.33    0.428915 
perfXbmeet~g |      2.21    0.452732 
perfXpinte~k |      2.21    0.452937 
   industry4 |      1.96    0.509290 
 ln_mktvalue |      1.96    0.510057 
perfXdirec~e |      1.93    0.516864 
indirects~re |      1.80    0.554589 
    nexecdir |      1.74    0.573852 
  pinterlock |      1.71    0.584905 
 directshare |      1.69    0.592657 
ln_blocksh~e |      1.64    0.610842 
  perfXpbusy |      1.63    0.613125 
 indpt_board |      1.58    0.632049 
 sqrt_tenure |      1.52    0.659944 
sqrt_board~e |      1.51    0.660714 
       pbusy |      1.48    0.674788 
         age |      1.45    0.690875 
   yr_dummy3 |      1.41    0.710088 
   yr_dummy2 |      1.38    0.723276 
   location2 |      1.36    0.734910 
     qualify |      1.32    0.759575 
 ln_bmeeting |      1.31    0.761655 
        pold |      1.28    0.784175 
   diversify |      1.27    0.789588 
   indpt_rem |      1.26    0.795712 
 indpt_audit |      1.25    0.800924 
 ln_leverage |      1.22    0.816427 
   ceo_dual1 |      1.21    0.828124 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |      2.00 
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Heteroscedasticity 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroscedasticity  
         Ho: Constant variance 
         Variables: fitted values of ln_totalrem 
 
         chi2(1)      =     7.76 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.0053 
 
Although no evidence of heteracesdasticity, the HC3 correction was made in order to improve the model. 
 
Regression with robust standard errors                 Number of obs =     610 
                                                       F( 38,   571) =   23.55 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.4689 
                                                       Root MSE      =   .7305 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |             Robust HC3 
 ln_totalrem |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Performance |   .0488265    .061696     0.79   0.429    -.0723522    .1700052 
 ln_mktvalue |   .1649522   .0449652     3.67   0.000     .0766348    .2532695 
 ln_leverage |   .0626044   .0351361     1.78   0.075    -.0064073    .1316161 
   industry2 |   .0452146    .102475     0.44   0.659    -.1560593    .2464885 
   industry3 |   .1036604   .1144299     0.91   0.365    -.1210944    .3284152 
   industry4 |   .0900654   .1765791     0.51   0.610    -.2567584    .4368892 
   industry5 |   .0137633   .1211975     0.11   0.910    -.2242839    .2518105 
   location2 |  -.0159034   .0716877    -0.22   0.825    -.1567073    .1249004 
   yr_dummy2 |   .0450347   .0740746     0.61   0.543    -.1004572    .1905266 
   yr_dummy3 |   .0527797   .0759024     0.70   0.487    -.0963023    .2018616 
   diversify |   .0193941   .0248705     0.78   0.436    -.0294547     .068243 
         age |  -.0162134   .0061837    -2.62   0.009     -.028359   -.0040678 
 sqrt_tenure |   .1827105   .0455775     4.01   0.000     .0931905    .2722305 
     qualify |   .0437486   .0734096     0.60   0.551    -.1004371    .1879344 
sqrt_board~e |   .8586108   .1257286     6.83   0.000     .6116638    1.105558 
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   ceo_dual1 |   .1588216   .1392997     1.14   0.255    -.1147807    .4324238 
 ln_bmeeting |   .0534985   .1399261     0.38   0.702    -.2213341    .3283311 
 indpt_board |   .4483193    .466758     0.96   0.337    -.4684527    1.365091 
 indpt_audit |  -.2262536    .359693    -0.63   0.530    -.9327364    .4802292 
   indpt_rem |  -.0942936   .1560899    -0.60   0.546     -.400874    .2122869 
    nexecdir |  -2.404453   .2440816    -9.85   0.000     -2.88386   -1.925045 
  pinterlock |   .4572922   .5621152     0.81   0.416    -.6467736    1.561358 
        pold |   .0930222   .2866801     0.32   0.746    -.4700539    .6560983 
       pbusy |   -.018657   .1436137    -0.13   0.897    -.3007325    .2634185 
indirects~re |  -.0020474   .0023259    -0.88   0.379    -.0066159     .002521 
 directshare |   .0030741   .0030738     1.00   0.318    -.0029632    .0091114 
ln_blocksh~e |  -.0046167   .0512567    -0.09   0.928    -.1052914    .0960581 
perfXboars~e |   .2272081   .1885028     1.21   0.229    -.1430354    .5974516 
perfXindpt~d |    .317569    .735702     0.43   0.666    -1.127443    1.762581 
perfXnexec~r |   -.626259   .4426665    -1.41   0.158    -1.495712    .2431942 
perfXpinte~k |  -.3116088   .4742325    -0.66   0.511    -1.243062    .6198442 
   perfXpold |   .5939944   .3027677     1.96   0.050      -.00068    1.188669 
  perfXpbusy |  -.0285999   .1624017    -0.18   0.860    -.3475774    .2903777 
perfXindir~e |   .0041964   .0040427     1.04   0.300    -.0037439    .0121367 
perfXdirec~e |   .0038259   .0057617     0.66   0.507    -.0074909    .0151427 
perfXblock~e |   .0178235   .0942862     0.19   0.850    -.1673666    .2030135 
perfXceodual |   .0545585   .2178354     0.25   0.802     -.373298     .482415 
perfXbmeet~g |    .165209   .1662664     0.99   0.321    -.1613593    .4917773 
       _cons |   4.338544   .6749277     6.43   0.000       3.0129    5.664188 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Normality of residuals 
 
 
                   Shapiro-Wilk W test for normal data 
    Variable |    Obs        W          V          z     Prob>z 
-------------+------------------------------------------------- 
           e |    610    0.95607     17.686      6.967  0.00000 
 
 
A robust regression was carried out in order to reduce the outliers effect on the regression. However, no difference 
was found using the Shapiro wilk test on the residuals of robust regression below: 
 
                  Shapiro-Wilk W test for normal data 
    Variable |    Obs        W          V          z     Prob>z 
-------------+------------------------------------------------- 
          e2 |    610    0.95607     17.686      6.967  0.00000 
 
linktest 
 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     610 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  2,   607) =  269.11 
       Model |  269.618798     2  134.809399           Prob > F      =  0.8321 
    Residual |  304.078055   607  .500952314           R-squared     =  0.4700 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.4682 
       Total |  573.696852   609  .942030956           Root MSE      =  .70778 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 ln_totalrem |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        _hat |   1.457137   .4125032     3.53   0.765     .6470304    2.267244 
      _hatsq |  -.0319951   .0287127    -1.11   0.804    -.0883835    .0243933 
       _cons |  -1.617482   1.482438    -1.09   0.276    -4.528812    1.293847 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of ln_totalrem 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                 F(3, 568) =      1.94 
                  Prob > F =      0.1218 
 
 
 
 
Panel data analysis 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       610 
Group variable (i): id_company                  Number of groups   =       228 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.1514                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.0517                                        avg =       2.7 
       overall = 0.0344                                        max =         4 
 
                                                F(34,348)          =      1.83 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.3158                        Prob > F           =    0.0042 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 ln_totalrem |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Performance |    .033869   .0361178     0.94   0.349    -.0371677    .1049056 
 ln_mktvalue |  -.0085372   .0307939    -0.28   0.782    -.0691028    .0520284 
 ln_leverage |  -.0185374   .0261839    -0.71   0.479     -.070036    .0329613 
   industry2 |  -.2923202   1.737556    -0.17   0.866    -3.709753    3.125113 
   industry3 |  (dropped) 
   industry4 |  (dropped) 
   industry5 |  (dropped) 
   location2 |  (dropped) 
   yr_dummy2 |   .0611343   .0321436     1.90   0.058    -.0020858    .1243545 
   yr_dummy3 |   .0523084   .0352895     1.48   0.139    -.0170992     .121716 
   diversify |  -.0779661   .4210534    -0.19   0.853    -.9060957    .7501636 
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         age |    .007686   .0079852     0.96   0.336    -.0080194    .0233914 
 sqrt_tenure |   .0592913   .0545632     1.09   0.278    -.0480238    .1666065 
     qualify |   .1699933   .1259321     1.35   0.178    -.0776906    .4176772 
sqrt_board~e |   .1734044   .1376503     1.26   0.209    -.0973268    .4441356 
   ceo_dual1 |  -1.025367   .2351856    -4.36   0.000    -1.487931   -.5628028 
 ln_bmeeting |  -.0336366   .0944224    -0.36   0.722     -.219347    .1520739 
 indpt_board |  -.2739887    .372794    -0.73   0.463    -1.007202    .4592241 
 indpt_audit |  -.2644232   .3324147    -0.80   0.427    -.9182178    .3893715 
   indpt_rem |  -.1487155   .3851664    -0.39   0.700    -.9062624    .6088314 
    nexecdir |  -1.156282   .3242596    -3.57   0.000    -1.794037   -.5185271 
  pinterlock |   1.275133   .6569355     1.94   0.053     -.016931    2.567196 
        pold |    .094757   .3948801     0.24   0.810     -.681895    .8714089 
       pbusy |  -.3656619   .2885558    -1.27   0.206    -.9331946    .2018709 
indirects~re |  -.0056338   .0032055    -1.76   0.080    -.0119385    .0006708 
 directshare |  -.0015881   .0079623    -0.20   0.842    -.0172483    .0140721 
ln_blocksh~e |  -.0332611   .0632872    -0.53   0.600    -.1577346    .0912123 
perfXboars~e |   .0982359   .0901171     1.09   0.276    -.0790068    .2754786 
perfXindpt~d |   .3000504   .2072966     1.45   0.149    -.1076614    .7077623 
perfXnexec~r |  -.2623089    .209329    -1.25   0.211    -.6740182    .1494003 
perfXpinte~k |     .66562   .5316229     1.25   0.211    -.3799781    1.711218 
   perfXpold |  -.0688184     .23127    -0.30   0.766    -.5236812    .3860444 
  perfXpbusy |  -.0958916   .1152066    -0.83   0.406    -.3224804    .1306973 
perfXindir~e |   .0020422    .001745     1.17   0.243    -.0013899    .0054744 
perfXdirec~e |   .0017658   .0026579     0.66   0.507    -.0034619    .0069934 
perfXblock~e |    .010381   .0458385     0.23   0.821    -.0797745    .1005364 
perfXceodual |  -.0252224   .0852722    -0.30   0.768    -.1929361    .1424913 
perfXbmeet~g |   .1411779   .0763207     1.85   0.065    -.0089299    .2912857 
       _cons |   8.514004   1.877964     4.53   0.000     4.820416    12.20759 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  .99109617 
     sigma_e |  .29328504 
         rho |  .91948226   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(227, 348) =    14.07            Prob > F = 0.0000 
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Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       610 
Group variable (i): id_company                  Number of groups   =       228 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0728                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.4390                                        avg =       2.7 
       overall = 0.4011                                        max =         4 
 
 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(38)      =    169.42 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 ln_totalrem |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Performance |   .0824677   .0338527     2.44   0.015     .0161176    .1488178 
 ln_mktvalue |    .079759   .0254183     3.14   0.002       .02994    .1295779 
 ln_leverage |   .0122064   .0240621     0.51   0.612    -.0349544    .0593673 
   industry2 |  -.0157233   .1565759    -0.10   0.920    -.3226065    .2911599 
   industry3 |   .1003021   .1730088     0.58   0.562    -.2387889    .4393932 
   industry4 |   .3038024   .2355191     1.29   0.197    -.1578066    .7654114 
   industry5 |   .0881313    .177236     0.50   0.619    -.2592449    .4355074 
   location2 |  -.0043878   .1151222    -0.04   0.970    -.2300233    .2212476 
   yr_dummy2 |   .0544834   .0331199     1.65   0.100    -.0104305    .1193972 
   yr_dummy3 |   .0534115   .0351767     1.52   0.129    -.0155335    .1223566 
   diversify |   .0247762    .030648     0.81   0.419    -.0352928    .0848452 
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         age |   -.006199   .0060601    -1.02   0.306    -.0180765    .0056786 
 sqrt_tenure |   .1299242   .0423875     3.07   0.002     .0468463    .2130022 
     qualify |   .0374626    .092917     0.40   0.687    -.1446514    .2195766 
sqrt_board~e |   .4890748   .1050565     4.66   0.000     .2831679    .6949817 
   ceo_dual1 |  -.1630094   .1409901    -1.16   0.248    -.4393449    .1133261 
 ln_bmeeting |   .0471777   .0887347     0.53   0.595    -.1267391    .2210946 
 indpt_board |  -.2020324   .3147235    -0.64   0.521    -.8188791    .4148142 
 indpt_audit |   .0135201   .2984874     0.05   0.964    -.5715044    .5985447 
   indpt_rem |  -.1235162   .2345447    -0.53   0.598    -.5832154     .336183 
    nexecdir |  -1.648434   .2375316    -6.94   0.000    -2.113987   -1.182881 
  pinterlock |    .884836    .407759     2.17   0.030      .085643    1.684029 
        pold |   .0394245   .2680057     0.15   0.883    -.4858571    .5647061 
       pbusy |   .0056548   .1828346     0.03   0.975    -.3526945    .3640041 
indirects~re |  -.0037594   .0022689    -1.66   0.098    -.0082063    .0006875 
 directshare |   .0036653   .0039676     0.92   0.356    -.0041112    .0114417 
ln_blocksh~e |  -.0401508   .0502821    -0.80   0.425    -.1387019    .0584002 
perfXboars~e |   .1684753   .0848238     1.99   0.047     .0022237    .3347269 
perfXindpt~d |   .2106642    .193337     1.09   0.276    -.1682693    .5895978 
perfXnexec~r |  -.4128292   .1984055    -2.08   0.037    -.8016968   -.0239615 
perfXpinte~k |   .0911416     .38508     0.24   0.813    -.6636014    .8458846 
   perfXpold |   .2044588   .1551186     1.32   0.187    -.0995681    .5084857 
  perfXpbusy |  -.0973694    .108941    -0.89   0.371    -.3108898     .116151 
perfXindir~e |   .0026208   .0016792     1.56   0.119    -.0006703    .0059119 
perfXdirec~e |   .0025237   .0024689     1.02   0.307    -.0023152    .0073626 
perfXblock~e |   .0160944   .0442897     0.36   0.716    -.0707117    .1029005 
perfXceodual |  -.0600312    .083513    -0.72   0.472    -.2237137    .1036512 
perfXbmeet~g |    .147741   .0718825     2.06   0.040     .0068539    .2886281 
       _cons |   5.867963   .6083247     9.65   0.000     4.675669    7.060258 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  .67270004 
     sigma_e |  .29328504 
         rho |  .84027949   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. 
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Hausman test# 
 
 
                 ---- Coefficients ---- 
             |      (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
             |     fixed          .          Difference          S.E. 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Performance |     .033869     .0824677       -.0485987        .0125893 
 ln_mktvalue |   -.0085372      .079759       -.0882962        .0173832 
 ln_leverage |   -.0185374     .0122064       -.0307438        .0103253 
   industry2 |   -.2923202    -.0157233       -.2765969        1.730487 
   yr_dummy2 |    .0611343     .0544834         .006651               . 
   yr_dummy3 |    .0523084     .0534115       -.0011031        .0028194 
   diversify |   -.0779661     .0247762       -.1027422        .4199365 
         age |     .007686     -.006199        .0138849           .0052 
 sqrt_tenure |    .0592913     .1299242       -.0706329        .0343576 
     qualify |    .1699933     .0374626        .1325307         .085002 
sqrt_board~e |    .1734044     .4890748       -.3156704        .0889424 
   ceo_dual1 |   -1.025367    -.1630094       -.8623574        .1882393 
 ln_bmeeting |   -.0336366     .0471777       -.0808143        .0322761 
 indpt_board |   -.2739887    -.2020324       -.0719563        .1998112 
 indpt_audit |   -.2644232     .0135201       -.2779433        .1463038 
   indpt_rem |   -.1487155    -.1235162       -.0251993        .3055191 
    nexecdir |   -1.156282    -1.648434        .4921518         .220733 
  pinterlock |    1.275133      .884836        .3902965        .5150697 
        pold |     .094757     .0394245        .0553324        .2900056 
       pbusy |   -.3656619     .0056548       -.3713167        .2232397 
indirects~re |   -.0056338    -.0037594       -.0018744        .0022644 
 directshare |   -.0015881     .0036653       -.0052534        .0069033 
ln_blocksh~e |   -.0332611    -.0401508        .0068897        .0384315 
perfXboars~e |    .0982359     .1684753       -.0702394        .0304305 
perfXindpt~d |    .3000504     .2106642        .0893862        .0747842 
perfXnexec~r |   -.2623089    -.4128292        .1505202        .0667375 
perfXpinte~k |      .66562     .0911416        .5744784        .3665191 
   perfXpold |   -.0688184     .2044588       -.2732772        .1715344 
  perfXpbusy |   -.0958916    -.0973694        .0014778        .0374757 
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perfXindir~e |    .0020422     .0026208       -.0005786        .0004749 
perfXdirec~e |    .0017658     .0025237       -.0007579        .0009845 
perfXblock~e |     .010381     .0160944       -.0057134        .0118152 
perfXceodual |   -.0252224    -.0600312        .0348088        .0172315 
perfXbmeet~g |    .1411779      .147741       -.0065631        .0256467 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
 
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
 
                 chi2(33) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                          =      108.12 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0000 
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite) 
 
. 
 
 
